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Trust as an entry barrier: Evidence from FinTech adoption 信任是进入壁垒：来自金融科技采用的证据
IF 10.4 1区 经济学
Journal of Financial Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104062
Keer Yang
{"title":"Trust as an entry barrier: Evidence from FinTech adoption","authors":"Keer Yang","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104062","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104062","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper studies the role of trust in incumbent lenders (banks) as an entry barrier to emerging FinTech lenders in credit markets. The empirical setting exploits the outbreak of the Wells Fargo scandal as a negative shock to borrowers’ trust in banks. Using a difference-in-differences framework, I find that increased exposure to the Wells Fargo scandal leads to an increase in the probability of borrowers using FinTech as mortgage originators. Utilizing political affiliation to proxy for the magnitude of trust erosion in banks in a triple-differences specification, I find that, conditional on the same exposure to the scandal, a county experiencing a greater erosion of trust has a larger increase in FinTech share relative to a county experiencing less of an erosion of trust. Estimating treatment effect heterogeneity using generic machine learning inference suggests that borrowers with the greatest decrease in trust in banks and the greatest increase in FinTech adoption have similar characteristics.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"169 ","pages":"Article 104062"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143838981","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Screening using a menu of contracts: A structural model for lending markets 使用合同菜单筛选：借贷市场的结构模型
IF 10.4 1区 经济学
Journal of Financial Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-16 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104056
Alberto Polo , Arthur Taburet , Quynh-Anh Vo
{"title":"Screening using a menu of contracts: A structural model for lending markets","authors":"Alberto Polo ,&nbsp;Arthur Taburet ,&nbsp;Quynh-Anh Vo","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104056","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104056","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>When lenders screen borrowers using a menu, they generate a contractual externality by rendering the composition of their competitors’ borrowers worse. Using data from the UK mortgage market and a structural model of screening with endogenous menus, this paper quantifies the impact of asymmetric information on equilibrium contracts and welfare. Counterfactual simulations show that, because of the externality, there is too much screening along the loan-to-value dimension. The deadweight loss, expressed in borrower utility, is equivalent to an interest rate increase of 30 basis points (a 15% increase) on all loans.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"169 ","pages":"Article 104056"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143838982","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The return of return dominance: Decomposing the cross-section of prices 收益支配的收益：分解价格的横截面
IF 10.4 1区 经济学
Journal of Financial Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-10 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104059
Ricardo Delao , Xiao Han , Sean Myers
{"title":"The return of return dominance: Decomposing the cross-section of prices","authors":"Ricardo Delao ,&nbsp;Xiao Han ,&nbsp;Sean Myers","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104059","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104059","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>What explains cross-sectional dispersion in stock valuation ratios? We find that 75% of dispersion in price–earnings ratios is reflected in differences in future returns, while only 25% is reflected in differences in future earnings growth. This holds at both the portfolio-level and the firm-level. We reconcile these conclusions with previous literature which has found a strong relation between prices and future profitability. Our results support models in which the cross-section of price–earnings ratios is driven mainly by discount rates or mispricing rather than future earnings growth. Evaluating six models of the value premium, we find that most models struggle to match our results; however, models with long-lived differences in risk exposure or gradual learning about parameters perform the best. The lack of earnings growth differences at long horizons provides new evidence in favor of long-run return predictability. We also show a similar dominance of predicted returns for explaining the dispersion in return surprises.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"169 ","pages":"Article 104059"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143807923","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Collateral value uncertainty and mortgage credit provision 抵押品价值的不确定性和抵押信贷供应
IF 10.4 1区 经济学
Journal of Financial Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-09 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104054
Erica Xuewei Jiang , Anthony Lee Zhang
{"title":"Collateral value uncertainty and mortgage credit provision","authors":"Erica Xuewei Jiang ,&nbsp;Anthony Lee Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104054","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104054","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Houses with higher value uncertainty receive less mortgage credit: mortgages backed by these houses are more likely to be rejected, have higher interest rates, and have lower loan-to-price ratios. The relationship between house value uncertainty and credit availability is driven partly by a classic channel in which uncertainty lowers debt recovery rates, and partly by a novel channel where more uncertain appraisals make regulatory constraints on loan size more likely to bind. We build a structural model to quantify the effects of each channel, and show how a shift toward computerized asset appraisals could influence credit access.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"169 ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143799213","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Payments and privacy in the digital economy 数字经济中的支付和隐私
IF 10.4 1区 经济学
Journal of Financial Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-08 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104050
Toni Ahnert , Peter Hoffmann , Cyril Monnet
{"title":"Payments and privacy in the digital economy","authors":"Toni Ahnert ,&nbsp;Peter Hoffmann ,&nbsp;Cyril Monnet","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104050","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104050","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We propose a model of lending, payments choice, and privacy in the digital economy. While digital payments enable merchants to sell goods online, they reveal information to their lender. Cash guarantees anonymity, but limits distribution to less efficient offline venues. In equilibrium, merchants trade off the efficiency gains from online distribution (with digital payments) and the informational rents from staying anonymous (with cash). While new technologies can reduce the privacy concerns associated with digital payments, they also redistribute surplus from the lender to merchants. Hence, privacy enhancements do not always improve welfare.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"169 ","pages":"Article 104050"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143791870","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Data sales and data dilution 数据销售和数据稀释
IF 10.4 1区 经济学
Journal of Financial Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-07 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104053
Ernest Liu , Song Ma , Laura Veldkamp
{"title":"Data sales and data dilution","authors":"Ernest Liu ,&nbsp;Song Ma ,&nbsp;Laura Veldkamp","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104053","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104053","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We explore indicators of market power in a data market. Markups cannot measure competition, because most data products’ marginal cost is zero, making the markup infinite. Yet, data monopolists may not exert monopoly power because they cannot commit to restricting data sales to future customers. This limited commitment and strategic substitutability of data undermine sellers’ monopoly power. But data subscriptions restore this monopoly power. Evidence from online data markets supports the model’s insight that subscriptions indicate market power. Model and evidence reveal that data subscriptions are better for consumers because they sustain the incentive to invest in high-quality data.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"169 ","pages":"Article 104053"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143785776","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Rules versus discretion in capital regulation 资本监管中的规则与自由裁量权
IF 10.4 1区 经济学
Journal of Financial Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104060
Urban Jermann , Haotian Xiang
{"title":"Rules versus discretion in capital regulation","authors":"Urban Jermann ,&nbsp;Haotian Xiang","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104060","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104060","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study capital regulation in a dynamic model for bank deposits. Capital regulation addresses banks’ incentive for excessive leverage that dilutes depositors, but preserves some dilution to reduce bank defaults. We show theoretically that capital regulation is subject to a time inconsistency problem. In a model with non-maturing deposits where optimal withdrawals make deposits endogenously long-term, we find commitment to have important effects on the optimal level and cyclicality of capital adequacy. Our results call for a systematic framework that limits capital regulators’ discretion.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"169 ","pages":"Article 104060"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143783417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Customer data access and fintech entry: Early evidence from open banking 客户数据访问与金融科技进入：开放银行的早期证据
IF 10.4 1区 经济学
Journal of Financial Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-05 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103950
Tania Babina , Saleem Bahaj , Greg Buchak , Filippo De Marco , Angus Foulis , Will Gornall , Francesco Mazzola , Tong Yu
{"title":"Customer data access and fintech entry: Early evidence from open banking","authors":"Tania Babina ,&nbsp;Saleem Bahaj ,&nbsp;Greg Buchak ,&nbsp;Filippo De Marco ,&nbsp;Angus Foulis ,&nbsp;Will Gornall ,&nbsp;Francesco Mazzola ,&nbsp;Tong Yu","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103950","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103950","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Open banking (OB) empowers bank customers to share their financial transaction data with fintechs and other banks. New cross-country data shows 49 countries adopted OB policies, privacy preferences predict policy adoption, and adoption spurs fintech entry. UK microdata shows that OB enables: (i) consumers to access both financial advice and credit; (ii) SMEs to establish new lending relationships. In a calibrated model, OB universally improves welfare through entry and product improvements when used for advice. When used for credit, OB promotes entry and competition by reducing adverse selection, but higher prices for costlier or privacy-conscious consumers partially offset these benefits.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"169 ","pages":"Article 103950"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143783418","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Strategic digitization in currency and payment competition 货币和支付竞争中的战略数字化
IF 10.4 1区 经济学
Journal of Financial Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-04 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104055
Lin William Cong , Simon Mayer
{"title":"Strategic digitization in currency and payment competition","authors":"Lin William Cong ,&nbsp;Simon Mayer","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104055","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104055","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We model the competition between digital forms of fiat money and private digital money. Countries digitize their currencies–by upgrading existing or launching new payment systems (including CBDCs)–to compete with foreign fiat currencies and private digital money. A pecking order emerges: less dominant currencies digitize earlier, reflecting a first-mover advantage; dominant currencies delay digitization until they face competition; the weakest currencies forgo digitization. However, delayed digitization allows private digital money to gain widespread adoption, eventually weakening fiat money’s role. We highlight how geopolitical considerations, stablecoins, and interoperability between fiat and private digital money shape the dynamics of currency competition.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"168 ","pages":"Article 104055"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143768534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Reaching for yield: Evidence from households 追求收益：来自家庭的证据
IF 10.4 1区 经济学
Journal of Financial Economics Pub Date : 2025-04-03 DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104057
Francisco Gomes , Cameron Peng , Oksana Smirnova , Ning Zhu
{"title":"Reaching for yield: Evidence from households","authors":"Francisco Gomes ,&nbsp;Cameron Peng ,&nbsp;Oksana Smirnova ,&nbsp;Ning Zhu","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104057","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104057","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The literature has documented “reaching for yield”—the phenomenon of investing more in risky assets when interest rates drop—among institutional investors. We analyze detailed transaction data from a large brokerage firm to provide direct field evidence that individual investors also exhibit this behavior. Consistent with models of portfolio choice with labor income, reaching for yield is more pronounced among younger and less-wealthy individuals. Consistent with prospect theory, reaching for yield is more pronounced when investors are trading at a loss. Finally, we observe and discuss the phenomenon of “reverse reaching for yield.”</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"168 ","pages":"Article 104057"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143758969","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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