Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences最新文献_第2页

Attuning the world: Ambient smart environments for autistic persons 适应世界：面向自闭症患者的智能环境

IF 2.3 1区哲学

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2024-08-21 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-024-10021-y

Janko Nešić

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引用次数: 0

Nonveridical biosemiotics and the Interface Theory of Perception: implications for perception-mediated selection 非虚拟生物符号学与知觉界面理论：对以知觉为中介的选择的影响

IF 2.3 1区哲学

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2024-08-13 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-024-10013-y

Brian Khumalo, Yogi Hale Hendlin

{"title":"Nonveridical biosemiotics and the Interface Theory of Perception: implications for perception-mediated selection","authors":"Brian Khumalo, Yogi Hale Hendlin","doi":"10.1007/s11097-024-10013-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-024-10013-y","url":null,"abstract":"Recently, the relationship between evolutionary ecology and perceptual science has received renewed attention under perception-mediated selection, a mode of natural selection linking perceptual saliency, rather than veridicality, to fitness. The Interface Theory of Perception (ITP) has been especially prominent in claiming that an organism’s perceptual interface is populated by icons, which arise as a function of evolved, species-specific perceptual interfaces that produce approximations of organisms’ environments through fitness-tuned perceptions. According to perception-mediated selection, perception and behavior calibrate one another as organisms’ capacities to experience and know the objects and properties of their environments lead to responses highlighting certain environmental features selected for survival. We argue this occurs via the Umwelt/Umgebung distinction in ethology, demonstrating that organisms interact with their external environments (Umgebung) through constructed perceptual schema (Umwelt) that produce constrained representations of environmental objects and their properties. Following Peircean semiotics, we claim that ITP’s focus on icons as saliency-simplified markers corresponds to biosemiotics’ understanding of perceptual representations, which manifest as iconic (resembling objects), indexical (referring), or symbolic (arbitrary) modalities, which provide for organisms’ semiotic scaffolding. We argue that ITP provides the computational evidence for biosemiotics’ notion of iconicity, while biosemiotics provides explanation within ITP for how iconicity can build up into indices and symbols. The common contention of these separate frameworks that the process of perception tracks saliency rather than veridicality suggests that digital/dyadic perceptual strategies will be outcompeted by their semiotic/triadic counterparts. This carries implications for evolutionary theory as well as theories of cognition.","PeriodicalId":51504,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-08-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142224578","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Keeping cognition kinky: a reply to Moyal-Sharrock on contentful cognition and its origins 保持认知的怪异性：对莫亚尔-沙罗克（Moyal-Sharrock）关于有内容的认知及其起源的答复

IF 2.3 1区哲学

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2024-08-07 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-024-10018-7

Daniel D. Hutto

引用次数: 0

Hinges, philosophy and mind: on Moyal-Sharrock’s certainty in action 铰链、哲学和思想：论莫亚尔-沙洛克的行动确定性

IF 2.3 1区哲学

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2024-08-07 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-024-10016-9

Annalisa Coliva

引用次数: 0

Experience and nature in pragmatism and enactive theory 实用主义和能动理论中的经验与自然

IF 2.3 1区哲学

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2024-08-06 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-024-10012-z

Nathaniel F. Barrett

{"title":"Experience and nature in pragmatism and enactive theory","authors":"Nathaniel F. Barrett","doi":"10.1007/s11097-024-10012-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-024-10012-z","url":null,"abstract":"Enactive theory seems to be reaching a critical juncture in its evolution, as it expands beyond cognitive science to include a project that Shaun Gallagher has called “new naturalism”: a “phenomenologized” reconstruction of nature, directed by a distinctive view of experience that is itself a product of “naturalized phenomenology.” This article aims to contribute to conversations about how to move forward with this project by highlighting important parallels between the trajectory of enactive theory and the early history of pragmatism. Pragmatism was first developed by Peirce, James, and Dewey out of a distinctive view of experience that strongly resembles that of enactive theory. Then, during the first third of the twentieth century, pragmatism evolved into a philosophy of nature and played a leading role in a reconstructive project much like the “new naturalism” proposed by Gallagher and others. Around midcentury, however, this project was largely abandoned as philosophers turned to problems of more limited scope. This history raises crucial questions for proponents of enactive “new naturalism”: Why did the pragmatist version of this project fail to achieve its aims? And how will it be different this time?","PeriodicalId":51504,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences","volume":"57 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141945119","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Self-knowledge from resistance training 从阻力训练中认识自我

IF 2.3 1区哲学

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2024-07-31 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-024-10020-z

Giovanni Rolla

引用次数: 0

Off the beaten path: perception in enactivism and the realism-idealism question 不走寻常路：颁布主义中的感知与现实主义-理想主义问题

IF 2.3 1区哲学

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2024-07-29 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-024-10011-0

Thomas van Es

{"title":"Off the beaten path: perception in enactivism and the realism-idealism question","authors":"Thomas van Es","doi":"10.1007/s11097-024-10011-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-024-10011-0","url":null,"abstract":"Where does enactivism fit on the question of realism or idealism for perception? In recent years all general positions have been argued to be adequate. I will argue that enactivism is neither realist nor idealist, and requires a completely different game altogether. In short: it is not idealist because it sees cognition as inherently world-involving, and isn’t realist because it emphasizes the agent’s role in shaping the world through our own historical, bodily activity. More generally, I argue that the question itself assumes a reified, abstract notion of perception. This introduces a wedge between organism and environment that is incompatible with enactivism’s view of organism and environment as mutually constitutive. This problematizes the intermediate position between realist and idealist extremes as has traditionally been argued for in enactivism. I also touch on the ethical implications of this question, and how enactivism provides a promising path to grapple with the contradiction of the objective, shared space and our individual, historically shaped encounters with it. In sum, I suggest it is time for enactivism to go off the beaten path, and lay its own path in walking again.","PeriodicalId":51504,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences","volume":"43 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141867285","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Aesthetic experiences with others: an enactive account 与他人一起的审美体验：一种积极主动的说法

IF 2.3 1区哲学

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2024-07-26 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-024-10015-w

Harry Drummond

{"title":"Aesthetic experiences with others: an enactive account","authors":"Harry Drummond","doi":"10.1007/s11097-024-10015-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-024-10015-w","url":null,"abstract":"We can look at paintings, listen to music, dance, play instruments, and watch movies, on our own almost anytime, anywhere. That is, we have effortless, on-demand access to an abundance of private aesthetic experiences. Why, then, do we seek out aesthetic experiences together? Indeed, it is not controversial to claim that listening to music, dancing, and watching films are activities that we do together more so than we do on our own. While the significance of interpersonal aesthetic experiences, and what explains that significance, is not uncharted territory, I claim that more precision regarding the kinds of relations and interactions that modulate and enable different kinds of interpersonal aesthetic experiences is warranted than is offered in extant literature. As such, an enactive approach that not only foregrounds embodiment and intersubjectivity in cognition, but duly explains how variations in them cause variations in cognition, is paramount to my explanation. Here, then, I marshal three ‘varieties’ of interpersonal aesthetic experience that I term aggregative, synchronised, and shared aesthetic experiences. In doing so, I explain what makes them particularly worthwhile, while introducing terminological and explanatory clarity to the literature as a unifying base from which future research can unfold.","PeriodicalId":51504,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141784424","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Phenomenology and making sense of the DSM: situatedness in melancholic and atypical depression DSM 的现象学和意义：忧郁症和非典型抑郁症的情景性

IF 2.3 1区哲学

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2024-07-26 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-024-10014-x

Aryan Kavosh

{"title":"Phenomenology and making sense of the DSM: situatedness in melancholic and atypical depression","authors":"Aryan Kavosh","doi":"10.1007/s11097-024-10014-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-024-10014-x","url":null,"abstract":"In light of the recent calls for integrating phenomenology and psychiatry, I will address the problem of heterogeneity in major depressive disorder (MDD) using the phenomenological account of depression put forth by Fernandez (Fernandez, 2014). I will first go over the distinction between two of the major specifiers of major depressive disorder, namely melancholic and atypical depression. Then, I review the account of depression developed by Fernandez, which considers some of the people diagnosed with MDD to have an erosion of the capacity for the category of moods as opposed to a particular kind of mood. I will apply this conception to the diagnostic and statistical manual criteria for melancholic and atypical depression, and consider how reactive and unreactive depressed moods can be clarified using this conception. I argue that we can help our understanding of MDD by viewing melancholic depression as primarily characterized by structural erosion of the person’s situatedness (observed as a lack of mood reactivity) and atypical depression as a state in which the capacity for moods in general has not been eroded (hence, the retention of mood reactivity), with the psychopathology rooted only in the content of experience (the moods themselves). I discuss how this conception related to other phenomenological accounts of depression and why it can be useful in making sense of some clinical observations between the two specifiers, namely the differences in illness severity and symptoms of depersonalization and derealization, before concluding the work by considering its relationship with the operationalized approach of the DSM.","PeriodicalId":51504,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences","volume":"34 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141784576","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Distinguishing imagining from perceiving: reality monitoring and the ‘Perky effect’ 区分想象与感知：现实监控与 "佩奇效应

IF 2.3 1区哲学

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2024-07-25 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-024-10009-8

Cain Todd

引用次数: 0