权力转移、军事不确定性和战争

IF 0.6 4区社会学 Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2020-09-16 DOI:10.1177/0951629820956304

William Spaniel

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引用次数: 4

摘要

在许多情况下，赞助人希望在增加原武士的军事力量的同时，减少原武士与其敌人之间发生战争的可能性。这些目标是否相容?我表明，当国家面临一类军事分配的不确定性时，答案是肯定的。武器转让通过使强类型和弱类型的行为更加相似来缓解信息问题。这鼓励了不知情的国家提出更安全的要求，从而降低了战争的可能性。因此，在这些条件下，向知情行为人的转移既增加了议价能力，又提高了效率。

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Power transfers, military uncertainty, and war

In many contexts, patrons wish to simultaneously increase a protégé’s military power while reducing the probability of war between that protégé and its enemy. Are these goals compatible? I show that the answer is yes when states face uncertainty over a class of military allotments. Arms transfers mitigate the information problem by making both strong and weak types behave more similarly. This encourages uninformed states to make safer demands, which decreases the probability of war. As a result, transfers to the informed actor both increase bargaining power and enhance efficiency under these conditions.

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来源期刊

Journal of Theoretical Politics POLITICAL SCIENCE-

CiteScore

2.10

自引率

10.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Theoretical Politics is an international journal one of whose principal aims is to foster the development of theory in the study of political processes. It provides a forum for the publication of original papers seeking to make genuinely theoretical contributions to the study of politics. The journal includes rigorous analytical articles on a range of theoretical topics. In particular, it focuses on new theoretical work which is broadly accessible to social scientists and contributes to our understanding of political processes. It also includes original syntheses of recent theoretical developments in diverse fields.