International Interactions最新文献

{"title":"Agents of peace or enablers of violence? The proximal effects of mediators in international disputes","authors":"Lesley G. Terris, O. Tykocinski","doi":"10.1080/03050629.2021.1977637","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2021.1977637","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51513,"journal":{"name":"International Interactions","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45408863","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A price for peace: troop contributing countries’ responses to peacekeeper fatalities","authors":"Jared Oestman","doi":"10.1080/03050629.2021.1959327","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2021.1959327","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT How do states respond to fatalities of their troops in UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs)? Recent research highlights that participation in peacekeeping is costly for most states. Personnel fatalities should create further costs for contributors and often result in a reduction of their commitments. Studies that evaluate this expectation yield mixed findings. One finds no evidence that OECD countries provide fewer personnel to UN PKOs following fatalities. In contrast, another finds that fatalities generally correspond with reductions in states’ personnel commitments to UN operations in Africa but also reveals that wealthier contributors tend to withdraw at larger magnitudes than their poorer counterparts. This study builds on this work by further hypothesizing that the incentives that motivate states to participate in PKOs condition their willingness to maintain their contributions after experiencing fatalities. An analysis of states’ troop fatalities and commitments to 41 UN operations from 1990 to 2015 supports this expectation. States that are contiguous to an operation, which face greater concerns about the externalities of nearby conflicts, and states that receive side payments for their troop commitments, via foreign aid, are more willing to maintain their commitments in response to fatalities of their troops than other contributors. Additional findings suggest that non-contiguous contributors that do not receive side payments are also inclined to withdraw troops in response to upticks in organized violence surrounding a mission as well as fatalities of other contributors’ troops. These results illustrate that the motives that states face to participate in PKOs also affect their willingness to maintain their troop commitments as their costs for participation increase.","PeriodicalId":51513,"journal":{"name":"International Interactions","volume":"47 1","pages":"986 - 1015"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47089050","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Utilitarianism or cosmopolitanism? A study of education’s impact on individual attitudes toward foreign countries","authors":"Gong Chen","doi":"10.1080/03050629.2021.1968388","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2021.1968388","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article attempts to study two different causal mechanisms where education affects individual attitudes toward foreign countries. On the one hand, education stands for human capital and/or skill level. According to the factor endowments model, for example, well-educated people in a capital-abundant country can materially benefit from trade ties with other labor-abundant countries. On the other hand, education cultivates social trust, disseminates information, and expands breadth of social perspective, all of which can make one more pro-outsider. Hence, both explanations tend to predict that one’s educational attainment is associated with a positive opinion of outgroup members and foreigners. By cross-national comparison including both developed and developing economies, I find empirical evidence supporting the socializing not the utilitarian effect of education on outgroup attitudes, using data from the second wave of the Asian Barometer Survey. Further structural equation modeling shows that education socializes an individual to be more internationalist and cosmopolitan mainly through an expanded social perspective.","PeriodicalId":51513,"journal":{"name":"International Interactions","volume":"48 1","pages":"110 - 138"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49593435","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Introduction: promoting restraint in war","authors":"Brian Mcquinn, Fiona Terry, Oliver Kaplan, Francisco Gutiérrez-Sanín","doi":"10.1080/03050629.2021.1931864","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2021.1931864","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Over the last decade, changes in the nature of conflict have generated profound operational challenges for international humanitarian organizations. The number of non-international armed conflicts doubled between 2001 and 2016, rising from fewer than 30 to more than 70. The number of armed groups fighting in them has also multiplied: more armed groups emerged in the last decade than in the previous century. Humanitarian organizations struggle to assist victims of these armed conflicts and to persuade fighters to act with restraint toward those individuals who are not, or no longer, taking part in hostilities. New research was required to identify sources of influence on battlefield restraint to inform operational activities. We present a theoretical framework that identifies the sources of norms of restraint in state and non-state armed groups. We argue that humanitarian organizations ought to broaden their notions of the processes that influence the socialization and uptake of norms of restraint and mobilize new societal actors to the cause of limiting violence. In our framing of the empirical articles in the collection, we argue that the structure of armed organizations and their embeddedness in local communities heavily influence how group norms and internal rules are formed and reinforced. While hierarchical militaries can largely be influenced by top-down discipline, restraint among more decentralized armed groups is strongly influenced by societal actors external to the group.","PeriodicalId":51513,"journal":{"name":"International Interactions","volume":"47 1","pages":"795 - 824"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49368953","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Peaceful dyads: A territorial perspective","authors":"Andrew P. Owsiak, John A. Vasquez","doi":"10.1080/03050629.2021.1962859","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2021.1962859","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Many dyads develop peaceful relationships, avoiding war for long, historical periods. Are such dyads common? How many exist, and why have they never fought? This study provides a territorial perspective on peaceful dyads, defined as those that never fight a war over a given historical period. It compares two explanations for why peaceful dyads exist: the territorial peace and the democratic peace. A series of hypotheses test the relative ability of these two theories to account for peaceful dyads. The tests employ three samples – all dyads, politically relevant dyads, and grievance dyads – from 1816–2001, with an emphasis on the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. Through our analyses, we produce three major findings. First, the absence of territorial conflict – but not democracy – predicts peaceful dyads. Second, the absence of territorial disagreements appears in the vast majority (i.e., 85–96%) of peaceful dyads. Finally, approximately, 93–98% of democratic dyads lack any territorial disagreements. This implies that democratic dyads are peaceful because they face different issues than non-democratic dyads – ones less likely to undermine the development of peaceful, dyadic relationships.","PeriodicalId":51513,"journal":{"name":"International Interactions","volume":"47 1","pages":"1040 - 1068"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43997019","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Deprivation, instability, and propensity to attack: how urbanization influences terrorism","authors":"Maxim Slav, Elena Smyslovskikh, V. Novikov, Igor Kolesnikov, Andrey Korotayev","doi":"10.1080/03050629.2021.1924703","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2021.1924703","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The study investigates different ways in which urbanization and its tempo influence terrorist activity. In line with other researchers investigating nonlinear effects on instability, we suggest that the influence of both of them is nonlinear, with quadratic regression being more appropriate for urbanization level impact and interaction between urbanization and its tempo being more appropriate to measure the tempo’s influence. Nonlinearity has been confirmed in the robustness section of the paper, in which an alternative dependent variable distribution and a greater set of control variables were used. The findings are in line with those of other researchers who found that societies, in the process of modernization, demonstrate heavier instability than societies before modernization or those after the modernization period.","PeriodicalId":51513,"journal":{"name":"International Interactions","volume":"47 1","pages":"1100 - 1130"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41356121","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Crowding out the field: External Support to Insurgents and the Intensity of Inter-rebel Fighting in Civil Wars","authors":"A. Stein, Marc-Olivier Cantin","doi":"10.1080/03050629.2021.1922899","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2021.1922899","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT How does external support to insurgents influence the likelihood that the latter will get involved in violent clashes against other rebel groups? In this article, we outline a theoretical framework which contends that, in multiparty civil wars, rebels sponsored by foreign states are more likely to participate in high-intensity inter-rebel conflicts than rebels receiving no support from external states. We argue that this is because external support creates strategic incentives for insurgent leaders to target other rebel contenders in order to signal resolve to their sponsors and to crowd out the battlefield ahead of the post-conflict period. External support, moreover, tends to activate potent socio-psychological mechanisms among rank-and-file combatants that may remove restraints on the use of violence against other rebel fighters. Using data on inter-rebel conflicts from 1989 to 2018, we test these hypotheses with a set of large-N regressions and find strong support for our theory. Further analyzes inductively reveal that our statistical results are likely, to some extent, to be driven by the prevalence of religious insurgencies in contemporary conflicts. Religious insurgencies display organizational features that could reinforce vertical strategic incentives and horizontal socio-psychological dynamics, thereby increasing their involvement in inter-rebel fighting. To further probe the ‘meso-foundations’ of inter-rebel fighting following rebel sponsorship, we then provide qualitative evidence on the Syrian Civil War. Our article contributes to scholarship by highlighting the consequences of external support on conflict processes beyond the insurgent-incumbent dyad. ¿De qué manera el apoyo externo a los insurgentes influye en la probabilidad de que se involucren en enfrentamientos violentos contra otros grupos rebeldes? En este artículo, exponemos un marco teórico que sostiene que, en las guerras civiles en las que hay varias partes involucradas, los rebeldes financiados por estados extranjeros tienen más probabilidades de participar en conflictos de gran intensidad entre grupos rebeldes que los que no reciben apoyo de estados externos. Sostenemos que esto se debe a que el apoyo externo crea incentivos estratégicos para que los líderes insurgentes apunten a otros rivales rebeldes con la finalidad de dar una señal de resolución a sus financiadores y atestar el campo de batalla para tener una ventaja en el período posterior al conflicto. Además, el apoyo externo tiende a activar potentes mecanismos sociopsicológicos entre los combatientes de base que pueden eliminar las restricciones sobre el uso de violencia contra otros combatientes rebeldes. Mediante el uso de datos sobre conflictos entre rebeldes de 1989 a 2018, probamos estas hipótesis con un conjunto de regresiones de N grandes y descubrimos que nuestra teoría tiene un gran sustento. Análisis adicionales revelan por inducción que nuestros resultados estadísticos probablemente, en cie","PeriodicalId":51513,"journal":{"name":"International Interactions","volume":"47 1","pages":"662 - 691"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/03050629.2021.1922899","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43651884","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Competing authorities and norms of restraint: governing community-embedded armed groups in South Sudan","authors":"N. Pendle","doi":"10.1080/03050629.2021.1918126","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2021.1918126","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT International humanitarian actors and academics continue to struggle to understand armed group conduct and how to restrain this conduct when it violates moral, legal and humanitarian norms. Armed groups that lack a visible, explicit formal hierarchical command structure, equivalent to those found in state militaries, have proved a particular puzzle. A growing body of scholarship on the strategic functions of patterns of violence and restraint has usefully moved beyond assumptions that extreme violence is indicative of an absence of authority over armed actors. However, literature has tended to ignore the potential plurality and complexity of authority figures that shape violence and the constraining, conservative nature of certain moral orders. This article makes use of qualitative and ethnographic research in South Sudan to understand patterns of restraint among the gojam and titweng cattle-guarding defense forces from 2014 to 2017. The analysis documents how public authorities gained legitimacy within these groups by renegotiating a group’s social order, moral boundaries, and restraint through their own reinterpretations of meta-ethical ideals and histories. Cultural norms of restraint were manipulated by elites but were also remade into acts of creative refusal against these same elites. The article specifically focuses on how the life-giving work of children, women and old friends was used to protect life as well as incite violence. The article has implications for how international humanitarians can engage with the remaking of custom to enhance armed group restraint and better protect civilians. Los actores humanitarios internacionales y los académicos continúan teniendo dificultades para comprender la conducta de los grupos armados y de qué manera contenerla cuando incumple las normas morales, legales y humanitarias. Los grupos armados que carecen de una estructura de mando jerárquica, formal, explícita y visible, equivalente a las que se encuentran en las fuerzas armadas estatales, han resultado un enigma particular. Un conjunto creciente de estudios sobre las funciones estratégicas de los patrones de la violencia y la limitación útilmente ha dejado atrás las suposiciones de que la violencia extrema es indicativa de una ausencia de autoridad sobre los actores armados. No obstante, la bibliografía ha tendido a ignorar la pluralidad y la complejidad potenciales de las figuras de autoridad que determinan la violencia y la naturaleza conservadora y restrictiva de ciertas órdenes morales. Este artículo hace uso de investigaciones cualitativas y etnográficas en Sudán del Sur para comprender los patrones de limitación entre las fuerzas de defensa protectoras del ganado titweng y gojam desde 2014 hasta 2017. El análisis documenta de qué manera las autoridades públicas obtuvieron legitimidad en estos grupos renegociando un orden social, límites morales y restricción del grupo a través de sus propias reinterpretaciones de los ideales y las ","PeriodicalId":51513,"journal":{"name":"International Interactions","volume":"47 1","pages":"873 - 897"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/03050629.2021.1918126","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47972231","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Only Friends Can Betray You: International Rivalry and Domestic Politics","authors":"Richard J Saunders","doi":"10.1080/03050629.2020.1824995","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2020.1824995","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article argues that dramatic political change in State A poses a threat to the interests that other states B share with it. The more salient those interests are to State B, the greater the threat posed by domestic political change within State A. Thus major changes in one state place the leaders of formerly friendly states into a domain of losses, motivating risk-seeking behavior in hopes of reversing these losses. Conversely, the new leaders of the state undergoing domestic political change initiate similarly risk-seeking behavior to defend their new endowments. The conflicts that result sow the seeds of long-lasting enmity (rivalry) between former partners. I test this argument in a dataset of rivalry onset during the period 1950–2005 and find evidence that in the wake of dramatic political change in State A, rivalries are most likely to form between A and its close partners.","PeriodicalId":51513,"journal":{"name":"International Interactions","volume":"47 1","pages":"504 - 529"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/03050629.2020.1824995","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45672592","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"State intervention, external spoilers, and the durability of peace agreements","authors":"Sema Hande Ogutcu-Fu","doi":"10.1080/03050629.2021.1910822","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2021.1910822","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT How does state intervention during civil conflict affect the variation in post-agreement outcomes? While intervention in civil conflict is a widely studied topic, the conflict resolution literature generally ignores how state intervention during conflict affects the durability of the peace agreement that follows. In this paper, I argue that state interveners continue to influence the decisions and actions of their war-time ally in the post-agreement period. Self-interested state interveners can use the leverage they possess over their ally to break down or nurture the fragile order the peace agreement provides depending on how satisfied they are with the policy outcomes of the peace agreement. Therefore, I contend that the durability of a peace agreement depends on a) the satisfaction level of state interveners with the post-agreement status quo, and in instances of multiple interventions, b) whether state interveners converge or diverge in their level of satisfaction. I trace state interveners’ level of satisfaction with the post-agreement status quo in the economic and political signals they send in the post-agreement period. I examine the durability of intra-state peace agreements signed between 1985 and 2004 and find that a) improving economic and political interactions between state interveners and the post-agreement state increase the durability of the peace agreement and b) the divergence between each state intervener’s economic and political interactions with the post-agreement state decreases the durability of the peace agreement. Findings indicate that intervener states’ satisfaction with the post-agreement status quo is a primary determinant of durable peace.","PeriodicalId":51513,"journal":{"name":"International Interactions","volume":"47 1","pages":"633 - 661"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/03050629.2021.1910822","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43653327","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}