司法反多数主义的多数主义基础

IF 0.6 4区社会学 Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2020-07-01 DOI:10.1177/0951629820927784

J. Rogers, J. Ura

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引用次数: 7

摘要

在多数主义三权分立体制下，司法保护不受欢迎的少数群体不受压迫性立法的影响，这引发了一个难题:为什么法官利用他们的权力保护少数群体并阻碍立法，而立法多数却没有制定歧视性立法来遏制司法权力?我们通过展示对不受欢迎的少数群体的司法保护可能成为多数主义政治的意外副产品来回答这个问题。我们开发了一个模型，其中包括亚历山大·汉密尔顿在《联邦党人文集》第78期中讨论的司法审查的两个方面:对不受欢迎的少数群体的司法保护，反对敌对的大众多数，以及对多数利益的司法保护，反对立法掠夺。正是这些职能之间的制度联系，在一定范围内诱使多数民众站在法官一边反对立法机构，即使这些法官保护的是多数民众想要压迫的少数群体。

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A majoritarian basis for judicial countermajoritarianism

Judicial protection of disfavored minorities against oppressive legislation in majoritarian separation-of-power systems raises a puzzle: Why don’t legislative majorities enacting discriminatory legislation curb judicial power when judges use their power to protect minorities and stymie the legislation? We answer this question by showing that judicial protection of disfavored minorities can emerge as an unintended by-product of majoritarian politics. We develop a model that includes the two aspects of judicial review Alexander Hamilton discusses in The Federalist No. 78: Judicial protection of disfavored minorities against hostile popular majorities, and judicial protection of majority interests against legislative depredation. It is the institutional linkage between these functions that induces popular majorities, within limits, to side with judges against legislatures even when those judges protect minorities that popular majorities want to oppress.

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来源期刊

Journal of Theoretical Politics POLITICAL SCIENCE-

CiteScore

2.10

自引率

10.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Theoretical Politics is an international journal one of whose principal aims is to foster the development of theory in the study of political processes. It provides a forum for the publication of original papers seeking to make genuinely theoretical contributions to the study of politics. The journal includes rigorous analytical articles on a range of theoretical topics. In particular, it focuses on new theoretical work which is broadly accessible to social scientists and contributes to our understanding of political processes. It also includes original syntheses of recent theoretical developments in diverse fields.