International Interactions最新文献

{"title":"Local competitive authoritarianism and post-conflict violence. An analysis of the assassination of social leaders in Colombia","authors":"Juan Albarracín, Juan Pablo Milanese, I. H. Valencia, Jonas Wolff","doi":"10.1080/03050629.2023.2142218","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2023.2142218","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The threat of continued violence is a primary concern in post-conflict societies. This article contributes to the literature on post-conflict violence by analyzing a specific phenomenon that has characterized Colombia since the signing of the 2016 peace agreement: the assassination of social leaders. Building on explanations that emphasize state weakness, illicit economies, and the role of illegal armed actors, we argue that the assassination of social leaders also responds to efforts by local elites to sustain local competitive authoritarian orders in the face of bottom-up threats to their power by sociopolitical actors mobilized around the local implementation of the peace agreement. Using a cross-sectional dataset of Colombian municipalities, we find that assassinations of social leaders are more likely and more frequent in municipalities with intermediate levels of party fragmentation and low levels of voter turnout—that is, in municipalities with restricted electoral competition. Furthermore, a higher share of votes for leftist parties, which signals the presence of challengers to local elites, correlates with a higher probability and a higher number of assassinations. Overall, this article suggests that the nature of local political orders constitutes a key dimension shaping the micro-dynamics of violence and repression in post-conflict contexts. La amenaza de la continuación de la violencia es una de las principales preocupaciones en las sociedades en posconflicto. Este artículo contribuye a la literatura sobre la violencia en el posconflicto analizando un fenómeno específico que ha caracterizado a Colombia desde la firma del acuerdo de paz de 2016: el asesinato de líderes sociales. Partiendo de las explicaciones que enfatizan la debilidad del Estado, las economías ilícitas y el papel de los actores armados ilegales, argumentamos que el asesinato de líderes sociales también responde a los esfuerzos de las élites locales para sostener los órdenes autoritarios competitivos locales frente a las amenazas a su poder por parte de los actores sociopolíticos movilizados en torno a la implementación local del acuerdo de paz. Utilizando un conjunto de datos de municipios colombianos, observamos que los asesinatos de líderes sociales son más probables y más frecuentes en municipios con niveles intermedios de fragmentación partidista y bajos niveles de participación electoral, es decir, en municipios con competencia electoral restringida. Además, se correlaciona una mayor proporción de votos a los partidos de izquierda, un indicador de la presencia de contendientes a las élites locales, con una mayor probabilidad de que ocurran asesinatos, así como un mayor número de casos. Como conclusión, este artículo sugiere que la naturaleza de los órdenes políticos locales constituye una dimensión clave que determina las microdinámicas de la violencia y la represión en contextos de posconflicto. Le risque de la poursuite des violences est une préoccupat","PeriodicalId":51513,"journal":{"name":"International Interactions","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42231972","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Reputation or interaction: What determines cooperation on economic sanctions?","authors":"Dawid Walentek","doi":"10.1080/03050629.2023.2133113","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2023.2133113","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article studies cooperation on multilateral economic sanctions. Despite low effectiveness and sanction-busting, multilateral economic sanctions are a popular tool of foreign policy. We explore an instrumental approach to sanctions and develop a game theory framework where sender states face a collective action problem when coordinating multilateral coercion. We indicate that cooperation can be achieved through repeated interactions and reputation. We test empirically the two mechanisms with the TIES data on economic sanctions and adherence to past sanction regimes and the Correlates of War data on membership in International Organizations. Our results indicate that reputation is a strong predictor of cooperation on multilateral economic coercion. The effect of repeated interaction appears conditional on reputation; states with poor reputation positively mediate its effect through repeated interaction. Este artículo analiza la cooperación en materia de sanciones económicas multilaterales. A pesar de la escasa eficacia y de la violación de las sanciones, las sanciones económicas multilaterales son una herramienta popular de la política exterior. Exploramos un enfoque decisivo de las sanciones y desarrollamos un marco de teoría del juego en el que los Estados de origen se enfrentan a un problema de acción colectiva cuando coordinan la coerción multilateral. Indicamos que la cooperación puede lograrse mediante repetidas interacciones y mediante la reputación. Comprobamos empíricamente los dos mecanismos con los datos sobre la amenaza y la imposición de sanciones económicas (TIES, por su sigla en inglés), así como la adhesión a regímenes sancionadores anteriores y los datos del proyecto Correlates of War sobre la pertenencia a organizaciones internacionales. Nuestros resultados indican que la reputación es un fuerte predictor de la cooperación en materia de coerción económica multilateral. El efecto de la interacción repetida se ve condicionado por la reputación; los Estados con mala reputación median positivamente su efecto a través de la interacción repetida. Le présent article s’intéresse à la coopération dans le cadre de sanctions économiques multilatérales. Malgré qu’elles soient peu efficaces et souvent violées, les sanctions économiques multilatérales restent un outil largement utilisé en politique étrangère. Nous nous intéressons à l’approche instrumentale des sanctions et développons un cadre de théorie des jeux dans lequel les États exportateurs sont confrontés au problème de l’action collective lors de la coordination de coercition multilatérale. Selon nous, la coopération est possible au moyen d’interactions répétées et grâce à la réputation. Nous testons empiriquement ces deux mécanismes à l’aide des données TIES sur les sanctions économiques et le respect des régimes de sanctions imposés par le passé, mais aussi des données du projet Correlates of War sur l’adhésion aux organisations internationales. Nos résultats indiquent","PeriodicalId":51513,"journal":{"name":"International Interactions","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42654534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"International Interactions best paper award 2022","authors":"Jeffrey Pickering","doi":"10.1080/03050629.2022.2141842","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2022.2141842","url":null,"abstract":"A committee consisting of three editorial board members selected Aydin and Emrence’s paper from full articles published in 2021. We thank Courtenay Conrad (chair) Bel en Gonz alez, and Clayton Webb for their service on the committee. Their thorough work took a substantial amount of time and effort, and we are appreciative. The committee shared why they chose Aydin and Emrence’s outstanding paper:","PeriodicalId":51513,"journal":{"name":"International Interactions","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45959085","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Estimating ideal points from UN General Assembly sponsorship data","authors":"Rafael Mesquita, Rodrigo Martins, Pedro Seabra","doi":"10.1080/03050629.2022.2115038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2022.2115038","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) represents a microcosm of global politics that offers a valuable snapshot of interstate relations and state preferences. In this context, roll-call votes and measures of voting affinity often receive the bulk of scholarly attention. However, even though techniques such as ideal point estimation have grown more sophisticated over time when applied to voting data, they remain grounded by an original selection bias that discards 2/3 of the UNGA yield. This share of disregarded output can prove highly informative if drafting and sponsorship procedures receive a closer look instead. This research note applies ideal point estimation to UNGA sponsorship data for the first time for every member from 2009 to 2019. It advances a cutting-edge approach to better estimate state preferences over a contested policy space, while correcting for the narrow focus of previous UNGA analyses on voting data. The results detect an underlying issue space that bears external validity with the inclination of states toward multilateralism. La Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas (AGNU) representa un microcosmos da la política global que ofrece una importante panorámica de las relaciones interestatales y las preferencias de los Estados. En este contexto, las votaciones nominales y las medidas de afinidad de voto suelen recibir la mayor parte de la atención por parte de los investigadores. Sin embargo, aunque las técnicas como la estimación de puntos ideales (“ideal point estimation”) se han vuelto más sofisticadas con el tiempo cuando se aplican a los datos de las votaciones, siguen basándose en un sesgo de selección original que descarta 2/3 de lo que produce la AGNU. Esta proporción de lo producido que no se tiene en cuenta puede resultar muy informativa si, en cambio, se examinan más detenidamente los procedimientos de redacción y patrocinio. Esta nota de investigación aplica por primera vez la estimación de puntos ideales a los datos de patrocinio de la AGNU para cada miembro desde 2009 hasta 2019. El artículo emplea una de las herramientas más recientes para estimar mejor las preferencias de los Estados en un espacio de disputa política, al tiempo que corrige el enfoque limitado de análisis anteriores de la AGNU sobre los datos de las votaciones. Los resultados detectan una dimensión política subyacente que tiene validez externa con la inclinación de los Estados hacia el multilateralismo. L’Assemblée générale des Nations unies (AGNU) constitue un microcosme de la politique internationale, et offre un aperçu éloquent des relations interétatiques et des préférences des différentes nations. Dans ce contexte, les travaux de recherche se concentrent souvent sur les votes par appel nominal et l’analyse des affinités politiques lors des votes. Cependant, bien que les méthodes telles que l’estimation des points idéaux (« ideal point estimation ») aient gagné en précision avec le temps lorsqu’appliquées aux votes, elles deme","PeriodicalId":51513,"journal":{"name":"International Interactions","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49229165","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Diffusion of protests in the Arab Spring","authors":"C. Magee, T. G. Massoud","doi":"10.1080/03050629.2022.2115039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2022.2115039","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper examines how protests spread across countries in the 2011 Arab Spring. Based on the diffusion literature, we form hypotheses about the factors that influence the transmission of protests across borders. To test the hypotheses, we use an events data set measuring media reports of protests, government reforms, and acts of repression on a daily basis by country. We show that the strength of the protest movement in one country is significantly affected by protest activities in other countries over the previous 1 or 2 weeks and that protests were more likely to spread between countries that had high levels of bilateral trade. When we examine periods longer than 2 weeks, we find that protests spread across borders only when they were successful in pressuring Arab governments into enacting reforms and when the protests did not lead to government reprisals. In all our models, government repression in one country significantly stifled protests in other countries. Each country was thus significantly affected by the choices that governments in other Arab League nations made, and this interdependence meant that governments had incentives to cooperate with each other in their responses to the Arab Spring protests. Este artículo analiza cómo se extendieron las protestas a través de distintos países durante la Primavera Árabe de 2011. Basándonos en la literatura sobre difusión, formulamos hipótesis sobre los factores que influyen en la transmisión de las protestas a través de fronteras. Para comprobar nuestras hipótesis, utilizamos un conjunto de datos de eventos que miden la información de los medios de comunicación sobre las protestas, las reformas gubernamentales y los actos de represión a diario por país. Demostramos que la fuerza del movimiento de protesta en un país se ve significativamente afectada por las actividades de protesta en otros países durante la semana o las dos semanas anteriores y que las protestas eran más propensas a extenderse entre los países que tenían altos niveles de comercio bilateral. Cuando examinamos periodos superiores a dos semanas, comprobamos que las protestas se extienden a través de las fronteras solo cuando estas consiguen presionar a los gobiernos árabes para que promulguen reformas y cuando las protestas no provocan represalias por parte del gobierno. En todos nuestros modelos, la represión gubernamental en un país frenó significativamente las protestas en otros países. Por lo tanto, cada país se vio significativamente afectado por las decisiones que tomaron los gobiernos de otras naciones de la Liga Árabe, y esta interdependencia significó que los gobiernos tenían incentivos para cooperar entre sí en sus respuestas a las protestas de la Primavera Árabe. Le présent article analyse la manière dont les protestations se sont propagées à travers les pays lors du Printemps arabe de 2011. Sur la base de la documentation diffusée, nous émettons des hypothèses sur les facteurs ayant influencé la transmission d","PeriodicalId":51513,"journal":{"name":"International Interactions","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41990353","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Sexual violence along ethnic lines? Revisiting rebel-civilian ethnic ties and wartime sexual violence","authors":"Herman Wieselgren","doi":"10.1080/03050629.2022.2115037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2022.2115037","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Previous research suggests that wartime sexual violence by rebel groups should generally be committed between rather than within ethnic groups. Since rebels can mobilize through and draw support from coethnic civilian networks, they should be less prone to commit sexual violence against their ethnic brethren. Moreover, ethnic divisions between groups are argued to spur inter-ethnic sexual violence as a strategy of war. Yet, much remains to be tested empirically. A major hindrance has been the lack of data on sexual violence that captures the ethnic identities of victims. This issue is circumvented by geocoding occurrences of sexual violence from the SVAC dataset and intersecting these with geographic patterns of ethnic settlement. Interestingly, the results show no indication of restraint in coethnic areas. They also indicate that mixed areas with both coethnic and non-coethnic civilians are more likely to experience sexual violence than entirely non-coethnic areas. Investigaciones anteriores sugieren que la violencia sexual en tiempos de guerra por parte de grupos rebeldes generalmente debería cometerse entre grupos étnicos y no dentro de ellos. Dado que los rebeldes pueden movilizarse a través de redes civiles coétnicas y obtener el apoyo de estas, deberían ser menos propensos a cometer actos de violencia sexual contra sus hermanos étnicos. Además, se argumenta que las divisiones étnicas entre grupos estimulan la violencia sexual interétnica como estrategia de guerra. Sin embargo, aún queda mucho por comprobar empíricamente. La falta de datos sobre la violencia sexual que capten las identidades étnicas de las víctimas ha sido un obstáculo importante. Este problema se evita mediante la geocodificación de los casos de violencia sexual del conjunto de datos sobre la violencia sexual en los conflictos armados y mediante su intersección con los patrones geográficos de asentamiento étnico. Curiosamente, los resultados no muestran ningún indicio de moderación en las zonas coétnicas. También indican que las zonas mixtas con civiles coétnicos y no coétnicos tienen más probabilidades de sufrir violencia sexual que las zonas totalmente no coétnicas. Une recherche antérieure laisse à penser que les violences sexuelles perpétrées en temps de guerre par des groupes rebelles devraient généralement être commises entre groupes ethniques plutôt qu’au sein d’un même groupe ethnique. Les rebelles, pouvant se mobiliser grâce aux réseaux civils de leur ethnie et obtenir le soutien de ces derniers, devraient être moins enclins à commettre des violences sexuelles à l’encontre de leurs frères ethniques. De plus, on estime que les divisions ethniques entre les groupes stimulent les violences sexuelles entre les ethnies en tant que stratégie militaire. Toutefois, beaucoup reste à tester empiriquement. L’absence de données sur les violences sexuelles enregistrant l’identité ethnique des victimes constituait un obstacle majeur. Le géocodage des occurrences de viol","PeriodicalId":51513,"journal":{"name":"International Interactions","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47572161","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Is terrorism deadlier in democracies?","authors":"Yufan Yang, Joshua Tschantret, C. Schmidt","doi":"10.1080/03050629.2022.2111419","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2022.2111419","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A long literature examines the relationship between terrorism and democracy. However, little research examines the lethality of terrorist attacks across regime type. This article theorizes the terrorism that democracies do experience will be less deadly. Democracy increases the opportunity for nonstate actors to use terrorism to attract attention to their causes, which we argue also mitigates the need to carry out deadly attacks. Using cross-national data on domestic terrorist attacks committed between 1970 and 2013, a multilevel statistical analysis demonstrates that terrorist attacks in democracies are less lethal. A time-series cross-sectional analysis further reveals that consolidated democracies and harsh authoritarian regimes experience few deaths from terrorism. While democracies experience high volumes of nonlethal terrorism, strong autocracies experience low amounts of deadly terrorism. Thus, there is strong evidence that—in one important sense—democracies are safer from terrorism. Existe una extensa literatura que examina la relación entre el terrorismo y la democracia. Sin embargo, son pocos los estudios que examinan la letalidad de los atentados terroristas según el tipo de régimen. Este artículo sostiene que el terrorismo que registran las democracias será menos mortífero. La democracia aumenta la oportunidad de que los actores no estatales utilicen el terrorismo para atraer la atención hacia sus causas, lo que, según argumentamos, también mitiga la necesidad de llevar a cabo ataques mortales. Utilizando datos transnacionales sobre ataques terroristas nacionales cometidos entre 1970 y 2013, un análisis estadístico multinivel demuestra que los ataques terroristas en las democracias son menos mortales. Un análisis transversal de series cronológicas revela además que las democracias consolidadas y los regímenes autoritarios duros registran pocas muertes por terrorismo. Mientras las democracias registran grandes volúmenes de terrorismo no letal, las autocracias fuertes registran bajas cantidades de terrorismo mortal. Por lo tanto, hay pruebas sólidas de que, en un sentido importante, las democracias son más seguras frente al terrorismo. Si une vaste littérature analyse les relations entre terrorisme et démocratie, peu de travaux se sont penchés sur la létalité des attaques terroristes selon le type de régime. Cet article émet l’hypothèse que le terrorisme qui frappe les démocraties est moins meurtrier. En effet, dans la mesure où le régime démocratique augmente les possibilités, pour les acteurs non étatiques, de recourir au terrorisme pour attirer l’attention sur les causes qu’ils défendent, il limite également la nécessité de perpétrer des attaques meurtrières. S’appuyant sur des données transnationales portant sur les attaques terroristes intérieures entre 1970 et 2013, une analyse statistique multiniveau démontre que les attaques terroristes sont moins létales dans les démocraties. Par ailleurs, une analyse transverse et tem","PeriodicalId":51513,"journal":{"name":"International Interactions","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48106458","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"How women promote peace: Gender composition, duration, and frames in conflict resolution","authors":"Vivian P Ta-Johnson, Eric Keels, A. Bayram","doi":"10.1080/03050629.2022.2106480","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2022.2106480","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Research shows that the inclusion of women in negotiations and conflict resolution efforts contributes to peaceful solutions to disputes and armed conflict. Yet we know little about how women contribute to peacebuilding. What, specifically, are women doing to help produce more peaceful outcomes? We present evidence from an international bargaining experiment showing that women contribute to peace by seeking more equitable and symmetrical solutions, even if these provide lower material payoffs. Critically, however, women are willing to give up on asymmetric advantage only when they negotiate with other women. The gender composition of negotiation dyads also significantly influences the duration of negotiations. Statistical analysis of historical territorial disputes probes the external validity of these results, offering suggestive complementary evidence. The main policy implication of our findings is that bilateral disputes will be settled more efficiently and equitably when both sides are represented by women. Our findings should encourage scholars to develop dyadic, not monadic, models of how gender affects international negotiations. La investigación demuestra que la inclusión de las mujeres en las negociaciones y en los esfuerzos de resolución de conflictos contribuye a conseguir soluciones pacíficas a las disputas y los conflictos armados. Sin embargo, sabemos poco sobre cómo contribuyen las mujeres a la construcción de la paz. ¿Qué hacen en concreto las mujeres para ayudar a conseguir resultados más pacíficos? Presentamos pruebas de un experimento de negociación internacional que demuestran que las mujeres contribuyen a la paz al buscar soluciones más equitativas y simétricas, aunque estas proporcionen menores beneficios materiales. No obstante, las mujeres están dispuestas a renunciar a la ventaja asimétrica solo cuando negocian con otras mujeres. La composición de género de las díadas de negociación también influye de modo considerable en la duración de las negociaciones. El análisis estadístico de las disputas territoriales históricas examina la validez externa de estos resultados, ofreciendo pruebas complementarias sugerentes. La principal implicación política de nuestras conclusiones es que las disputas bilaterales se resolverán de forma más eficaz y equitativa cuando ambas partes estén representadas por mujeres. Nuestras conclusiones deberían animar a los investigadores a desarrollar modelos diádicos, no monádicos, sobre cómo el género afecta a las negociaciones internacionales. La recherche a démontré que l’inclusion de femmes dans les processus de négociations et les initiatives de résolution des conflits contribue à déboucher sur des solutions pacifiques aux désaccords et aux conflits armés. Pourtant, nous disposons de peu d’informations sur la manière dont les femmes participent au maintien de la paix. Que font précisément les femmes pour produire des résultats davantage orientés vers une résolution pacifique? Nous nous a","PeriodicalId":51513,"journal":{"name":"International Interactions","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41266768","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"When the levee breaks: A forecasting model of violent and nonviolent dissent","authors":"Jonathan Pinckney, Babak Rezaee Daryakenari","doi":"10.1080/03050629.2022.2090933","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2022.2090933","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Forecasting major political conflicts is a long-time interest in conflict research. However, the literature thus far has focused almost exclusively on armed conflicts such as civil wars. Attempts to forecast primarily unarmed conflicts have yet to identify a model able to forecast such uprisings with a high degree of accuracy. This thorny forecasting problem may in part be due to the literature’s heavy focus on parametric forecasting methods and relatively rare testing and comparison of a wide range of forecasting algorithms. This paper addresses these gaps in the literature by developing the first unified forecasting model of both major armed and unarmed conflicts at the country-year level based on extensive training, cross-validation, and comparison of eight machine learning algorithms and five forecasting ensembles. We draw on two types of data: slow-moving structural factors such as geography and levels of economic development and short-term political dynamics captured by events data trends, to inform our forecasting models. This approach significantly improves predictive power for both armed and unarmed conflict in comparison to commonly used methods in the literature and suggests that there is significant room for improving forecasts of major political conflicts. However, our algorithms still forecast armed conflict significantly better than unarmed conflict, suggesting the need for continued theory development to inform future forecasting efforts in this area. El poder predecir los grandes conflictos políticos es un tema que interesa desde hace tiempo dentro del campo de la investigación de conflictos. Sin embargo, hasta ahora, la literatura especializada se ha centrado casi exclusivamente en los conflictos armados, como, por ejemplo, las guerras civiles. Los intentos de predecir conflictos, principalmente no armados, aún no han podido identificar un modelo capaz de pronosticar estos levantamientos con un alto grado de precisión. Este azaroso problema para realizar predicciones puede deberse, en parte, a que la literatura se centra mucho en los métodos predictivos paramétricos y a que las pruebas y comparaciones de una amplia gama de algoritmos de predicción son relativamente escasas. Este artículo aborda estas lagunas en la literatura desarrollando el primer modelo unificado de predicción, tanto de los grandes conflictos armados como de los no armados a nivel de país-año, basado en formación intensiva, validación cruzada y en la comparación de ocho algoritmos de aprendizaje automático y cinco conjuntos predictivos. Recurrimos a dos tipos de datos: factores estructurales de evolución lenta, como la geografía y los niveles de desarrollo económico, así como la dinámica política a corto plazo plasmada en las tendencias registradas en los datos de los acontecimientos, para fundamentar nuestros modelos de predicción. Este enfoque mejora significativamente el poder de predicción, tanto para los conflictos armados como para los no armado","PeriodicalId":51513,"journal":{"name":"International Interactions","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49370550","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Government ideology and bailout conditionality in the European financial crisis","authors":"F. Genovese, Héctor Hermida-Rivera","doi":"10.1080/03050629.2022.2090936","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2022.2090936","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The political economy literature on international bailouts has repeatedly shown that the domestic politics of rescued countries influence international bailout compliance. However, we know less about the domestic politics of bailout negotiations, and especially the type of conditions negotiated by governments of more developed countries with strong ties to international lenders. This paper puts forward an argument about the role of a government’s partisanship in shaping the conditions stipulated between international lenders and developed countries when crises confront the latter. Consistent with political cover theories, we argue that governments of crisis countries seek to scapegoat international institutions in order to push domestically unpleasant reforms. However, when crises affect countries significantly close to international lenders, international institutions may tolerate the scapegoating attitude and accept to emphasize governments’ reforms in the direction of their core ideological constituencies. Focusing on bailout negotiations during the Eurocrisis (2008–2016), we maintain that while important and painful reforms were discussed at the negotiation tables, the involved international lenders also accommodated the policy preferences of both left and right governments of crisis-ridden countries, everything else constant. So, conditionality came with duress, but governments were also able to emphasize reforms on the opponents’ policy issues, hence systematically obtaining fewer measures on their voters’ main policy areas. Regression analyses of an original country-quarter dataset of EU bailout conditionality measures provide support to our hypothesis. The findings are relevant to the analysis of partisan politics in economic negotiations and of democratic deficits in international organizations. Furthermore, this study contributes to understanding the political accessibility and ideological dynamics of international lending beyond the Eurocrisis.","PeriodicalId":51513,"journal":{"name":"International Interactions","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44815974","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}