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How Peace Treaties Can Influence Countries’ Climate Policies 和平条约如何影响各国的气候政策
IF 3.1 1区 社会学
Journal of Conflict Resolution Pub Date : 2025-12-06 DOI: 10.1177/00220027251406634
Tobias Böhmelt
{"title":"How Peace Treaties Can Influence Countries’ Climate Policies","authors":"Tobias Böhmelt","doi":"10.1177/00220027251406634","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251406634","url":null,"abstract":"Peace agreements increasingly contain environmental provisions, yet we know little about the impact these clauses might have. This study is the first to systematically assess whether and how environmental terms in peace treaties can influence states’ climate policies. I argue that peace accords help establish the foundations for legalization and the rule of law in post-conflict societies, which facilitates that environmental terms lead to actual legislation. I analyze over 2,000 peace agreements and thousands of climate mitigation policies from 1990 to 2024, using multiple estimation strategies. The findings show that peace agreements’ environmental provisions are associated with the adoption of climate policies in post-conflict periods. This relationship holds even when exploring environmental outcomes, accounting for countries’ self-selection into environmental terms, or considering moderating factors like institutional capacity. The study contributes to the literature on peacebuilding and environmental politics, offering new insights into how peace agreements can shape post-conflict settings.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145680298","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Historical Analogies and Public Support for Foreign Policy Action 外交政策行动的历史类比和公众支持
IF 3.1 1区 社会学
Journal of Conflict Resolution Pub Date : 2025-12-05 DOI: 10.1177/00220027251399905
Christopher Blair, Paul Lendway, Joshua A. Schwartz
{"title":"Historical Analogies and Public Support for Foreign Policy Action","authors":"Christopher Blair, Paul Lendway, Joshua A. Schwartz","doi":"10.1177/00220027251399905","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251399905","url":null,"abstract":"Politicians frequently use historical analogies to justify their preferred foreign policies. However, despite their prevalence, it remains unclear whether, how, and why they shape public opinion. We conduct the most comprehensive experimental test to date of the impact of historical analogies on the U.S. public’s foreign policy preferences and find compelling evidence that analogical appeals increase mass confidence in leaders’ foreign policy decisionmaking. We also illustrate several of the key mechanisms underlying this dynamic and show that historical analogies are more effective at shaping public opinion than (arguably) less rational presidential justifications like “gut” or intuition. Finally, we demonstrate that analogical reasoning is no more effective at moving public opinion than other types of rational justifications leaders use, such as appeals to experts, and that these other communication strategies impact public opinion through similar mechanisms as analogies. This suggests analogies are just one of many potentially effective devices in leaders’ broader rhetorical toolkits. Our results reveal the logic and limitations of an important elite communication strategy in foreign policymaking, and contribute to the growing literature on foreign policy attitudes and political communication.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"250 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145680336","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Group Enrolment and Conflict Behavior 群体注册与冲突行为
IF 3.1 1区 社会学
Journal of Conflict Resolution Pub Date : 2025-11-24 DOI: 10.1177/00220027251398483
Gerald Eisenkopf, Torben Kölpin
{"title":"Group Enrolment and Conflict Behavior","authors":"Gerald Eisenkopf, Torben Kölpin","doi":"10.1177/00220027251398483","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251398483","url":null,"abstract":"A large literature in psychology and economics suggests that enrolment into groups shapes conflict behavior, even if the groups lack a salient identity. Our experimental design systematically modifies group formation and prize sharing rules to explain behavioral differences between conflicts among individuals and intergroup feuds. Apart from rather high levels of conflict expenditure in all treatments, we find no specific evidence for outgroup hostility. Group formation induces conditional cooperation within the groups. The prize distribution rules have a strong aggregate impact. Proportional prize sharing in winning groups fosters expenditure while egalitarian prize-sharing – a staple of such experiments – induces the predicted free-rider effects. Overall, our results support inequality aversion rather than parochial altruism as an explanation for differences in expenditures between individual and group conflicts.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"44 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145583042","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Did 3G Make Afghan Insurgents Fight More Effectively? A Disaggregated Study 3G是否使阿富汗叛乱分子更有效？分类研究
IF 3.1 1区 社会学
Journal of Conflict Resolution Pub Date : 2025-11-18 DOI: 10.1177/00220027251399888
Mehmet Erdem Arslan
{"title":"Did 3G Make Afghan Insurgents Fight More Effectively? A Disaggregated Study","authors":"Mehmet Erdem Arslan","doi":"10.1177/00220027251399888","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251399888","url":null,"abstract":"Studies on the impacts of communication technologies on civil conflict often focus on the presence of cell phone networks and draw mixed conclusions. Meanwhile, communication technologies have been advancing and the nature of telecommunication has changed. I argue that the richness of information exchange marked by the introduction of 3G mobile technologies provides an opportunity to push the debate forward, by leading to an increase in the violence of insurgent groups in a high-intensity episode. I focus on Afghanistan as a tough test for my argument. Analysing the effect of introducing 3G network in existing 2G network areas using matched wake analysis and spatial models, I find that the introduction of 3G is associated with an increase in the number of violent events, IED attacks, and coordinated multiple attacks perpetrated by Afghan insurgents. The results are robust to different sizes of spatial units, placebo tests, and less likely to suffer from reporting bias.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"157 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145545694","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Civil-Military Relations in the Aftermath of Coups: How Does Coup Failure Affect Counterbalancing in Autocratic Regimes? 政变后的军民关系：政变失败如何影响专制政权的制衡？
IF 3.1 1区 社会学
Journal of Conflict Resolution Pub Date : 2025-11-11 DOI: 10.1177/00220027251395066
Artem Kyzym
{"title":"Civil-Military Relations in the Aftermath of Coups: How Does Coup Failure Affect Counterbalancing in Autocratic Regimes?","authors":"Artem Kyzym","doi":"10.1177/00220027251395066","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251395066","url":null,"abstract":"How do dictators successfully counterbalance (fragment their coercive apparatus) despite the significant risk of military retaliation? Drawing on recent insights that the timing of coup-proofing is essential to its success, I argue that dictators are more likely to increase counterbalancing efforts in the aftermath of failed coups. I test this proposition in a difference-in-differences framework, using novel data on coups and counterbalancing, and find a statistically significant effect of coup failure. I substantiate my analysis with two illustrative examples from Sierra Leone and Turkey that probe the plausibility of my theorized mechanism. My findings contribute to the growing literature on the effects of failed coups by opening up the discussion on their long-term structural consequences for the dictator’s security apparatus.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145485711","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Coups: Different Mechanisms and Their Consequences for Institution Change 政变：不同机制及其对制度变迁的影响
IF 3.1 1区 社会学
Journal of Conflict Resolution Pub Date : 2025-11-11 DOI: 10.1177/00220027251396035
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith
{"title":"Coups: Different Mechanisms and Their Consequences for Institution Change","authors":"Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith","doi":"10.1177/00220027251396035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251396035","url":null,"abstract":"Based on an extension of selectorate theory, we characterize three structural conditions that make a coup likely: winning coalition size near the size that yields minimum utility to its members (so small or intermediate-sized coalitions), low economic productivity, and a leader relatively new to office. Policy misallocation exacerbates the risk of a coup. The theory and evidence show two mechanisms that increase the risk of coup: policy under-provision and over-provision. Leaders whose policy provisions are commensurate with expectations experience fewer coups. One anticipatory response of leaders to a heightened coup risk is to change the government’s institutions. High coup risks increase the likelihood of institution change whether a coup actually occurs or not. The threat of an under-provision coup tends to result in an expansion of the winning coalition size (democratization), while an elevated risk of an over-provision coup typically results in a contraction in coalition size whether a coup actually occurs or not.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"34 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145491813","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Who Gets the Guns? How Democratic Values and Security Threats Affect American Attitudes Toward Military Aid 谁有枪？民主价值观和安全威胁如何影响美国对军事援助的态度
IF 3.1 1区 社会学
Journal of Conflict Resolution Pub Date : 2025-10-29 DOI: 10.1177/00220027251388634
Scott Williamson
{"title":"Who Gets the Guns? How Democratic Values and Security Threats Affect American Attitudes Toward Military Aid","authors":"Scott Williamson","doi":"10.1177/00220027251388634","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251388634","url":null,"abstract":"The United States gives substantial aid to the militaries of autocratic governments that abuse human rights. US officials claim this aid is necessary to manage security threats, but others argue the United States should prioritize aid for governments that reflect democratic values. How do these competing concerns shape Americans’ attitudes toward military aid? Through an experiment implemented on four surveys, I document a strong preference for aiding democracies that respect human rights, and this preference is robust to the presence of terrorism threats. However, internationalist Americans become especially less likely to prioritize democratic values when terrorist threats exist. Descriptive survey questions reinforce this pattern by showing how internationalists who support military aid the most are conflicted proponents of prioritizing democratic values in US foreign policy. The article extends research on attitudes toward foreign aid and illustrates an important limitation to the influence of democratic values on Americans’ foreign policy preferences.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145397383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Permission to Secede? The Impact of Foreign Endorsements on Attitudes Toward Separatist Movements 允许退出？外国支持对分离主义运动态度的影响
IF 3.1 1区 社会学
Journal of Conflict Resolution Pub Date : 2025-10-28 DOI: 10.1177/00220027251391176
Stephanie Wright, Ala Alrababah, Rachel Myrick
{"title":"Permission to Secede? The Impact of Foreign Endorsements on Attitudes Toward Separatist Movements","authors":"Stephanie Wright, Ala Alrababah, Rachel Myrick","doi":"10.1177/00220027251391176","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251391176","url":null,"abstract":"How do international endorsements of separatist movements by foreign powers impact popular views toward secession? Much literature on secessionist movements focuses on subnational bargaining between the government and separatist groups. However, these models often neglect international audiences, who offer endorsement and other forms of support for separatist groups. This paper demonstrates that when foreign powers take positions on secessionist activities, these actions can affect popular support for such movements. In a survey experiment conducted before Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, we examine Ukrainians’ attitudes toward the Russian-backed separatist movement in the Donbas region. We randomize hypothetical scenarios in which foreign powers endorse secession and measure changes in public attitudes in both the parent state and the occupied territories under separatist control. Our results show that even in conflict-affected settings where attitudes have presumably hardened, international endorsements can influence popular support for secessionist movements.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145397385","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Reaching for the Threshold: How Minimum Participation Rules Facilitate Multilateral Treaty Ratification 达到门槛：最低参与规则如何促进多边条约批准
IF 3.1 1区 社会学
Journal of Conflict Resolution Pub Date : 2025-10-25 DOI: 10.1177/00220027251390435
Christian Arnold, Carsten-Andreas Schulz
{"title":"Reaching for the Threshold: How Minimum Participation Rules Facilitate Multilateral Treaty Ratification","authors":"Christian Arnold, Carsten-Andreas Schulz","doi":"10.1177/00220027251390435","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251390435","url":null,"abstract":"Uncertainty about other states’ willingness to cooperate often impedes collective action. Many multilateral agreements address this by incorporating Minimum Participation Rules (MPRs), which are provision-point mechanisms that specify the minimum coalition size required for a treaty to enter into force. Public and institutional choice theories suggest that such mechanisms lower barriers to participation by reducing coordination problems and limiting opportunities for freeriding. To test this assumption, we introduce a survival estimator to evaluate how the inclusion and design of MPRs impact treaty ratification across diverse issue areas. Drawing on data from agreements deposited with the United Nations Secretary-General, this study offers the first systematic analysis of MPRs in multilateral treaty cooperation. We find that threshold provisions accelerate ratification, even in contexts where incentives to freeride are unlikely to be significant.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"37 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145397390","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Volunteer’s Dilemma with Cost Synergies 志愿者的困境与成本协同效应
IF 3.1 1区 社会学
Journal of Conflict Resolution Pub Date : 2025-10-17 DOI: 10.1177/00220027251388601
Rabah Amir, Dominika Machowska, Jingwen Tian
{"title":"The Volunteer’s Dilemma with Cost Synergies","authors":"Rabah Amir, Dominika Machowska, Jingwen Tian","doi":"10.1177/00220027251388601","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027251388601","url":null,"abstract":"This paper revisits the well-known volunteer’s dilemma on the production of a public good when a single participant is sufficient for the task. We propose a cost-sharing model with a volunteering cost that decreases exponentially in the number of volunteers. We show that, at the unique mixed-strategy equilibrium, the probability of production may increase in the number of players for sufficiently low volunteering costs. This provides an alternative account of the fit of the model with some political-military conflict situations: A larger group does erode the individual incentive to volunteer but in an offsetting way that favors the production of the public good. A second result is that the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium may be more socially efficient than the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for some parameter values, which is a major reversal with respect to the standard dilemma and many other coordination games.","PeriodicalId":51363,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Conflict Resolution","volume":"101 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1,"publicationDate":"2025-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145311028","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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