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Journal of Financial Intermediation最新文献

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Loan market benefits of (High) IPO underpricing 贷款市场受益（高）IPO定价过低
IF 3.1 1区 经济学
Journal of Financial Intermediation Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101132
Xunhua Su , Donghang Zhang , Xiaoyu Zhang
{"title":"Loan market benefits of (High) IPO underpricing","authors":"Xunhua Su ,&nbsp;Donghang Zhang ,&nbsp;Xiaoyu Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101132","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101132","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We provide novel evidence on the loan market benefits of high IPO underpricing. We show that greater underpricing is associated with a significantly larger within-firm reduction of post-IPO borrowing costs. This benefit of underpricing is less pronounced for firms with high ex-ante information asymmetry and is concentrated in firms with a high demand for advertisements. In addition, neither price revision before the IPO nor the short-term or long-term stock return after the IPO has a similar effect. Our results suggest that underpricing affects borrowing costs through an attention channel and highlight a real economic effect of underpricing from the loan market.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":"61 ","pages":"Article 101132"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143141069","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Scope and limits of bank liquidity creation 银行流动性创造的范围和限制
IF 3.1 1区 经济学
Journal of Financial Intermediation Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101123
Diemo Dietrich , Thomas Gehrig
{"title":"Scope and limits of bank liquidity creation","authors":"Diemo Dietrich ,&nbsp;Thomas Gehrig","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101123","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101123","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In standard banking models a demand for liquidity arises because investors want to take precautions against sudden consumption needs. It has long been taken for granted that banks’ maturity transformation is because they insure against such risk, exposing them to crises and justifying bank regulation. We show that if a demand for liquidity arises additionally for another important reason, their co-existence substantially alters equilibrium outcomes. Specifically, we introduce investors who want to preserve flexibility in case better investment opportunities arrive later. We show that (1) there is no maturity transformation if the funding liquidity of new investment opportunities is not sufficiently limited, (2) equilibria in models that consider only a single reason for liquidity demand are not necessarily robust, (3) an equilibrium in pure strategies in the depositing game may not exist at all.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":"61 ","pages":"Article 101123"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143097463","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Firm-level ESG information and active fund management 公司层面的环境、社会和公司治理信息与主动基金管理
IF 3.1 1区 经济学
Journal of Financial Intermediation Pub Date : 2024-10-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101122
Linquan Chen , Yao Chen , Alok Kumar , Woon Sau Leung
{"title":"Firm-level ESG information and active fund management","authors":"Linquan Chen ,&nbsp;Yao Chen ,&nbsp;Alok Kumar ,&nbsp;Woon Sau Leung","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101122","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101122","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Using a novel dataset with daily firm-level ESG information, we examine whether and how active mutual fund managers integrate ESG information into their portfolio decisions. Our results show that managers actively trade on ESG information, leading to improved portfolio performance. This enhanced risk-adjusted return is attributed to the incorporation of ESG information into asset prices rather than to price pressure on green assets. Additionally, fund managers adjust their portfolios to cater to investor demand, especially during periods of heightened ESG awareness. Further, funds located in Democratic states and those with higher ESG ratings exhibit a stronger inclination towards ESG integration.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":"60 ","pages":"Article 101122"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142699483","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Optimal timing of policy interventions in troubled banks 对问题银行进行政策干预的最佳时机
IF 3.1 1区 经济学
Journal of Financial Intermediation Pub Date : 2024-10-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101116
Philipp J. König , Paul Mayer , David Pothier
{"title":"Optimal timing of policy interventions in troubled banks","authors":"Philipp J. König ,&nbsp;Paul Mayer ,&nbsp;David Pothier","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101116","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101116","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>When will a policy authority (PA) resolve a bank whose solvency is uncertain? Delaying resolution gives the PA time to obtain information about the bank’s solvency. Delaying resolution also gives creditors time to withdraw funds, raising the cost of bailing out depositors. The optimal resolution date trades off these costs with the option value of making a more efficient resolution decision given new information. Providing liquidity support buys the PA time to wait for information, but increases its losses if the bank turns out to be insolvent. The PA may therefore optimally delay the provision of liquidity support.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":"60 ","pages":"Article 101116"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142441354","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Whatever it takes? Market maker of last resort and its fragility 不惜一切代价？最后的做市商及其脆弱性
IF 3.1 1区 经济学
Journal of Financial Intermediation Pub Date : 2024-10-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101117
Dong Beom Choi , Tanju Yorulmazer
{"title":"Whatever it takes? Market maker of last resort and its fragility","authors":"Dong Beom Choi ,&nbsp;Tanju Yorulmazer","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101117","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101117","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We provide a theoretical framework to analyze the market maker of last resort (MMLR) role of central banks. Central bank announcement to purchase assets in case of distress promotes private agents’ willingness to make markets, which immediately restores liquidity decreasing the need for future intervention. That is, the central bank can reduce the usage of the facility ex post by announcing a large capacity ex ante. This comes with potential fragility due to the possibility of multiple equilibria. Central bank can eliminate the bad equilibrium by announcing a large enough facility. However, fragility resurfaces if market participants doubt central bank’s commitment. Furthermore, permanent access to MMLR may crowd out private liquidity making the intervention ineffective.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":"60 ","pages":"Article 101117"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142652193","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Religion and branch banking 宗教与银行分行
IF 3.1 1区 经济学
Journal of Financial Intermediation Pub Date : 2024-10-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101115
Junyong Lee , Kyounghun Lee , Frederick Dongchuhl Oh
{"title":"Religion and branch banking","authors":"Junyong Lee ,&nbsp;Kyounghun Lee ,&nbsp;Frederick Dongchuhl Oh","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101115","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101115","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This study aims to examine whether religion influences branch banking. Using a large sample of U.S. county-level branch banking and religious characteristics data between 1994 and 2018, we find that the local religiosity of the bank headquarters’ region is positively related to the presence of bank branches. By contrast, banks in regions with more Catholics than Protestants are less likely to have branches. Moreover, religious diversity negatively affects branch banking. Overall, our study highlights the significant role of local religions in branch-banking decisions.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":"60 ","pages":"Article 101115"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142426095","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The costs of corporate debt overhang 公司债务悬置的成本
IF 3.1 1区 经济学
Journal of Financial Intermediation Pub Date : 2024-10-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101118
Kristian Blickle , João A.C. Santos
{"title":"The costs of corporate debt overhang","authors":"Kristian Blickle ,&nbsp;João A.C. Santos","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101118","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101118","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We make use of rich U.S. data to show that debt overhang significantly reduces firm asset-, capex-, and employee-growth. We show these contractions are likely driven by firm decisions as opposed to the result of credit constraints or changes in investment opportunities. Our measure of overhang – liabilities to cash flow — aligns with traditional theory and focuses on the importance of a firm’s debt servicing capacity. It further allows us to capitalize on the COVID-19 shock as a quasi-natural experiment to confirm the impact of overhang on firm investment and growth.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":"60 ","pages":"Article 101118"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142572183","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Can information imprecision be valuable? The case of credit ratings 信息不精确是否有价值？信用评级案例
IF 3.1 1区 经济学
Journal of Financial Intermediation Pub Date : 2024-10-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101114
Sonny Biswas , Kostas Koufopoulos , Anjan V. Thakor
{"title":"Can information imprecision be valuable? The case of credit ratings","authors":"Sonny Biswas ,&nbsp;Kostas Koufopoulos ,&nbsp;Anjan V. Thakor","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101114","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101114","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We develop a model in which credit ratings are endogenously coarse relative to the underlying default probabilities, and ratings precision is countercyclical. Ratings coarseness arises from the profit-maximizing behavior of rating agencies, and coarseness may maximize welfare even when greater ratings precision is costlessly available. Because the private outcome may differ from the socially desirable outcome, a social planner can improve welfare by putting a ceiling (floor) on the rating agency’s fee if the desired outcome is coarseness (precision). Strikingly, when information production is costless, ratings coarseness is socially optimal, but it does not arise in the laissez-faire equilibrium, thus inviting regulatory intervention.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":"60 ","pages":"Article 101114"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142426094","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Transparency and bank runs 透明度和银行挤兑
IF 3.1 1区 经济学
Journal of Financial Intermediation Pub Date : 2024-10-01 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101120
Cecilia Parlatore
{"title":"Transparency and bank runs","authors":"Cecilia Parlatore","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101120","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101120","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In a banking model with imperfect information, I find that more precise information increases the economy’s vulnerability to bank runs. For low information quality, depositors cannot distinguish bad from good states based on their information and, absent liquidity shocks, have no incentives to withdraw early. As information quality increases and signals become more informative, depositors’ incentives to withdraw strengthen and run-proof contracts become costlier in risk-sharing terms: to prevent runs, the bank must offer less to early withdrawers. When information quality is high enough, the bank would rather forgo return and hold excess liquidity than choose a run-proof deposit contract.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":"60 ","pages":"Article 101120"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142699484","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Security design: A review 安全设计：综述
IF 3.1 1区 经济学
Journal of Financial Intermediation Pub Date : 2024-09-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101113
Franklin Allen , Adelina Barbalau
{"title":"Security design: A review","authors":"Franklin Allen ,&nbsp;Adelina Barbalau","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101113","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfi.2024.101113","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Security design, which broadly speaking deals with the issue of designing optimal contractual mechanisms for overcoming various frictions between agents, is the subject of an extensive literature. This paper presents a review of recent work on security design and is organized around the applications of security design in various fields of finance starting with classic corporate finance applications such as capital structure and corporate governance, financial intermediation applications such as securitization and contingent capital, the interaction of market and security design, as well as emerging applications such as fintech, sustainable finance and healthcare finance. Future research is also discussed.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":"60 ","pages":"Article 101113"},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2024-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S104295732400041X/pdfft?md5=f3f3e147217a9227d9526a3956c7b047&pid=1-s2.0-S104295732400041X-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142167493","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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