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Journal of Financial Intermediation最新文献

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Bank restructuring under asymmetric information: The role of bad loan sales 不对称信息下的银行重组：不良贷款销售的作用
IF 5.2 1区 经济学
Journal of Financial Intermediation Pub Date : 2023-10-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2023.101058
Anatoli Segura , Javier Suarez
{"title":"Bank restructuring under asymmetric information: The role of bad loan sales","authors":"Anatoli Segura ,&nbsp;Javier Suarez","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2023.101058","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2023.101058","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study restructuring solutions to the debt overhang problem faced by banks with a deteriorated loan portfolio in the presence of asymmetric information on loan quality. Classical liability restructuring solutions fail to work because banks can overstate the severity of their bad loan problem to obtain additional concessions from existing creditors. A sufficiently large loan sale requirement to the restructuring banks discourages such an opportunistic behavior, so a suitably chosen menu of loan sales cum liability restructuring is able to solve the debt overhang. We discuss the implementation of such a solution for banks funded with insured deposits through loan sales to outside investors supported by an asset protection scheme sponsored by the deposit insurance fund.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.2,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50178127","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Whose bailout is it anyway? The roles of politics in PPP bailouts of small businesses vs. banks 到底是谁的救助?政治在公私合营小企业与银行救助中的作用
IF 5.2 1区 经济学
Journal of Financial Intermediation Pub Date : 2023-10-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2023.101044
Allen N. Berger , Mustafa U. Karakaplan , Raluca A. Roman
{"title":"Whose bailout is it anyway? The roles of politics in PPP bailouts of small businesses vs. banks","authors":"Allen N. Berger ,&nbsp;Mustafa U. Karakaplan ,&nbsp;Raluca A. Roman","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2023.101044","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfi.2023.101044","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p><span><span>We address whether politics played important roles in allocating Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) bailout funds, and whether PPP allocations effectively bailed out small businesses vs. banks. Our </span>econometric evidence suggests that politicians/other government agents at </span><em>national</em> and <em>local</em> levels effectively steered PPP funds toward small businesses and banks based on their locations to try to influence election outcomes. We also uncover evidence that some PPP funds were effectively allocated by lobbying efforts of certain banks. Findings are confirmed by a novel mediation analysis and numerous robustness checks. We also find banks profited from PPP through multiple channels, adding to extant findings, and suggesting that PPP may have effectively bailed out banks as well as small businesses, but through different political influences.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.2,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43474148","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Testing dividend tax theory: Firm and industry heterogeneity 股息税理论检验：企业和行业异质性
IF 5.2 1区 经济学
Journal of Financial Intermediation Pub Date : 2023-10-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2023.101060
Robert DeYoung , Karen Y. Jang
{"title":"Testing dividend tax theory: Firm and industry heterogeneity","authors":"Robert DeYoung ,&nbsp;Karen Y. Jang","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2023.101060","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2023.101060","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The Jobs Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 cut the top dividend tax rate in the U.S. by more than half, yet numerous studies of nonfinancial firms have failed to detect the expected supply-side stimulus to capital investment. We test the impact of this tax cut on U.S. commercial banks and find that bank lending responded differently, conditional on banks’ access to external capital as well as their reliance on internal liquidity. Our heterogeneous results include support for all three branches of dividend tax theory. Loan growth increased the most at publicly traded banks with relatively illiquid balance sheets and increased by the least (or not at all) at untraded banks with relatively liquid balance sheets. Consistent with previous studies, we find increased dividend payouts at all subsets of banks. We conjecture that the effectively short maturities of bank loan contracts made banks better able to respond positively to this tax cut and provide some suggestive evidence in support of this conjecture.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.2,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50178130","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The information content from lending relationships across the supply chain 供应链中借贷关系的信息内容
IF 5.2 1区 经济学
Journal of Financial Intermediation Pub Date : 2023-10-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2023.101057
Theo Cotrim Martins , Rafael Schiozer , Fernando de Menezes Linardi
{"title":"The information content from lending relationships across the supply chain","authors":"Theo Cotrim Martins ,&nbsp;Rafael Schiozer ,&nbsp;Fernando de Menezes Linardi","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2023.101057","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2023.101057","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Using unique administrative data on firm-to-firm payments and bank-to-firm lending, we investigate how lending to a firm is affected by same-bank lending to the firm's customers and suppliers. We show that the supply of loans to a firm increases when the firm's customers have loans from the same bank. We also find that negative information about a firm's top customer causes banks to tighten the loan supply to the firm, and particularly more so when the firm's sales are concentrated on this customer. These results suggest that lending to firms connected through the supply chain conveys valuable information to banks.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.2,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50178128","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Internal ratings and bank opacity: Evidence from analysts’ forecasts 内部评级和银行不透明:来自分析师预测的证据
IF 5.2 1区 经济学
Journal of Financial Intermediation Pub Date : 2023-10-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2023.101062
Brunella Bruno , Immacolata Marino , Giacomo Nocera
{"title":"Internal ratings and bank opacity: Evidence from analysts’ forecasts","authors":"Brunella Bruno ,&nbsp;Immacolata Marino ,&nbsp;Giacomo Nocera","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2023.101062","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2023.101062","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We document that reliance on internal ratings-based (IRB) models to compute credit risk and capital requirements reduces bank opacity. Greater reliance on IRB models is associated with lower absolute forecast error and reduced disagreement among analysts regarding expected bank earnings per share. These results are stronger for banks that apply internal ratings to the most opaque loans and adopt the advanced version of IRB models, which entail a more granular risk assessment and greater disclosure of risk parameters. The results stem from the higher earnings informativeness and the more comprehensive disclosure of credit risk in banks adopting internal ratings. We employ an instrumental variables approach to validate our findings.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.2,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1042957323000451/pdfft?md5=6c0f474c8d634eb7273f7eab82aa10d3&pid=1-s2.0-S1042957323000451-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"92100483","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Crowded out from the beginning: Impact of government debt on corporate financing 从一开始就被排挤：政府债务对企业融资的影响
IF 5.2 1区 经济学
Journal of Financial Intermediation Pub Date : 2023-10-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2023.101046
Cagri Akkoyun , Nuri Ersahin , Christopher M. James
{"title":"Crowded out from the beginning: Impact of government debt on corporate financing","authors":"Cagri Akkoyun ,&nbsp;Nuri Ersahin ,&nbsp;Christopher M. James","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2023.101046","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2023.101046","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Using hand-collected data on corporate bond and stock offerings, we identify the impact of government debt on corporate financing during World War I. The early twentieth century provides a unique opportunity to identify the impact of government debt on private financing because during this period (1) firms announced the amount they wanted to raise before each security offering and (2) the Treasury issued debt in discrete intervals. We identify the impact of Treasury issues by comparing differences in the amount firms offered to the amount they actually raised when the Treasury was borrowing to when the Treasury was not in the market. We find that long-term government bond offerings negatively affect both amount of long-term corporate bonds and dividend paying stocks issued. In contrast, we find no effect on short-term debt issue. Our findings suggest that investors view stable dividend paying stocks a close substitute for relatively safe long-term bonds.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.2,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50178126","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Did doubling reserve requirements cause the 1937–38 recession? New evidence on the impact of reserve requirements on bank reserve demand and lending 准备金率翻倍是否导致了1937-38年的经济衰退？准备金率对银行准备金需求和贷款影响的新证据
IF 5.2 1区 经济学
Journal of Financial Intermediation Pub Date : 2023-10-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2023.101056
Charles W. Calomiris , Joseph R. Mason , David C. Wheelock
{"title":"Did doubling reserve requirements cause the 1937–38 recession? New evidence on the impact of reserve requirements on bank reserve demand and lending","authors":"Charles W. Calomiris ,&nbsp;Joseph R. Mason ,&nbsp;David C. Wheelock","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2023.101056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2023.101056","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In 1936–37, the Federal Reserve doubled member banks’ reserve requirements. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) famously argued that the doubling increased reserve demand and forced the money supply to contract, which they argued caused the recession of 1937–38. Using a new database on individual banks, we find that higher reserve requirements did not generally increase banks’ reserve demand or contract lending because reserve requirements were not binding for most banks. Aggregate effects on credit supply from reserve requirement increases were therefore economically small and statistically zero.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.2,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50178129","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Determinants of strategic behavior: Evidence from a foreclosure moratorium 战略行为的决定因素：止赎禁令的证据
IF 5.2 1区 经济学
Journal of Financial Intermediation Pub Date : 2023-10-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2023.101059
Nikolaos Artavanis , Ioannis Spyridopoulos
{"title":"Determinants of strategic behavior: Evidence from a foreclosure moratorium","authors":"Nikolaos Artavanis ,&nbsp;Ioannis Spyridopoulos","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2023.101059","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2023.101059","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study mortgagors’ attitudes toward strategic behavior following a foreclosure moratorium in Greece. To identify strategic delinquencies, we exploit the concurrent introduction of a debt discharge process that provides generous debt relief for borrowers who prove their inability to pay but entails high costs for those who can afford their mortgages. This setting creates distinct optimal strategies for delinquent borrowers: non-strategic mortgagors participate in the debt discharge process, whereas strategic borrowers use the moratorium to protect their homes. Our results indicate that borrower sophistication, aversion to moral hazard, banking relationships, and preference for liquidity play an important role in strategic behavior.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.2,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50178062","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Did Doubling Reserve Requirements Cause the 1937-38 Recession? New Evidence on the Impact of Reserve Requirements on Bank Reserve Demand and Lending 两倍的储备要求是1937-38年经济衰退的原因吗？准备金要求对银行准备金需求和贷款影响的新证据
IF 5.2 1区 经济学
Journal of Financial Intermediation Pub Date : 2023-09-01 DOI: 10.20955/wp.2022.011
David C. Wheelock, J. Mason, Charles W. Calomiris
{"title":"Did Doubling Reserve Requirements Cause the 1937-38 Recession? New Evidence on the Impact of Reserve Requirements on Bank Reserve Demand and Lending","authors":"David C. Wheelock, J. Mason, Charles W. Calomiris","doi":"10.20955/wp.2022.011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.20955/wp.2022.011","url":null,"abstract":"In 1936-37, the Federal Reserve doubled member banks’ reserve requirements. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) famously argued that the doubling increased reserve demand and forced the money supply to contract, which they argued caused the recession of 1937-38. Using a new database on individual banks, we show that higher reserve requirements did not generally increase banks’ reserve demand or contract lending because reserve requirements were not binding for most banks. Aggregate effects on credit supply from reserve requirement increases were therefore economically small and statistically zero. The authors thank Jason Dunn, Jamie Kurash, Hong Lee, David Lopez, Peter McCrory, and Paul Morris for research assistance, and Matt Jaremski and Allan Meltzer for helpful discussions. Views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis or the Federal Reserve System.","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.2,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43345369","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Shadow banking of non-financial firms: Arbitrage between formal and informal credit markets in China 非金融企业的影子银行:中国正规和非正规信贷市场之间的套利
IF 5.2 1区 经济学
Journal of Financial Intermediation Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2023.101032
Julan Du , Chang Li , Yongqin Wang
{"title":"Shadow banking of non-financial firms: Arbitrage between formal and informal credit markets in China","authors":"Julan Du ,&nbsp;Chang Li ,&nbsp;Yongqin Wang","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2023.101032","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfi.2023.101032","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In China's credit markets with financial repression, state-controlled non-financial firms (SOEs) are privileged in gaining access to bank credit, while non-SOEs, especially those small- and medium-sized firms, are disadvantaged. Corporate re-lending emerges as a response wherein the former secure bank loans and then re-lend to the latter. We document the characteristics of inter-corporate loans from a sample of legal cases. We employ four empirical strategies to conduct a forensic study of re-lending by detecting abnormal relations between financial accounts of listed firms. State-controlled companies conduct more re-lending, and firms with better growth opportunities, stronger corporate governance, and more financial constraints engage less. We compare re-lending with entrusted loans and find that firms extending nonaffiliated entrusted loans conduct re-lending actively, while firms offering affiliated entrusted loans do not. We also compare inter-corporate loans with micro-credit company loans in a review of legal cases.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.2,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46610651","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
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