保持认知的怪异性：对莫亚尔-沙罗克（Moyal-Sharrock）关于有内容的认知及其起源的答复

IF 2 1区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Pub Date : 2024-08-07 DOI:10.1007/s11097-024-10018-7

Daniel D. Hutto

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引用次数: 0

摘要

激进制定主义的倡导者认为，有内容的认知是怪异的，我们需要对其自然起源做出怪异的解释（Hutto & Satne 2017, Hutto, D. D., & Myin, E. (2017)。Evolving enactivism.麻省理工学院出版社）。在推进这一观点的过程中，他们坚持认为，能够进行完整的内容性思维和言语的生物与不能进行完整的内容性思维和言语的生物之间存在着重要的认知差异。此外，他们还认为，成熟的内涵式认知能力需要特殊的解释--它需要一种解释，而这种解释不是对先前存在的认知形式的简单阐述或美化。莫亚尔-沙洛克（Moyal-Sharrock，2021a, 2021b）不认为有必要引入这两种情况。这篇论文回应了她的批评性评价，捍卫了激进的颁布主义立场，即有必要保持内容认知的奇特性。

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Keeping cognition kinky: a reply to Moyal-Sharrock on contentful cognition and its origins

Advocates of radical enactivism maintain that contentful cognition is kinky, and that we need a kinky explanation of its natural origins (Hutto & Satne 2017, Hutto, D. D., & Myin, E. (2017). Evolving enactivism. MIT Press.). In advancing this idea, they maintain that there are qualitatively important cognitive differences between creatures capable of full-fledged contentful thought and speech and those which are not. Moreover, they maintain that the capacity for full-fledged contentful cognition needs special kind of explanation – it needs an explanation that isn’t a simple tale of the mere elaboration or embellishment of prior existing forms of cognition. Moyal-Sharrock (2021a, 2021b) rejects the need to introduce kinks of either sort. This contribution responds to her critical assessment, defending the radical enactivist stance on the need to keep contentful cognition kinky.

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来源期刊

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

5.00

自引率

8.70%

发文量

期刊介绍： Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences is an interdisciplinary, international journal that serves as a forum to explore the intersections between phenomenology, empirical science, and analytic philosophy of mind. The journal represents an attempt to build bridges between continental phenomenological approaches (in the tradition following Husserl) and disciplines that have not always been open to or aware of phenomenological contributions to understanding cognition and related topics. The journal welcomes contributions by phenomenologists, scientists, and philosophers who study cognition, broadly defined to include issues that are open to both phenomenological and empirical investigation, including perception, emotion, language, and so forth. In addition the journal welcomes discussions of methodological issues that involve the variety of approaches appropriate for addressing these problems. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences also publishes critical review articles that address recent work in areas relevant to the connection between empirical results in experimental science and first-person perspective.Double-blind review procedure The journal follows a double-blind reviewing procedure. Authors are therefore requested to place their name and affiliation on a separate page. Self-identifying citations and references in the article text should either be avoided or left blank when manuscripts are first submitted. Authors are responsible for reinserting self-identifying citations and references when manuscripts are prepared for final submission.