发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

Journal of Financial Intermediation最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Religion and branch banking 宗教与银行分行
IF 3.1 1区 经济学
Journal of Financial Intermediation Pub Date : 2024-10-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101115
Junyong Lee , Kyounghun Lee , Frederick Dongchuhl Oh
{"title":"Religion and branch banking","authors":"Junyong Lee ,&nbsp;Kyounghun Lee ,&nbsp;Frederick Dongchuhl Oh","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101115","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101115","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study aims to examine whether religion influences branch banking. Using a large sample of U.S. county-level branch banking and religious characteristics data between 1994 and 2018, we find that the local religiosity of the bank headquarters’ region is positively related to the presence of bank branches. By contrast, banks in regions with more Catholics than Protestants are less likely to have branches. Moreover, religious diversity negatively affects branch banking. Overall, our study highlights the significant role of local religions in branch-banking decisions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":"60 ","pages":"Article 101115"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142426095","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The costs of corporate debt overhang 公司债务悬置的成本
IF 3.1 1区 经济学
Journal of Financial Intermediation Pub Date : 2024-10-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101118
Kristian Blickle , João A.C. Santos
{"title":"The costs of corporate debt overhang","authors":"Kristian Blickle ,&nbsp;João A.C. Santos","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101118","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101118","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We make use of rich U.S. data to show that debt overhang significantly reduces firm asset-, capex-, and employee-growth. We show these contractions are likely driven by firm decisions as opposed to the result of credit constraints or changes in investment opportunities. Our measure of overhang – liabilities to cash flow — aligns with traditional theory and focuses on the importance of a firm’s debt servicing capacity. It further allows us to capitalize on the COVID-19 shock as a quasi-natural experiment to confirm the impact of overhang on firm investment and growth.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":"60 ","pages":"Article 101118"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142572183","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Can information imprecision be valuable? The case of credit ratings 信息不精确是否有价值？信用评级案例
IF 3.1 1区 经济学
Journal of Financial Intermediation Pub Date : 2024-10-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101114
Sonny Biswas , Kostas Koufopoulos , Anjan V. Thakor
{"title":"Can information imprecision be valuable? The case of credit ratings","authors":"Sonny Biswas ,&nbsp;Kostas Koufopoulos ,&nbsp;Anjan V. Thakor","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101114","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101114","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We develop a model in which credit ratings are endogenously coarse relative to the underlying default probabilities, and ratings precision is countercyclical. Ratings coarseness arises from the profit-maximizing behavior of rating agencies, and coarseness may maximize welfare even when greater ratings precision is costlessly available. Because the private outcome may differ from the socially desirable outcome, a social planner can improve welfare by putting a ceiling (floor) on the rating agency’s fee if the desired outcome is coarseness (precision). Strikingly, when information production is costless, ratings coarseness is socially optimal, but it does not arise in the laissez-faire equilibrium, thus inviting regulatory intervention.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":"60 ","pages":"Article 101114"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142426094","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Transparency and bank runs 透明度和银行挤兑
IF 3.1 1区 经济学
Journal of Financial Intermediation Pub Date : 2024-10-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101120
Cecilia Parlatore
{"title":"Transparency and bank runs","authors":"Cecilia Parlatore","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101120","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101120","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In a banking model with imperfect information, I find that more precise information increases the economy’s vulnerability to bank runs. For low information quality, depositors cannot distinguish bad from good states based on their information and, absent liquidity shocks, have no incentives to withdraw early. As information quality increases and signals become more informative, depositors’ incentives to withdraw strengthen and run-proof contracts become costlier in risk-sharing terms: to prevent runs, the bank must offer less to early withdrawers. When information quality is high enough, the bank would rather forgo return and hold excess liquidity than choose a run-proof deposit contract.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":"60 ","pages":"Article 101120"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142699484","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Security design: A review 安全设计：综述
IF 3.1 1区 经济学
Journal of Financial Intermediation Pub Date : 2024-09-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101113
Franklin Allen , Adelina Barbalau
{"title":"Security design: A review","authors":"Franklin Allen ,&nbsp;Adelina Barbalau","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101113","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101113","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Security design, which broadly speaking deals with the issue of designing optimal contractual mechanisms for overcoming various frictions between agents, is the subject of an extensive literature. This paper presents a review of recent work on security design and is organized around the applications of security design in various fields of finance starting with classic corporate finance applications such as capital structure and corporate governance, financial intermediation applications such as securitization and contingent capital, the interaction of market and security design, as well as emerging applications such as fintech, sustainable finance and healthcare finance. Future research is also discussed.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":"60 ","pages":"Article 101113"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S104295732400041X/pdfft?md5=f3f3e147217a9227d9526a3956c7b047&pid=1-s2.0-S104295732400041X-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142167493","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Collateral requirements and corporate policy decisions 抵押要求和公司政策决定
IF 3.1 1区 经济学
Journal of Financial Intermediation Pub Date : 2024-08-21 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101104
Kizkitza Biguri , Jörg R. Stahl
{"title":"Collateral requirements and corporate policy decisions","authors":"Kizkitza Biguri ,&nbsp;Jörg R. Stahl","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101104","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101104","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We challenge the theorized trade-off between risk management and investment due to collateral constraints. We compile a unique dataset of derivative transactions and collateral for U.S. public firms. Exploiting exogenous variation in cash-collateral, we observe significant effects on hedging but no impact on investment. Variations in PPE-collateral, instead, impact investment but show no association with hedging. Our findings suggest that a firm’s assets should not be seen as interchangeable; they rather play distinct roles in the collateralization process.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":"60 ","pages":"Article 101104"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142129562","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Effects of financing constraints on maintenance investments in rent-stabilized apartments 融资限制对租金稳定公寓维护投资的影响
IF 3.1 1区 经济学
Journal of Financial Intermediation Pub Date : 2024-08-10 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101103
Lee Seltzer
{"title":"Effects of financing constraints on maintenance investments in rent-stabilized apartments","authors":"Lee Seltzer","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101103","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101103","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper studies whether financing constraints adversely affect renters by reducing maintenance. Consistent with a sensitivity of maintenance to financial resources, housing code violations increased after a change in the law that effectively decreased cash flows available to maintain some rent-stabilized buildings in New York City. The effect is most severe when financing constraints are present. Moreover, results of panel regressions using a dataset of 45 cities obtained with Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests are consistent with a hypothesis that buildings with higher LTV ratio mortgages have more code violations. Together, the results provide evidence that financing constraints reduce maintenance, an outcome that exacerbates the unintended consequences of rent control.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":"59 ","pages":"Article 101103"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142002285","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Access to credit and firm survival during a crisis: The case of zero-bank-debt firms 危机期间获得信贷与企业生存：零银行债务企业的案例
IF 3.1 1区 经济学
Journal of Financial Intermediation Pub Date : 2024-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101102
Roberto Blanco, Miguel García-Posada, Sergio Mayordomo, María Rodríguez-Moreno
{"title":"Access to credit and firm survival during a crisis: The case of zero-bank-debt firms","authors":"Roberto Blanco,&nbsp;Miguel García-Posada,&nbsp;Sergio Mayordomo,&nbsp;María Rodríguez-Moreno","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101102","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101102","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Before the Covid-19 crisis, zero-bank-debt firms, especially risky ones, faced, due to their lack of credit history, more difficult access to bank loans than firms which previously had bank debt. These credit constraints were tightened by the Covid shock, irrespective of firms’ risk, arguably because of increased information asymmetries during a period of high macroeconomic uncertainty. Zero-bank-debt firms, even those which were safe and profitable, were also far more likely to leave the market during the pandemic than firms which previously had bank debt. However, those zero-bank-debt firms that did obtain new credit reduced their probability of exit.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":"59 ","pages":"Article 101102"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141993257","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Monetary easing, lack of investment and financial instability 货币宽松、投资不足和金融不稳定
IF 3.1 1区 经济学
Journal of Financial Intermediation Pub Date : 2024-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101100
Viral V. Acharya , Guillaume Plantin , Pietro Reggiani , Iris Yao
{"title":"Monetary easing, lack of investment and financial instability","authors":"Viral V. Acharya ,&nbsp;Guillaume Plantin ,&nbsp;Pietro Reggiani ,&nbsp;Iris Yao","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101100","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101100","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Low monetary policy rates lower the cost of capital for firms, thereby spurring productive investment. Low interest rates however can also induce the private sector to enter into risky carry trades when they imply that the earned carry more than offsets liquidity risk. Such carry trades and productive investment compete for funds, so much so that the former may crowd out the latter. Below an endogenous lower bound, monetary easing generates only limited capital expenditures that come at the cost of large and destabilizing financial risk-taking. Absent the ability to regulate carry trades, monetary easing must be complemented with a restrictive emergency-lending policy in the form of higher lending rates so as to discourage risk-taking by relatively illiquid firms. Monetary easing, tepid investment response, and rollover risk for liquid firms then arise jointly (and optimally) in equilibrium.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":"59 ","pages":"Article 101100"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141846908","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Distortionary effects of PPP loans on business competition 购买力平价贷款对商业竞争的扭曲效应
IF 3.1 1区 经济学
Journal of Financial Intermediation Pub Date : 2024-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101099
Eva Steiner , Alexei Tchistyi
{"title":"Distortionary effects of PPP loans on business competition","authors":"Eva Steiner ,&nbsp;Alexei Tchistyi","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101099","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101099","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study the effects of PPP loans on business competition. We start by introducing temporary cash subsidies into a model of monopolistic competition with differentiated products and heterogeneous production costs. We test the predictions of our model in a sample of U.S. airport hotels for which we observe daily demand, prices, output, and profits. Consistent with model predictions, less profitable businesses were more likely to apply for PPP loans. Businesses with active PPP loans reduced prices, boosting output and profits relative to non-PPP competitors. Those relative differences were reversed once PPP loans expired. We calculate that, for every dollar of PPP subsidies, PPP hotels earned 72.4 cents in extra profits and non-PPP competitors lost 71.4 cents in aggregate. Our results suggest that the PPP initiative distorted competition, imposing significant costs on businesses that chose to forgo these loans.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":"59 ","pages":"Article 101099"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141484100","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
首页 上一页 下一页 尾页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：481959085
Book学术官方微信