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Journal of Theoretical Politics最新文献

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Editors’ introduction 编辑的介绍
IF 1 4区 社会学
Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2020-04-01 DOI: 10.1177/0951629820913120
Torun Dewan, John W. Patty
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引用次数: 0
Parties, agendas, and roll rates 缔约方、议程和滚动率
IF 1 4区 社会学
Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2020-04-01 DOI: 10.1177/0951629819892325
Shawn Patterson, Thomas Schwartz
{"title":"Parties, agendas, and roll rates","authors":"Shawn Patterson, Thomas Schwartz","doi":"10.1177/0951629819892325","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629819892325","url":null,"abstract":"For the US House of Representatives, Cox and McCubbins discover tiny majority-party roll rates and offer them as evidence of majority-party agenda control. However, the observed roll rates are approximately what would result from chance alone or from chance constrained in several natural ways. Besides that, we show that rolls themselves are not evidence of any lapse in partisan agenda control and may even occur as the intended consequence of agenda setting by the majority party. Innovations include a solution to the combinatorial problem of counting all possible rolls, the associated computations, hypothetical examples of strategically advantageous self-induced rolls, and a review of likely real examples of the same.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"32 1","pages":"348 - 359"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629819892325","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43433369","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Military conscription, external security, and income inequality: The missing link 征兵、外部安全和收入不平等：缺失的一环
IF 1 4区 社会学
Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2020-01-29 DOI: 10.1177/0951629819895595
N. Konstantinidis
{"title":"Military conscription, external security, and income inequality: The missing link","authors":"N. Konstantinidis","doi":"10.1177/0951629819895595","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629819895595","url":null,"abstract":"This article seeks to analyze the political economy of military conscription policy and its relationship with a country’s external security environment. National security is modeled as a non-rivalrous and non-excludable public good, whose production technology consists of either centrally conscripted or competitively recruited military labor. Conscription is construed as an implicit discretionary tax on citizens’ labor endowment. Based on this, I propose a simple political economy model of pure public goods provision financed by two policy instruments: a lump-sum income tax and a conscription tax. Constraint optimization of a quasi-linear utility function gives rise to three general classes of preferences: high- and low-skilled citizens will prefer an all-volunteer army, albeit of different size, whereas medium-skilled citizens will favor positive levels of conscription. These derived preferences allow me to tease out an explicit relationship between military manpower procurement policy, a country’s level of external threat, and its pre-tax income inequality levels. One of my key findings is that more egalitarian countries are more likely to use conscription as a military manpower procurement mechanism.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"32 1","pages":"312 - 347"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629819895595","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44492779","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Subpoena power and informational lobbying 传讯权和信息游说
IF 1 4区 社会学
Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2020-01-27 DOI: 10.1177/0951629819892339
Arnaud Dellis, Mandar P. Oak
{"title":"Subpoena power and informational lobbying","authors":"Arnaud Dellis, Mandar P. Oak","doi":"10.1177/0951629819892339","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629819892339","url":null,"abstract":"This article studies the role of subpoena power in enabling policymakers to make better-informed decisions. In particular, we take into account the effect of subpoena power on the information voluntarily supplied by interest groups as well as the information obtained by the policymaker via the subpoena process. To this end, we develop a model of informational lobbying in which interest groups seek access to the policymaker in order to provide him verifiable evidence about the desirability of implementing reforms they care about. The policymaker is access-constrained, that is, he lacks time/resources to scrutinize the evidence owned by all interest groups. The policymaker may also be agenda-constrained, that is, he may lack time/resources to reform all issues. We find that if a policymaker is agenda-constrained, then he is better off by having subpoena power. On the other hand, if a policymaker is not agenda-constrained, he can be worse off by having subpoena power. The key insight behind these findings is that subpoena power, while it increases the policymaker’s ability to acquire information from interest groups, it also alters the amount of information they voluntarily provide via lobbying, and that the net effect differs depending on whether or not the policymaker is agenda-constrained.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"32 1","pages":"188 - 234"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629819892339","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44110475","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Legislative bargaining and partisan delegation 立法谈判和党派授权
IF 1 4区 社会学
Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2020-01-21 DOI: 10.1177/0951629819895594
T. Choate, J. Weymark, Alan E. Wiseman
{"title":"Legislative bargaining and partisan delegation","authors":"T. Choate, J. Weymark, Alan E. Wiseman","doi":"10.1177/0951629819895594","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629819895594","url":null,"abstract":"We use an extension of the Baron–Ferejohn model of legislative bargaining in which there are three legislators, two of whom have partisan ties, to analyze the division of a fixed political resource in a majoritarian legislature. A legislator’s preferences depend on the shares that he and any copartisan receive. We ask whether there are circumstances under which a partisan legislator is willing to delegate proposal-making authority to a party leader so as to take advantage of the special proposal rights accorded by the legislature to this office rather than retaining equal-recognition proposal rights for himself. We show that this is the case only if (i) the leader’s proposal recognition probability is larger than the probability that one of the partisans is recognized when the legislators act independently, (ii) the value of partisan affiliation is sufficiently high, and (iii) the legislators are sufficiently impatient. We explore the relevance of these results to ongoing debates regarding the role and effect of parties and party leaders in Congress.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"32 1","pages":"289 - 311"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629819895594","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49351419","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
War and diplomacy on the world stage: Crisis bargaining before third parties 世界舞台上的战争与外交:在第三方面前的危机谈判
IF 1 4区 社会学
Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2020-01-13 DOI: 10.1177/0951629819893025
S. Wolford
{"title":"War and diplomacy on the world stage: Crisis bargaining before third parties","authors":"S. Wolford","doi":"10.1177/0951629819893025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629819893025","url":null,"abstract":"I analyze a three-actor model of crisis bargaining with two key features. First, diplomatic opposition raises the costs of war, but an informed state can avoid it by conveying restraint to a supporter. Second, the means of conveying restraint may fail to convince an enemy tempted to risk war of the informed state’s willingness to fight. I derive three results. First, war is more likely when third parties believe the informed state to be generally restrained. Second, the threat of opposition that modestly affects the costs of war discourages risky bluffing. Third, the threat of opposition that substantially raises the costs of war can lead states to mask a true willingness to fight, securing diplomatic support at the price of an elevated risk of war despite the availability of a credible signal. Building diplomatic coalitions to prevent balancing can simultaneously make credible communication that averts war both easy and unattractive.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"32 1","pages":"235 - 261"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629819893025","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44664255","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Delegation and political turnover 授权和政治变动
IF 1 4区 社会学
Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2020-01-13 DOI: 10.1177/0951629819895596
Greg Sasso
{"title":"Delegation and political turnover","authors":"Greg Sasso","doi":"10.1177/0951629819895596","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629819895596","url":null,"abstract":"We study a two-period delegation model with an uncertain future principal. In the first period, an incumbent principal decides whether to delegate policy-making authority to an agent or make policy herself. Before the second period, there is an election, and another principal with different preferences may take power. The main result is that the incumbent can exploit the uncertainty about the future principal to extract policy surplus from the agent. The agent’s uncertainty about the future principal pushes him to implement a policy that both principals accept. The surplus from this compromise policy makes the incumbent better off than she would be without the possibility of turnover. We also find that when costs are low, policy stability can increase as elections become more competitive, as the agent has more incentive to implement a compromise policy. We then allow the incumbent to appoint the agent. We show that as the incumbent becomes more likely to retain office, she prefers more policy conflict with the agent.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"32 1","pages":"262 - 288"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629819895596","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47808281","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Party, candidate, and voter incentives under free list proportional representation 自由名单比例代表制下的政党、候选人和选民激励
IF 1 4区 社会学
Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2020-01-01 DOI: 10.1177/0951629819893023
Thomas Mustillo, John Polga-Hecimovich
{"title":"Party, candidate, and voter incentives under free list proportional representation","authors":"Thomas Mustillo, John Polga-Hecimovich","doi":"10.1177/0951629819893023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629819893023","url":null,"abstract":"Under free list proportional representation voters can: (a) cast preference votes for candidates; (b) cast multiple preferences; and (c) distribute preferences across multiple lists. Alternatively, they can cast a list vote. Our theory shows that office-seeking candidates face incentives to pursue the personal vote, while non-candidate partisans seek the party vote. Voters are in the cross-currents of these forces. Also, since preference voting is so cognitively and informationally demanding, voters have incentives to use shortcuts, especially (a) list voting; (b) casting fewer than their allotment of preferences; and (c) preference voting for well-known or highly placed candidates. We find support for our expectations using linear mixed-effects regression of the proportion of preference votes in candidate-level electoral data from Ecuador. Personal voting is more prevalent as magnitude increases, where the local party is strong, and for candidates that are incumbents, male, high on the list, and in the position of first loser.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"32 1","pages":"143 - 167"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629819893023","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43367422","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
Public goods equilibria under closed- and open-list proportional representation 封闭和开放列表比例代表下的公共产品均衡
IF 1 4区 社会学
Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2020-01-01 DOI: 10.1177/0951629819895808
D. Kselman
{"title":"Public goods equilibria under closed- and open-list proportional representation","authors":"D. Kselman","doi":"10.1177/0951629819895808","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629819895808","url":null,"abstract":"Building on past research, this paper develops a game theoretic model to study the provision of local public goods under closed- and open-list proportional representation (CLPR and OLPR). The core results suggest that, all thing equal, legislators will provide voters with higher levels of public goods in OLPR than in CLPR systems. However, two intervening variables condition the institutional comparison: the district magnitude and electoral volatility. Firstly, public goods effort increases as district magnitude increases in OLPR systems, while it tends to decrease as magnitude increases in CLPR systems. Indeed, when district magnitude is 2 , the two systems are often indistinguishable. Furthermore, the distinction between OLPR and CLPR weakens when electoral volatility is low, such that neither system generates high levels of public goods effort. In addition to their relevance for political economy, the paper’s results provide game theoretic foundations for a series of theoretical conjectures found in Carey and Shugart’s (1995) seminal study of electoral institutions and legislative personalism (Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: A rank-ordering of electoral formulas. Electoral Studies 1995; 14(4): 417–439).","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"32 1","pages":"112 - 142"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629819895808","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49315989","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 10
Who wins preference votes? An analysis of party loyalty, ideology, and accountability to voters 谁赢得了优先投票?对政党忠诚、意识形态和对选民责任的分析
IF 1 4区 社会学
Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2020-01-01 DOI: 10.1177/0951629819893028
Olle Folke, Johanna Rickne
{"title":"Who wins preference votes? An analysis of party loyalty, ideology, and accountability to voters","authors":"Olle Folke, Johanna Rickne","doi":"10.1177/0951629819893028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629819893028","url":null,"abstract":"We study the distribution of preference votes across politicians with different behaviors and attitudes. There are two main findings. First, preference votes are concentrated to politicians who are more active in communicating their policy proposals and policy priorities. This suggests that preference voting may incentivize more transparency and communication among politicians, and, hence, be positive for accountability. Second, preference votes are concentrated to politicians who are more—not less—loyal to the party in their voting decisions, and to politicians who’s ideological and policy positions are mainstream—rather than extreme—compared to their party colleagues. Together with the first finding, this suggests that preference voting can strengthen the bond of accountability between voters and politicians without undercutting parties’ ideological cohesion.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"32 1","pages":"11 - 35"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629819893028","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44449118","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 16
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