预测处理模型中的直接访问问题:超越自然主义的解决方案

IF 2 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Dionysis Christias
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文试图说明,尽管预测处理(PP)的支持者最近试图抵御导致怀疑论的指责(Clark, A. (2016)。冲浪不确定性:预测、行动与具身心灵》。牛津大学出版社,Clark, A. (2019).Replies to critics:In search of the embodied, extended, enactive predictive (EEE-P) mind.In M. Colombo, E. Irvine, & M. Stapleton (Eds.), Andy Clark and his critics (pp. 266-302).牛津大学出版社),容易受到康德式(而非笛卡尔式)怀疑论的不良后果的影响。具体而言,我将论证克拉克版本的密钥容易受到康德式怀疑论的影响,在康德式怀疑论中,密钥生成模型直接揭示的外部世界是康德意义上的现象世界:这种 "内在性 "与康德的不同之处仅在于它是进化的结果。本文将提出,通过阐明 PP 中关于心灵与世界之间界限的更细微的概念,即区分对心灵(生成模型)与世界之间界限的本体论与认识论的理解,可以避免这些令人怀疑的后果。此外,我们还将论证,为了避免康德式的怀疑论,我们必须从非形而上学和实用主义的角度来理解现象世界与世界本身的区别,将其视为在一个不断变化和不可预测的世界中从认识论角度协调经验探索的框架条件。此外,这种观点似乎还能容纳自生自发主义的见解,而无需接受后者有争议的 "超验唯心主义 "有机体相关本体论。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The problem of direct access in predictive processing models: a transcendental naturalist solution

The paper attempts to show that Predictive Processing (PP), despite recent attempts by its proponents to ward off accusations that lead to skepticism (Clark, A. (2016). Surfing uncertainty: prediction, action and the embodied mind. Oxford University Press, Clark, A. (2019). Replies to critics: In search of the embodied, extended, enactive predictive (EEE-P) mind. In M. Colombo, E. Irvine, & M. Stapleton (Eds.), Andy Clark and his critics (pp. 266–302). Oxford University Press), is susceptible to undesirable skeptical consequences of a Kantian (rather than Cartesian) character. Specifically, I shall argue that Clark’s version of PP is susceptible to a particularly Kantian version of skepticism in which the external world directly revealed by PP generative models is a phenomenal one in the Kantian sense: A world perceived and conceived as external, but at the same time essentially ‘internal’ in its categorial form, where this ‘internality’ only diverges from Kant in that it is a consequence of evolution. It will be suggested that these skeptical consequences can be avoided by articulating a more nuanced notion of the boundary between mind and world in PP, namely, one that differentiates an ontological from an epistemological understanding of the boundary between mind (generative model) and world. Moreover, it will be argued that in order to avoid Kantian skepticism, we must construe the very distinction between the phenomenal world and the world as it is in itself in non-metaphysical, pragmatic terms, as a framework condition for epistemically coordinating empirical inquiry within an ever-changing and unpredictable world. As a bonus, this view seems capable of accommodating the insights of autopoietic enactivism without buying into the latter’s controversial ‘transcendental idealist’ organism-relative ontology.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
5.00
自引率
8.70%
发文量
72
期刊介绍: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences is an interdisciplinary, international journal that serves as a forum to explore the intersections between phenomenology, empirical science, and analytic philosophy of mind. The journal represents an attempt to build bridges between continental phenomenological approaches (in the tradition following Husserl) and disciplines that have not always been open to or aware of phenomenological contributions to understanding cognition and related topics. The journal welcomes contributions by phenomenologists, scientists, and philosophers who study cognition, broadly defined to include issues that are open to both phenomenological and empirical investigation, including perception, emotion, language, and so forth. In addition the journal welcomes discussions of methodological issues that involve the variety of approaches appropriate for addressing these problems.    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences also publishes critical review articles that address recent work in areas relevant to the connection between empirical results in experimental science and first-person perspective.Double-blind review procedure The journal follows a double-blind reviewing procedure. Authors are therefore requested to place their name and affiliation on a separate page. Self-identifying citations and references in the article text should either be avoided or left blank when manuscripts are first submitted. Authors are responsible for reinserting self-identifying citations and references when manuscripts are prepared for final submission.
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