Journal of Theoretical Politics最新文献_第8页

The personal vote and party cohesion: Modeling the effects of electoral rules on intraparty politics 个人投票与政党凝聚力：选举规则对党内政治影响的建模

IF 1 4区社会学

Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2020-01-01 DOI: 10.1177/0951629819892336

Royce Carroll, M. Nalepa

{"title":"The personal vote and party cohesion: Modeling the effects of electoral rules on intraparty politics","authors":"Royce Carroll, M. Nalepa","doi":"10.1177/0951629819892336","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629819892336","url":null,"abstract":"Conventional wisdom suggests that parties in candidate-centered electoral systems should be associated with less cohesive policy preferences among legislators. We model the incentives of party leaders to achieve voting unity accounting for the costs of discipline, showing that candidate-centered systems have the counterintuitive effect of promoting party agreement on policies and preference cohesion. These implications for cohesion derive from the degree of control over list rank held by leaders under open lists (open-list proportional representation, OLPR) and closed lists (closed-list proportional representation, CLPR). Because discipline is costlier in OLPR, owing to leaders’ lack of control over list rank, leaders seeking voting unity propose policies that promote agreement between members and leadership. Under CLPR, however, leaders can more easily achieve voting unity by relying on discipline and therefore lack incentives to promote internal agreement. We then extend the model to allow the party leader to replace members, showing that preference cohesion itself is greater under OLPR. Further, our baseline results hold when allowing legislative behavior to affect vote share and when accounting for candidates’ valence qualities. We interpret our results to suggest that candidate-centered systems result in stronger incentives for developing programmatic parties, compared with party-centered systems.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"32 1","pages":"36 - 69"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629819892336","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48644847","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 21

Revisiting electoral personalism 重新审视选举个人化

IF 1 4区社会学

Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2020-01-01 DOI: 10.1177/0951629819898365

J. Cheibub, M. Nalepa

引用次数: 1

Preference vote and intra-party competition in open list PR systems 公开名单公关制度中的偏好投票与党内竞争

IF 1 4区社会学

Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2020-01-01 DOI: 10.1177/0951629819893024

J. Cheibub, Gisela Sin

{"title":"Preference vote and intra-party competition in open list PR systems","authors":"J. Cheibub, Gisela Sin","doi":"10.1177/0951629819893024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629819893024","url":null,"abstract":"Open list proportional representation (PR) systems require that candidates seek personal votes in order to be successful. This feature of the system is considered to lead to intense competition among co-partisans and, ultimately, to weak electoral and legislative parties, narrow public policies, localism, clientelism, and corruption. We examine the distribution of personal votes among candidates from the same party for seven elections to the Brazilian national chamber of deputies (1990–2014). These elections are widely seen as hyper-competitive, particularly among candidates from the same list. Yet, the patterns in the data are not compatible with such a view. We find that the level of overall competition is considerably lower than the absolute number of parties and candidates competing would suggest. More significantly, we find that the number of viable candidates within party lists is limited and that their votes are distributed in such a way that indicates a contained competition among co-partisans during the election. These findings add to recent work that builds a more nuanced view of ballot structure, competition, and personalism.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"32 1","pages":"70 - 95"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629819893024","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42148846","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 30

Challenging the wisdom on preferential proportional representation 挑战优先比例代表制的智慧

IF 1 4区社会学

Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2020-01-01 DOI: 10.1177/0951629819892334

Carol Mershon

引用次数: 12

Why differentiated integration is such a common practice in Europe: A rational explanation 为什么差别化一体化在欧洲如此普遍:一个理性的解释

IF 1 4区社会学

Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2019-10-01 DOI: 10.1177/0951629819875522

K. Holzinger, J. Tosun

引用次数: 15

Editor’s Introduction to JTP issue 31.4 JTP第31.4期编辑介绍

IF 1 4区社会学

Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2019-10-01 DOI: 10.1177/0951629819886225

引用次数: 0

The design of enforcement: Collective action and the enforcement of international law 执行的设计：集体行动与国际法的执行

IF 1 4区社会学

Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2019-09-26 DOI: 10.1177/0951629819875514

Leslie Johns

引用次数: 1

The design of enforcement: Collective action and the enforcement of international law: 执行的设计：集体行动和国际法的执行：

IF 1 4区社会学

Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2019-09-26 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2956515

Leslie Johns

引用次数: 9

Plausible deniability 似是而非的推诿

IF 1 4区社会学

Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2019-09-23 DOI: 10.1177/0951629819875518

Joshua A Strayhorn

引用次数: 1

Persuading policy-makers 说服决策者

IF 1 4区社会学

Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2019-09-20 DOI: 10.1177/0951629819875512

C. Salas

{"title":"Persuading policy-makers","authors":"C. Salas","doi":"10.1177/0951629819875512","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629819875512","url":null,"abstract":"Interest groups persuade policy-makers by publicly providing information about policies—for example, through commissioning scientific studies or piloting programs—or about constituents’ views—for example, through opinion polls or organizing manifestations. By understanding these public lobbying activities as public signals whose informational content can be strategically manipulated, this paper studies the strategic use of these tools in order to persuade a policy-maker. A game between a policy-oriented interest group who can design a public signal and a self-interested executive who can implement a policy is used to analyze the equilibrium public signal and policy, the underlying persuasion mechanism, and the consequences for voters. This paper finds that, even when an interest group always wants the same policy regardless of the state of the world, voters can sometimes benefit from the group’s activity. Furthermore, voters may be best served by a worse (less able or more cynical) policy-maker. This is because a-priori a worse policy-maker will tend to herd on the prior relatively more than a better policy-maker; this will force interest groups to release greater amounts of information in order to change the policy-maker’s mind, which increases the probability that the voters’ best policy is implemented. Ideologically biased policy-makers are not totally undesirable either, for they induce similar incentives to interest groups of opposite ideology.","PeriodicalId":51606,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical Politics","volume":"31 1","pages":"507 - 542"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0951629819875512","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48048260","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 4