International Interactions最新文献

{"title":"Compliant or defiant? Economic sanctions and United Nations General Assembly voting by target countries","authors":"Bimal Adhikari, J. Jeong, Dursun Peksen","doi":"10.1080/03050629.2022.2059478","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2022.2059478","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract What effect do economic sanctions have on the foreign policy orientation of sanctioned (target) countries towards sanctioning (sender) countries? Do sanctions create more or fewer incentives for targets to pursue divergent foreign policy agendas from that of their senders in major international forums? We posit that economic sanctions escalate tension between target and sender countries, prompting target governments to vote against the interests of sender countries at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). To assess the empirical merits of this theoretical claim, we combine US sanctions data with the data on the UNGA votes for over 150 countries for the 1984–2006 period. The findings show that US sanctions, particularly high-cost sanctions, are significantly associated with more dissimilar UNGA votes between the US and its targets. Our analysis suggests that sanctions not only often fail to achieve their intended policy goals but also instigate more defiant behavior by target countries. ¿Qué efecto tienen las sanciones económicas en la orientación de la política exterior de los países sancionados (objetivo) hacia los países que emiten la sanción (emisores)? ¿Crean las sanciones más o menos incentivos para que los países objetivos apliquen programas de política exterior divergentes de los de sus países emisores en los principales foros internacionales? Sostenemos que las sanciones económicas aumentan la tensión entre los países objetivo y los emisores, lo que lleva a los gobiernos objetivo a votar en contra de los intereses de los países emisores en la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas (AGNU). Para evaluar los méritos empíricos de esta afirmación teórica, combinamos los datos de las sanciones de EE. UU. con los datos de las votaciones de la AGNU de más de 150 países para el periodo 1984–2006. Los resultados muestran que las sanciones de EE. UU., en particular las de alto costo, están relacionadas en gran medida con votaciones más disímiles en la AGNU entre EE. UU. y sus países objetivos. Nuestro análisis sugiere que las sanciones no solo no logran a menudo cumplir sus objetivos políticos previstos, sino que además instigan un comportamiento más desafiante por parte de los países objetivo. Quelle est l’incidence des sanctions économiques sur la politique pratiquée par les pays sanctionnés à l’égard des pays émetteurs? Ces sanctions ont-elles pour effet d’encourager, ou bien au contraire de décourager les pays sanctionnés à adopter des stratégies antagoniques par rapport aux pays émetteurs dans les grandes instances internationales? Nous émettons l’idée que les sanctions économiques accentuent les tensions entre pays émetteurs et pays sanctionnés en poussant ces derniers à voter contre les intérêts des pays émetteurs à l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies (AGNU). Pour déterminer la valeur empirique de cette théorie, nous avons comparé les sanctions américaines et les votes à l’AGNU de plus de 150 pays entre 1984 et 2006. Cette ","PeriodicalId":51513,"journal":{"name":"International Interactions","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45958037","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Oil discovery, oil production, and coups d’état","authors":"Hans-Inge Langø, Curtis M Bell, S. Wolford","doi":"10.1080/03050629.2022.2061968","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2022.2061968","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We analyze a model of bargaining in the shadow of coups d’état in which oil rents increase the value of capturing the state but also allow leaders to coup-proof their governments and appease potential plotters. These mechanisms offset each other once oil wealth has already been realized; incentives to topple the government are countered by the government’s capacity to thwart or discourage coups. But when oil is newly discovered and rents have not yet been realized, plotters may launch a coup before the government can use oil wealth to shift the distribution of power decisively against them. Coup attempts are uniquely likely in such windows of opportunity, but those same coup attempts are also likely to fail. We uncover these relationships in an empirical analysis of oil production, oil discovery, coup attempts, and coup outcomes in a global sample of states from 1980 to 2010.","PeriodicalId":51513,"journal":{"name":"International Interactions","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49517543","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Employing local peacekeeping data to forecast changes in violence","authors":"L. Hultman, M. Leis, Desirée Nilsson","doi":"10.1080/03050629.2022.2055010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2022.2055010","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract One way of improving forecasts is through better data. We explore how much we can improve predictions of conflict violence by introducing data reflecting third-party efforts to manage violence. By leveraging new sub-national data on all UN peacekeeping deployments in Africa, 1994–2020, from the Geocoded Peacekeeping (Geo-PKO) dataset, we predict changes in violence at the local level. The advantage of data on peacekeeping deployments is that these vary over time and space, as opposed to many structural variables commonly used. We present two peacekeeping models that contain several local peacekeeping features, each with a separate set of additional variables that form the respective benchmark. The mean errors of our predictions only improve marginally. However, comparing observed and predicted changes in violence, the peacekeeping features improve our ability to identify the correct sign of the change. These results are particularly strong when we limit the sample to countries that have seen peacekeeping deployments. For an ambitious forecasting project, like ViEWS, it may thus be highly relevant to incorporate fine-grained and frequently updated data on peacekeeping troops.","PeriodicalId":51513,"journal":{"name":"International Interactions","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43535249","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Domestic politics and requests for UNESCO’s international assistance program","authors":"Hyoseon Lee, Ye-Young Kim, W. Jho","doi":"10.1080/03050629.2022.2051025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2022.2051025","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Recently, the world has witnessed increased participation from nondemocratic countries in international cultural institutions, such as UNESCO’s International Assistance (IA) program. This study poses the question of why several authoritarian countries request IA programs more frequently than others do. In addition to economic and international factors, we argue that differences in domestic institutions within autocracies influence the decision-making of such states in requesting IA programs because these programs can be a useful tool for several incumbent regimes to generate public support or maintain their status. We implement negative binomial regressions for 131 authoritarian countries between 1979 and 2014 and demonstrate that politically competitive regimes are more likely to request IA programs than non-competitive ones. The findings suggest that authoritarian regimes with competitive political institutions are likely to utilize the programs of cultural international regimes. Recientemente, el mundo ha observado una mayor participación de países no democráticos en instituciones culturales internacionales, tales como el programa de Asistencia Internacional (International Assistance, IA) de la UNESCO. Este estudio plantea la pregunta de por qué numerosos países autoritarios solicitan programas de IA con más frecuencia que otros países. Además de los factores internacionales y económicos, sostenemos que las diferencias en las instituciones nacionales dentro de las autocracias influyen en la toma de decisiones de tales estados al solicitar programas de IA, ya que estos programas pueden ser una herramienta útil para que los regímenes de turno obtengan el apoyo del público o mantengan su posición. Implementamos regresiones binomiales negativas para 131 países autoritarios entre 1979 y 2014, y demostramos que los regímenes políticamente competitivos son más propensos a solicitar programas de IA que los que no lo son. Los resultados sugieren que es probable que los regímenes autoritarios con instituciones políticas competitivas utilicen los programas de regímenes culturales internacionales. Le monde a récemment été témoin d’une participation accrue des pays non démocratiques aux institutions culturelles internationales, notamment au niveau des programmes d’aide internationale de l’UNESCO. Cette étude s’interroge sur les raisons pour lesquelles plusieurs pays autoritaires demandent des programmes d’aide internationale plus fréquemment que d’autres. En plus des facteurs économiques et internationaux, nous soutenons que les différences dans les institutions nationales des autocraties influencent la prise de décision de ces États lorsqu’ils demandent des programmes d’aide internationale, car ces programmes peuvent être un outil utile pour plusieurs régimes en place pour générer un soutien public ou maintenir leur statut. Nous avons appliqué des régressions binomiales négatives pour 131 pays autoritaires entre 1979 et 2014 et nous démontrons qu","PeriodicalId":51513,"journal":{"name":"International Interactions","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45859637","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Challenging the status quo: Predicting violence with sparse decision-making data","authors":"Konstantin Bätz, Ann-Cathrin Klöckner, Gerald Schneider","doi":"10.1080/03050629.2022.2051024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2022.2051024","url":null,"abstract":"<p><b>Abstract</b></p><p>This article addresses the discrepancy between the explanation and the prediction of political violence through the development of different models that approximate the decision-making on war and peace. Borrowing from the crisis bargaining literature, the prediction models particularly consider the situational attributes through which players can challenge the status quo. We distinguish between direct and indirect proxies of a weakening of the status quo and show that adding decision-making data can improve the accuracy of cross-sectional forecasting models. The study, which demonstrates the increased conflict risk due to the COVID-19 pandemic and thus another development upsetting the status quo, discusses the usefulness of decision-making forecasts through various case study illustrations.</p><p>Este artículo aborda la discrepancia entre la explicación y la predicción de la violencia política mediante la elaboración de diversos modelos que se acercan a la toma de decisiones sobre la guerra y la paz. Inspirados en las publicaciones sobre negociaciones de crisis, los modelos de predicción consideran, en particular, las características situacionales a través de las cuales las piezas claves pueden desafiar el statu quo. Distinguimos entre indicadores directos e indirectos de un debilitamiento del statu quo y demostramos que la incorporación de datos sobre la toma de decisiones puede mejorar la precisión de los modelos de previsión transversal. El estudio, que demuestra el aumento del riesgo de conflicto durante la pandemia de la COVID-19 y, por lo tanto, otro acontecimiento que altera el statu quo, analiza la utilidad de las previsiones para la toma de decisiones mediante diferentes ejemplos de casos prácticos.</p><p>Cet article aborde la divergence entre l’explication et la prédiction de la violence politique par le développement de différents modèles qui permettent une estimation des prises de décisions sur la guerre et la paix. S’inspirant de la littérature sur les négociations de crises les modèles de prédiction prennent en particulier en compte les attributs situationnels par lesquels les acteurs peuvent remettre en question le statu quo. Nous distinguons les variables directes des variables indirectes de l’affaiblissement du statu quo et montrons que l’ajout de données sur les prises de décisions peut améliorer la précision des modèles de prévision transversaux. L’étude, qui démontre l’augmentation du risque de conflit par la pandémie de COVID et donc une autre évolution bouleversant le statu quo, discute de l’utilité des prévisions de prises de décisions à travers diverses illustrations par des études de cas.</p>","PeriodicalId":51513,"journal":{"name":"International Interactions","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138525555","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Documenting energy flows between states: The Global Energy Relations Dataset (GERD), 1978–2014","authors":"O. Gökçe, E. Hatipoglu","doi":"10.1080/03050629.2022.2045286","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2022.2045286","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Being the most globally traded commodity in terms of monetary value, energy remains one of the important shapers of interstate relations. States’ quest to secure exports and imports of energy resources and the resultant efforts to govern energy flows have created numerous phenomena that have been of immediate interest to international relations (IR) scholars. However, few studies have so far aimed to systematically examine how energy relations shape global politics. One important reason for this paucity relates to the lack of a dataset with wide spatiotemporal coverage that allows for such systematic analysis. The Global Energy Relations Dataset (GERD), featured in this study, aims to facilitate systematic analyses of energy relations in IR. The dataset offers yearly energy flow data for all country-pairs around the globe between 1978 and 2014. The data are compiled from major international and national agencies that offer reliable data on energy trade. Standardized over megajoules, the data are offered in directed-dyadic (exporter-importer) and monadic (country-only) format. The data are further broken down by resource (i.e., coal, oil, gas, and electricity) whenever possible. Preliminary analyses indicate energy relations exhibit considerable variance among pairs of states and over time, and that trade in some energy resources may pacify relations more than others. Correlating this variance with canonical variables used in international relations points to promising areas of research. Al ser el producto más comercializado en todo el mundo en términos de valor monetario, la energía sigue siendo uno de los principales factores que determinan las relaciones entre los estados. El afán de los estados por garantizar las exportaciones e importaciones de los recursos energéticos y las acciones resultantes para controlar los flujos de energía crearon numerosos fenómenos que generaron un interés inmediato en los especialistas en relaciones internacionales (RR. II.). Sin embargo, son pocos los estudios que, hasta ahora, analizaron de manera sistemática cómo las relaciones en materia de energía configuran la política mundial. Un motivo importante de esta escasez de estudios es la falta de un conjunto de datos con una amplia cobertura espacio-temporal que permita dicho análisis sistemático. El Conjunto de datos de las relaciones energéticas mundiales (Global Energy Relations Dataset, GERD), presentado en este estudio, tiene como objetivo facilitar el análisis sistemático de las relaciones en materia de energía en las RR. II. El conjunto de datos ofrece todos los años información sobre el flujo de energía para todos los pares de países del mundo entre 1978 y 2014. Los datos proceden de los principales organismos internacionales y nacionales que ponen a disposición información confiable sobre la comercialización de la energía. Estandarizados en megajulios (MJ), los datos se ofrecen en formato diádico (exportador-importador) y en formato monádico (paí","PeriodicalId":51513,"journal":{"name":"International Interactions","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44652225","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Predicting escalating and de-escalating violence in Africa using Markov models","authors":"David Randahl, J. Vegelius","doi":"10.1080/03050629.2022.2049772","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2022.2049772","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This contribution to the ViEWS prediction competition 2020 proposes using Markov modeling to model the change in the logarithm of battle-related deaths between two points in time in a country. The predictions are made using two ensembles of observed and hidden Markov models, where the covariate sets for the ensembles are drawn from the ViEWS country month constituent models. The weights for the individual models in the ensembles were obtained using a genetic algorithm optimizing the fit on the TADDA-score in a calibration set. The weighted ensembles of visible and hidden Markov models outperform the ViEWS prediction competition benchmark models on the TADDA score in the test period of January 2017 to December 2019 for all time steps. Forecasts until March 2021 predict increased violence primarily in Algeria, Libya, Tchad, Niger, and Angola, and decreased or unchanged levels of violence in most of the remaining countries in Africa. An analysis of the model weights in the ensembles shows that the conflict history constituent model provided by ViEWS was dominant in the ensembles. Esta contribución a la competencia de predicciones 2020 del Sistema de Alerta Temprana de Violencia (Violence Early Warning System, ViEWS) propone utilizar la modelización de Márkov para elaborar un modelo del cambio en el logaritmo de las muertes relacionadas con batallas entre dos puntos temporales en un país. Las predicciones se elaboran con dos conjuntos de modelos observados y ocultos de Márkov, en los que los grupos de covariables de los conjuntos se obtienen de los modelos constituyentes mensuales de los países del ViEWS. La relevancia de los modelos individuales en los conjuntos se obtuvo mediante un algoritmo genético que optimiza el ajuste de la puntuación TADDA en un grupo de calibración. Los conjuntos ponderados de los modelos visibles y ocultos de Márkov superan los modelos de referencia de la competencia de predicciones del ViEWS en relación con la puntuación TADDA (Distancia absoluta orientada con aumento de dirección) en el período de prueba de enero de 2017 a diciembre de 2019 para todos los intervalos de tiempo. Las predicciones hasta marzo de 2021 pronostican un aumento en la violencia principalmente en Argelia, Libia, Chad, Níger y Angola, y niveles de violencia disminuidos o sin variaciones en la mayoría de los países restantes en África. Un análisis de la relevancia de los modelos en los conjuntos demuestra que los modelos constituyentes de la historia de conflictos que proporciona el ViEWS fueron dominantes en dichos conjuntos. Cette contribution au concours de prévision ViEWS (Violence early-warning system, système d’alerte précoce sur la violence) 2020 propose d’utiliser la modélisation de Markov pour modéliser l’évolution du logarithme des décès liés aux conflits entre deux moments de l’histoire d’un pays. Les prédictions sont effectuées à l’aide de deux ensembles de modèles de Markov cachés et de modèles de Markov observés, et les jeux de","PeriodicalId":51513,"journal":{"name":"International Interactions","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42948016","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Land use and the incidence of forced displacement","authors":"G. Lambardi, Paola Palacios","doi":"10.1080/03050629.2022.2045287","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2022.2045287","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In the context of the Colombian internal conflict, rural communities engaged in subsistence agriculture and traditional modes of production, most of which are not highly profitable, are significantly affected by displacement. We explain this finding by the use of a game-theoretical model where the government obtains income and provides security for regions while the armed group extorts productive agriculture and chooses the percentage of subsistence farmers to force out from their lands. By displacing population, the armed group reallocates land from subsistence to modern agriculture, increasing the potential gains from extortion. We find that if land productivity is sufficiently high and the proportion of land devoted to modern productive agriculture is small, the government provides low security, and displacement occurs. The government only prevents displacement if the income obtained from the region exceeds the cost of security provision which occurs when the proportion of land devoted to subsistence agriculture is sufficiently small. Predictions from the theoretical model are tested using a panel data set of Colombian municipalities for 2003–2017. Results from the fixed-effects panel estimations indicate that municipalities with collective titles exhibit higher IDPs expulsion rates, in accordance with the theory. Findings from the model could also shed light on other countries where forced displacement is aimed at land reallocation that allows for a more productive use of this resource. En el contexto del conflicto interno de Colombia, las comunidades rurales que implementan la agricultura de subsistencia y los métodos de producción tradicionales, la mayoría de los cuales no son muy rentables, se ven afectadas por el desplazamiento de manera significativa. Explicamos este descubrimiento mediante un modelo simple de la teoría de juegos, en el que el Gobierno obtiene ingresos y brinda seguridad para las regiones, mientras que el grupo armado extorsiona la agricultura productiva y selecciona el porcentaje de agricultores de subsistencia para expulsar de sus tierras. Mediante el desplazamiento de la población, el grupo armado redistribuye la tierra de la agricultura de subsistencia a la moderna y aumenta las posibles ganancias provenientes de la extorsión. Observamos que, si la productividad de la tierra es lo suficientemente alta y la proporción de tierra dedicada a la agricultura productiva moderna es pequeña, el Gobierno brinda poca seguridad, y tiene lugar el desplazamiento. El Gobierno solo evita el desplazamiento si los ingresos obtenidos de la región superan el costo de la provisión de seguridad, lo cual se produce cuando la proporción de tierra dedicada a la agricultura de subsistencia es lo suficientemente pequeña. Los descubrimientos del modelo teórico se contrastan con el caso de las comunidades que ocupan los territorios ancestrales en la región del Pacífico del país y participaron en un gran programa colectivo de títulos de ","PeriodicalId":51513,"journal":{"name":"International Interactions","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41839348","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"High resolution conflict forecasting with spatial convolutions and long short-term memory","authors":"Benjamin J. Radford","doi":"10.1080/03050629.2022.2031182","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2022.2031182","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The 2020 Violence Early Warning System (ViEWS) Prediction Competition challenged participants to produce predictive models of violent political conflict at high spatial and temporal resolutions. This paper presents a convolutional long short-term memory (ConvLSTM) recurrent neural network capable of forecasting the log change in battle-related deaths resulting from state-based armed conflict at the PRIO-GRID cell-month level. The ConvLSTM outperforms the benchmark model provided by the ViEWS team and performs comparably to the best models submitted to the competition. In addition to providing a technical description of the ConvLSTM, I evaluate the model’s out-of-sample performance and interrogate a selection of interesting model forecasts. I find that the model relies heavily on lagged levels of battle-related fatalities to forecast future decreases in violence. The model struggles to forecast escalations in violence and tends to underpredict the magnitude of escalation while overpredicting the spatial spread of escalation. El concurso de predicciones del sistema de alerta temprana sobre la violencia (Violence Early Warning System, ViEWS) de 2020 desafió a los participantes a producir modelos predictivos de conflictos políticos violentos a altas resoluciones espaciales y temporales. Este documento presenta una red neuronal recurrente de memoria convolucional a corto y largo plazo (convolutional long short-term memory, ConvLSTM) capaz de predecir el cambio de registro en las muertes relacionadas con las batallas como resultado de los conflictos armados de estado a nivel de mes de celda de PRIO-GRID. La ConvLSTM supera el modelo de referencia proporcionado por el equipo de ViEWS y funciona de manera similar a los mejores modelos presentados en el concurso. Además de proporcionar una descripción técnica de la ConvLSTM, analizo el rendimiento del modelo fuera de la muestra y cuestiono una serie de interesantes previsiones del modelo. Considero que el modelo se basa, principalmente, en niveles rezagados de víctimas mortales a causa de las batallas para predecir las futuras disminuciones de la violencia. El modelo se esfuerza por predecir las escaladas de la violencia y tiende a predecir con poca frecuencia la magnitud de la escalada, pero con más frecuencia la propagación espacial de esta. Le concours 2020 du système d’alerte précoce sur la violence (Violence Early Warning System, ViEWS) a mis les participants au défi de produire des modèles prédictifs des conflits politiques violents à hautes résolutions temporelles et spatiales. Cet article présente un réseau de neurones récurrents à mémoire convolutive à long terme à court terme (ConvLSTM) capable de prévoir l’évolution logarithmique des décès liés aux combats résultant de conflits armés étatiques au niveau Cellule par mois de la grille PRIO. La ConvLSTM surpasse le modèle de référence fourni par l’équipe ViEWS et offre des performances comparables à celles des meilleurs modèles soumis pou","PeriodicalId":51513,"journal":{"name":"International Interactions","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45385863","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Could leaders deflect from political scandals? Cross-national experiments on diversionary action in Israel and Japan","authors":"E. Segev, Atsushi Tago, Kohei Watanabe","doi":"10.1080/03050629.2022.2044326","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2022.2044326","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The diversionary theory of war is one of the best-known conflict initiation theories focusing on democratic leaders’ incentives to divert public attention away from political scandals or economic policy failures. While this assumption is well-known, few studies have examined if and how the use of force could divert public attention from such a scandal or failure. By using cross-national experiments in Japan and Israel, we provide empirical tests of this particular assumption and test the other theoretically discussed implications. Our contribution is twofold. First, we confirm that, in both Japan and Israel, diverting public attention from salient political scandals may fail. Second, drawing from an experiment using a mock news article predicting the prime minister’s hawkish policy, we demonstrate that actual escalation against a potentially nuclear-armed enemy would not directly lead to greater support for the prime minister compared to the mere emphasis on the threat posed by the enemy. Simply warning of an imminent threat from North Korea or Iran is critical and sufficient to induce political support from the general public; we call it threat-induced political support. La teoría de la guerra de distracción es una de las más conocidas sobre el inicio de los conflictos que se enfoca en los intereses de los líderes democráticos de desviar la atención pública de los escándalos políticos o las políticas económicas fallidas. Si bien este postulado es bien conocido, en pocos estudios se analizó si el uso de la fuerza podría desviar la atención del público de un escándalo o una política fallida, y de qué manera. Mediante la utilización de experimentos transnacionales en Japón e Israel, proporcionamos pruebas empíricas de este supuesto en particular y ponemos a prueba las otras implicancias debatidas en marcos teóricos. Nuestro aporte es doble. En primer lugar, confirmamos que, tanto en Japón como en Israel, desviar la atención de la opinión pública de los escándalos políticos más destacados puede fracasar. En segundo lugar, a partir de un experimento en el que se utiliza un artículo de prensa simulado que predice una política agresiva del primer ministro, demostramos que la escalada real contra un potencial enemigo armado con armas nucleares no conduce directamente a un mayor apoyo al primer ministro en comparación con el mero énfasis en la amenaza que supone el enemigo. La simple advertencia de una amenaza inminente por parte de Corea del Norte o Irán es determinante y suficiente para inducir el apoyo político del público; lo llamamos “apoyo político inducido por la amenaza.” La théorie de la diversion de la guerre est l’une des théories les plus connues sur le déclenchement des conflits. Elle se concentre sur les motivations des dirigeants démocratiques à détourner l’attention du public des scandales politiques ou des échecs de la politique économique. Bien que cette hypothèse soit bien connue, peu d’études ont examiné si et comment le reco","PeriodicalId":51513,"journal":{"name":"International Interactions","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45459902","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}