Claudio Bassi , Markus Behn , Michael Grill , Martin Waibel
{"title":"Window dressing of regulatory metrics: Evidence from repo markets","authors":"Claudio Bassi , Markus Behn , Michael Grill , Martin Waibel","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101086","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101086","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper investigates both the magnitude and the drivers of bank window dressing behavior in euro-denominated repo markets. Using a confidential transaction-level data set, our analysis illustrates that banks engineer an economically sizeable contraction in their repo transactions around regulatory reporting dates. We establish a causal link between these reductions and banks’ incentives to window dress and document the role of the leverage ratio and the G-SIB framework as the most relevant drivers of window dressing behavior. Our findings suggest that regulatory action is warranted to limit banks’ ability to window dress.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":"58 ","pages":"Article 101086"},"PeriodicalIF":5.2,"publicationDate":"2024-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140147431","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Intergenerational bankruptcy risks: Learning from parents’ mistakes","authors":"Sumit Agarwal , Tien Foo Sing , Xiaoyu Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101087","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101087","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This study investigates inter-generational transmissions of parental bankruptcy shock on children's financial behavior in adulthood. Our results show that younger children who were 9 years or below when their parents declared bankruptcy were 2–3 % points less likely to declare bankruptcy than their older siblings who were 10 years and older when the parents’ bankruptcy event occurred. We rule out alternative hypotheses, including birth order, cohort effects, and truncated sample bias. We find corroborative evidence for the “parent socialization” channel, where bankrupt parents, through interactions with children during childhood years, influence their financial behavior and reduce the risks of their children repeating the same mistakes in adulthood.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":"59 ","pages":"Article 101087"},"PeriodicalIF":5.2,"publicationDate":"2024-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140076338","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Inter-firm relationships and the special role of common banks","authors":"Emanuela Giacomini , Nitish Kumar , Andy Naranjo","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101084","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101084","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Using a novel dataset that combines information on customer-supplier trade relationships with information on firm-bank lending relationships, we show that common banks that lend to firms at both ends of a trade link grow and strengthen such trade relationships. To establish causality, we use bank mergers, which generate exogenous variations in the presence of common banks, and show that common bank relationships between customers and suppliers increase trade relationships by 49.6%. We find that the role of a common bank is greater when it is more informed and when supply chains suffer from larger information and holdup problems. We also document that suppliers with common banks face lower spillover risks from a distressed customer. Overall, our findings show the unique role of banks in driving inter-firm growth and investment by mitigating information and holdup problems, which arguably leads to greater economic growth.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":"58 ","pages":"Article 101084"},"PeriodicalIF":5.2,"publicationDate":"2024-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140018500","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Bruce D. Grundy , Patrick Verwijmeren , Antti Yang
{"title":"Intermediary frictions and convertible bond pricing","authors":"Bruce D. Grundy , Patrick Verwijmeren , Antti Yang","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101085","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101085","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Buy-and-hedge intermediaries are important investors in the convertible bond market as they intermediate between firms that require capital quickly and investors requiring time to assess the security. Their strategy requires them to manage the trade-offs involved with the costs and benefits of hedging. We find that prices of convertible securities reflect the costs that intermediaries incur when managing their positions. Especially cross-sectional and within-bond variation of intermediaries’ loan costs helps explain variation in convertible bond underpricing.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":"58 ","pages":"Article 101085"},"PeriodicalIF":5.2,"publicationDate":"2024-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1042957324000135/pdfft?md5=3b92abdefdabd75e2239ad2db12eee61&pid=1-s2.0-S1042957324000135-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139955157","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Central bank asset purchases and lending: Impact on search frictions","authors":"Reiko Tobe , Jun Uno","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101075","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101075","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We investigate the impact of two central bank policies, asset purchases and asset lending, on the search frictions in the government bond market in Japan. We build a search-theoretic model to explore the impact of a central bank’s securities lending facility (SLF) by introducing a central bank as a lender. We test model predictions using intraday data from an electronic platform for Japanese government bonds. First, we find large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs) increase order imbalance in the repurchase agreement (repo) market. Threshold analysis reveals that asset purchase amounts exceeding 0.18% of the outstanding, which corresponds to 38.98% of our sample, cause a significantly higher imbalance. Second, the SLF has a floor effect on the repo rate by affecting dealers’ choices between the repo market and the SLF. Third, the novel friction measures we test show that LSAPs and the SLF have opposite influences on bargaining power in the repo market.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":"58 ","pages":"Article 101075"},"PeriodicalIF":5.2,"publicationDate":"2024-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139936390","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Andre Guettler , Mahvish Naeem , Lars Norden , Bernardus Van Doornik
{"title":"Pre-publication revisions of bank financial statements: A novel way to monitor banks?","authors":"Andre Guettler , Mahvish Naeem , Lars Norden , Bernardus Van Doornik","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101073","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101073","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We investigate whether pre-publication revisions of bank financial statements contain forward-looking information about bank risk. Using 7.4 million observations of monthly financial reports from all banks in Brazil during 2007–2019, we show that 78 % of all revisions occur before the publication of these statements. The frequency, missing of reporting deadlines, and severity of revisions are positively related to future bank risk. Using machine learning techniques, we provide evidence on mechanisms through which revisions affect bank risk. Our findings suggest that private information about pre-publication revisions is useful for supervisors to monitor banks.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":"58 ","pages":"Article 101073"},"PeriodicalIF":5.2,"publicationDate":"2024-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139772055","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Financial intermediation services and competition analyses: Review and paths forward for improvement","authors":"Allen N. Berger , Arnoud W.A. Boot","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101072","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101072","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Financial intermediation has distinct value from transforming financial claims to create liquidity and mitigate risks. However, research and policy competition analyses often neglect this value or minimally account for it. We review findings to better incorporate this value. We suggest shifting the mix of individual services analyzed to better represent the distinct value, focusing more on topics closely aligned with the distinct value concept beyond individual services, and accounting for the multimarket nature of financial intermediation. We recommend attention on future competition with digital FinTech, BigTech, and DeFi firms and policies to best preserve the distinct value of financial intermediation.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":"57 ","pages":"Article 101072"},"PeriodicalIF":5.2,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139516154","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Agree to disagree: Lender equity holdings, within-syndicate conflicts, and covenant design","authors":"Yongqiang Chu , Luca X. Lin , Zhanbing Xiao","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2023.101065","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2023.101065","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Lenders’ simultaneous equity holdings introduce conflicts of interest among members of syndicated loans. We argue that lenders address such within-syndicate conflicts with financial covenant design to improve contracting efficiency. We show that loans with higher conflicts rely less on performance-based covenants, which serve as tripwires to facilitate ex-post control transfer and require coordination among syndicate members. Instead, high-conflict loans rely more on capital-based covenants to align shareholder-creditor interest ex-ante and incentivize shareholder monitoring. Overall, these results suggest that such conflicts can reduce capital flexibility and renegotiation efficiency for the borrowers.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":"57 ","pages":"Article 101065"},"PeriodicalIF":5.2,"publicationDate":"2023-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138412374","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Bank capital buffers and lending, firm financing and spending: What can we learn from five years of stress test results?✰","authors":"Jose M. Berrospide, Rochelle M. Edge","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2023.101061","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfi.2023.101061","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We use bank-firm matched data to study how the capital buffers that large U.S. banks must satisfy to “pass” the Federal Reserve's stress tests impact banks’ lending and firms’ loan volumes, overall debt, investment, and employment. We find that larger stress-test capital buffers lead to reductions in banks’ lending, modest increases in loan rates and spreads, and reductions in new loan originations. However, we do not find an impact of higher capital buffers on firms’ overall debt, investment, and employment, suggesting that firms find other credit sources to substitute for the reduction in loans from banks that participate in the stress tests.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":"57 ","pages":"Article 101061"},"PeriodicalIF":5.2,"publicationDate":"2023-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136159591","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Bank restructuring under asymmetric information: The role of bad loan sales","authors":"Anatoli Segura , Javier Suarez","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2023.101058","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2023.101058","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study restructuring solutions to the debt overhang problem faced by banks with a deteriorated loan portfolio in the presence of asymmetric information on loan quality. Classical liability restructuring solutions fail to work because banks can overstate the severity of their bad loan problem to obtain additional concessions from existing creditors. A sufficiently large loan sale requirement to the restructuring banks discourages such an opportunistic behavior, so a suitably chosen menu of loan sales cum liability restructuring is able to solve the debt overhang. We discuss the implementation of such a solution for banks funded with insured deposits through loan sales to outside investors supported by an asset protection scheme sponsored by the deposit insurance fund.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":"56 ","pages":"Article 101058"},"PeriodicalIF":5.2,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50178127","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}