{"title":"Financial regulatory cycles: A political economy model","authors":"Pooya Almasi , Jihad Dagher , Carlo Prato","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2025.101164","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfi.2025.101164","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>A historical look at financial boom-bust cycles shows that pro-cyclicality in financial regulation is a common and recurring pattern. This paper shows that inefficient regulatory cycles can naturally arise when electoral concerns are introduced into a simple model of financial intermediation. We explore how financial innovations, public opinion and policymakers’ incentives shape financial regulation within this framework. We show that in the presence of incompetent politicians, competent politicians take regulatory risks to signal their competence. This amplifies the influence of public opinion on policy, leading to an <em>ex ante</em> inefficient pro-cyclicality in financial regulation.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":"63 ","pages":"Article 101164"},"PeriodicalIF":3.7,"publicationDate":"2025-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144724653","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Anticipating binding constraints: An analysis of debt covenants","authors":"Ken Teoh","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2025.101160","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfi.2025.101160","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper shows that anticipation can meaningfully impact inferences about the effects of covenant violations. Using textual analysis of SEC filings and earnings call transcripts, I construct a measure of covenant concerns that identifies instances where firms disclose forward-looking risks related to their debt covenants. On average, nearly 30 percent of U.S. non-financial firms report covenant concerns each year. While the real effects of covenant violations are robust for most outcomes, the estimated impact of some variables, including cash acquisitions, default risk, and credit line availability, can be overstated. This finding highlights the importance of selection around violation: firms that anticipate and successfully avoid violations differ systematically from firms that fail to avoid them.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":"63 ","pages":"Article 101160"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144549218","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Adverse selection in deposit insurance and government funding following the 2023 banking crisis","authors":"David A. Huberdeau-Reid , George G. Pennacchi","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2025.101165","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfi.2025.101165","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine whether U.S. banks whose uninsured deposits were subject to greater risk of loss prior to the March 2023 banking crisis used institutional mechanisms to expand their deposit insurance or accessed government funding after the crisis. We construct a bank-level measure of pre-crisis uninsured depositor risk incorporating financial statements, unrealized security losses, and estimates of unrealized loan losses that predicts a bank’s post-crisis loss of uninsured deposits. We find that riskier small and midsize banks tended to utilize reciprocal, sweep, and brokered deposits, but not listing service deposits, to attract more insured deposits. Riskier small and midsize banks temporarily accessed FHLB advances while only risky midsize banks borrowed from the Discount Window. Risk did not predict banks’ use of Fed BTFP funding. Riskier banks, particularly small and midsize ones, paid relatively higher interest rates on many types of deposits.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":"63 ","pages":"Article 101165"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144670982","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Peter Bednarek , Olga Briukhova , Steven Ongena , Natalja v. Westernhagen
{"title":"Effects of bank capital requirements on lending by banks and non-bank financial institutions","authors":"Peter Bednarek , Olga Briukhova , Steven Ongena , Natalja v. Westernhagen","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2025.101167","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfi.2025.101167","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>What is the impact of a sudden and sizeable increase in bank capital requirements on the lending activity by directly affected banks and by non-affected non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs)? To answer this question, we apply a difference-in-differences methodology around the capital exercise by the European Banking Authority (EBA) in 2011 with German credit register data. We find that insurance companies, financial enterprises, and factoring companies — but not leasing companies or very large NBFIs — and Non-EBA banks expand their corporate lending relative to EBA banks. In particular, NBFIs use the opportunity to expand their credit activities, in riskier and more competitive borrower segments.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":"63 ","pages":"Article 101167"},"PeriodicalIF":3.7,"publicationDate":"2025-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144724654","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Open data and API adoption of U.S. banks","authors":"Xiangyu Lin , S. Sarah Zhang , Markos Zachariadis","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2025.101162","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfi.2025.101162","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Bank adoption of external application programming interfaces (APIs) enables bank customers to share their data more efficiently and securely with other third-party financial institutions and FinTechs, thus enabling open banking and bank data portability. Analyzing determinants of API adoption by U.S. banks from 2007 to 2022, we show that banks that adopt APIs tend to be larger and face lower competitive pressures. The announcement of President Biden’s executive order in July 2021 encouraged increased bank data portability and led to an acceleration in bank API adoption. Banks that adopt APIs experience an increase in Return on Assets (<em>ROA</em>) and <em>Tobin’s Q</em> and a decrease in loan loss provisions, particularly after President Biden’s executive order. We find that APIs’ ability to facilitate data access and sharing improves bank information flows and supports banks’ loan and deposit services which form the foundation of notable improvements in bank performance. Overall, our results on the determinants and implications of API adoption have important policy implications for the discussion on open banking regulation and bank data portability.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":"63 ","pages":"Article 101162"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144321246","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Sergio Leão , Rafael Schiozer , Raquel F. Oliveira , Gustavo Araujo
{"title":"Lending relationships and access to currency hedging: Evidence from Brazil","authors":"Sergio Leão , Rafael Schiozer , Raquel F. Oliveira , Gustavo Araujo","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2025.101153","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfi.2025.101153","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Firms’ currency exposure can lead to financial distress and macroeconomic instability. Over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives provided by financial institutions are the primary risk management tool for nonfinancial firms. However, the role of financial institutions in providing these derivatives remains underexplored in the literature. Using novel loan and derivatives microdata, we examine how lending relationships influence access to foreign exchange (FX) OTC derivatives. We find that firms are more likely to trade derivatives with their lending relationship banks than with other banks, with a stronger preference for their main lender. These effects are more pronounced for small firms and first-time derivatives users, highlighting how lending relationships reduce informational and search costs, thereby facilitating access to hedging. Additionally, derivatives prices are lower when traded with the firms’ main lender and lenders providing loans in foreign currency, indicating that banks encourage hedging to reduce risks in their loan portfolios.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":"63 ","pages":"Article 101153"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144470008","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Manthos Delis , Fulvia Fringuellotti , Maria Iosifidi , Steven Ongena
{"title":"Credit and entrepreneurs’ income","authors":"Manthos Delis , Fulvia Fringuellotti , Maria Iosifidi , Steven Ongena","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2025.101161","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfi.2025.101161","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Small business entrepreneurs facing credit constraints may experience significantly different future income trajectories compared to their unconstrained counterparts. We quantify this difference using uniquely detailed loan application data and a regression discontinuity design based on a bank’s credit score cutoff rule employed in the loan approval process. Our findings indicate that loan acceptance increases recipients’ real income by 11 % five years later compared to rejected applicants. This effect persists across a wide range of robustness tests and is primarily driven by the utilization of borrowed funds for profitable investments, as captured by the bank’s ex-ante soft information and the ex-post firm performance. Additionally, within the cohort of accepted applicants, future income is higher for those who were easily accepted compared to marginally accepted borrowers with similar creditworthiness, highlighting the important efficiency effects of loan usage.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":"63 ","pages":"Article 101161"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144279904","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Geographic diversification, climate risk, and bank lending: Evidence from farm loans","authors":"Emdad Islam , Mandeep Singh","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2025.101152","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfi.2025.101152","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study examines how geographically diversified banks adjust lending practices in response to abnormal hot temperatures, a proxy for climate risk, and finds that these banks reduce small farm lending by 2–3 percent more than geographically constrained banks after a standard deviation increase in abnormal temperatures. Geographically diversified banks demonstrate proactive portfolio risk management by prioritizing credit in core markets and reallocating funds away from high-risk non-core regions, leaving lending gaps in affected counties. These findings highlight the importance of geographic diversification in building climate resiliency for banks while reducing the total credit available to farmers in a region.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":"63 ","pages":"Article 101152"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144169215","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Sideshow or center stage? Information transmission between CDS and equity markets","authors":"Alexandre Rubesam, Paul Zimmermann","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2025.101151","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfi.2025.101151","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Recent studies provide strong evidence that credit default swap (CDS) markets play a leading role in information intermediation. This paper proposes a model to rationalize the information transmission mechanism between the CDS and equity markets. In our model, informed traders with an informational advantage obtained from monitoring credit markets engage in capital structure arbitrage and trade strategically to exploit mispricings between individual stocks and CDS. In line with our model’s prediction, our empirical results provide evidence of a contemporaneous channel transmitting structural CDS shocks to equities. A positive shock to CDS decreases stock returns contemporaneously and over the long run. This credit-to-equity channel dominates the reverse transmission channel from stocks to CDS. Robustness tests confirm the role of the CDS market as a preferred venue for informed trading, independently of credit rating events or business sectors.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":"63 ","pages":"Article 101151"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144068387","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Carbon transition risk and corporate loan securitization","authors":"Isabella Mueller , Huyen Nguyen , Trang Nguyen","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2025.101146","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfi.2025.101146","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We examine how banks manage carbon transition risk by selling loans given to polluting borrowers to less regulated shadow banks in securitization markets. Exploiting the election of Donald Trump as an exogenous shock that reduces carbon transition risk, we find that banks engage in regulatory arbitrage and use brown loan securitization to manage their exposure to carbon transition risk. Banks are more likely to securitize brown loans when carbon transition risk is high but keep these loans on their balance sheets when the risk is reduced. In addition, securitization enables banks to offer lower interest rates to polluting borrowers but does not affect the supply of green loans. Our findings are more pronounced among banks with low levels of capitalization, domestic banks, and banks that do not display green lending preferences. We discuss how securitization can weaken the effectiveness of bank climate policies.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":"63 ","pages":"Article 101146"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143948664","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}