厌倦你的朋友风险投资关系的动态变化

IF 3.1 1区 经济学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Qianqian Du , Thomas Hellmann
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们通过实证研究了风险资本家如何随着时间的推移调整共同投资人关系。我们发现了一个基本的权衡机制,即在与其他联合投资伙伴进行联合投资时,要权衡熟悉程度带来的好处与机会成本。利用美国的数据,我们发现风险资本家会通过逐渐脱离过于深入的关系来动态调整他们的关系强度。网络集中度较高的投资者对脱离关系更为谨慎。在热门投资市场,投资者更容易脱离现有关系,但在热门市场建立的新关系却不那么持久。或许令人惊讶的是,我们发现更深厚的先前关系与投资业绩之间存在负相关关系。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Getting tired of your friends: The dynamics of venture capital relationships

We empirically examine how venture capitalists adjust coinvestor relationships over time. We identify a fundamental trade-off where the benefits of familiarity are weighed against the opportunity costs of coinvesting with other syndication partners. Using US data, we find that venture capitalists dynamically adjust their relationship intensities by gradually disengaging from overly deep relationships. More centrally networked investors are more cautious with disengaging. In hot investment markets investors disengage more readily from existing relationships, but new relationships forged in hot market are less enduring. Perhaps surprisingly, we find a negative relationship between deeper prior relationships and investment performance.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
8.60
自引率
7.70%
发文量
45
期刊介绍: The Journal of Financial Intermediation seeks to publish research in the broad areas of financial intermediation, financial market structure, corporate finance, risk management, and valuation.
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