Stefano Giglio, Matteo Maggiori, Johannes Stroebel, Zhenhao Tan, Stephen Utkus, Xiao Xu
{"title":"Four facts about ESG beliefs and investor portfolios","authors":"Stefano Giglio, Matteo Maggiori, Johannes Stroebel, Zhenhao Tan, Stephen Utkus, Xiao Xu","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103984","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103984","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze survey data on ESG beliefs and preferences in a large panel of retail investors linked to administrative data on their investment portfolios. The survey elicits investors’ expectations of long-term ESG equity returns and asks about their motivations, if any, to invest in ESG assets. We document four facts. First, investors generally expected ESG investments to underperform the market. Between mid-2021 and late-2023, the average expected 10-year annualized return of ESG investments relative to the overall stock market was <mml:math altimg=\"si1.svg\" display=\"inline\"><mml:mo>−</mml:mo></mml:math>2.1%. Second, there is substantial heterogeneity across investors in their ESG return expectations and their motives for ESG investing: 48% of survey respondents do not see any reason to invest in ESG, 24% are primarily motivated by ethical considerations, 22% are driven by climate hedging motives, and 6% are motivated by return expectations. Third, there is a strong link between individuals’ reported ESG investment motives and their actual investment behaviors, with the highest ESG portfolio holdings among individuals who report ethics-driven investment motives. Fourth, financial considerations matter independently of other investment motives: we find meaningful ESG holdings only for investors who expect these investments to outperform the market, even among those investors who reported that their most important ESG investment motives were ethical or hedging reasons.","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"279 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.9,"publicationDate":"2024-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142873918","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Biodiversity finance","authors":"Caroline Flammer, Thomas Giroux, Geoffrey M. Heal","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103987","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103987","url":null,"abstract":"We study biodiversity finance—the use of private capital to finance biodiversity conservation and restoration—which is a new practice in sustainable finance. First, we provide a conceptual framework that lays out how biodiversity can be financed by pure private capital and blended financing structures. In the latter, private capital is blended with public or philanthropic capital, whose aim is to de-risk private capital investments. The main element underlying both types of financing is the “monetization” of biodiversity, that is, using investments in biodiversity to generate a financial return for private investors. Second, we provide empirical evidence using deal-level data from a leading biodiversity finance institution. Our findings are consistent with a three-dimensional efficient frontier (return, risk, and biodiversity impact)—deals with a favorable risk-return profile tend to be financed by pure private capital, whereas for other deals the biodiversity impact needs to be sufficiently large for blended finance to be used. Overall, our results suggest that blended finance is an important tool for improving the risk-return profile of these projects, thereby increasing their appeal to private investors and crowding in private capital. Finally, our results suggest that private capital is unlikely to substitute for effective public policies in addressing the biodiversity crisis.","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"32 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.9,"publicationDate":"2024-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142873917","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Strategic insider trading and its consequences for outsiders: Evidence from the eighteenth century","authors":"Mathijs Cosemans, Rik Frehen","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103974","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103974","url":null,"abstract":"This paper uses hand-collected historical data to provide empirical evidence on the strategic trading behavior of insiders and its consequences for outsiders. Specifically, we collect all equity trades of all insiders and outsiders in an era without legal restrictions on insider trading and a market where trading is non-anonymous. We find that access to private information creates a significant gap between the post-trade returns of insiders and outsiders. Consistent with theory, insiders capitalize on their information advantage by hiding their identity and timing their trades. Both experienced and inexperienced outsiders face expected losses due to this strategic insider trading.","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"19 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.9,"publicationDate":"2024-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142873968","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Household mobility and mortgage rate lock","authors":"Jack Liebersohn, Jesse Rothstein","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103973","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103973","url":null,"abstract":"Rising interest rates can create “mortgage rate lock” for homeowners with fixed rate mortgages, who can hold onto their low rates as long as they stay in their homes but would have to take on new mortgages with higher rates if they moved. We show mobility rates fell in 2022 and 2023 for homeowners with mortgages, as market rates rose. We observe both absolute declines and declines relative to homeowners without mortgages, who are unaffected by mortgage rate lock. Mobility declines are not explained by changes in home values. Overall, our estimates imply that rising interest rates reduced mobility in 2022 and 2023 for households with mortgages by 16% and caused $20bn of deadweight loss.","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"38 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.9,"publicationDate":"2024-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142825477","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The impact of impact investing","authors":"Jonathan B. Berk , Jules H. van Binsbergen","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103972","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103972","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The change in the cost of capital that results from a divestiture strategy can be closely approximated by a simple function of three parameters: (1) the fraction of socially conscious capital, (2) the fraction of targeted firms in the economy and (3) the return correlation between the targeted firms and the rest of the stock market. When calibrated to current data, we demonstrate that the impact on the cost of capital is too small to meaningfully affect real investment decisions. We then derive the conditions that would be required for the strategy to have a meaningful impact. We empirically corroborate our theoretical results by studying firm changes in ESG status and are unable to detect an impact of ESG divestiture strategies on the cost of capital of treated firms. Our results suggest that to have impact, instead of divesting, socially conscious investors should invest and exercise their rights of control to change corporate policy.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"164 ","pages":"Article 103972"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2024-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142759101","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"CEO turnover and director reputation","authors":"Felix von Meyerinck , Jonas Romer , Markus Schmid","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103971","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103971","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper analyzes the reputational effects of forced CEO turnovers on outside directors. We find that directors interlocked to a forced CEO turnover experience large and persistent increases in withheld votes at subsequent re-elections relative to non-turnover-interlocked directors. Directors are not penalized for an involvement in a turnover per se but for forced CEO turnovers that are related to governance failures by the board. Our results challenge the widespread view that forcing out a CEO can generally be understood as a sign of a well-functioning corporate governance.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"163 ","pages":"Article 103971"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2024-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142696380","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Matthew Jaremski , Gary Richardson , Angela Vossmeyer
{"title":"Signals and stigmas from banking interventions: Lessons from the Bank Holiday of 1933","authors":"Matthew Jaremski , Gary Richardson , Angela Vossmeyer","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103968","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103968","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>A nationwide panic forced President Roosevelt to declare a banking holiday in March 1933. The government reopened banks sequentially using a process that sent noisy signals about banks’ health. New microdata reveals that the public responded to these signals. Deposits at rapidly reopened banks rebounded quicker than at comparable or stronger banks that reopened even a few days later. The stigma of late reopening shifted funds from stigmatized to lauded banks and among communities that they served. Despite persisting over a decade, the shift had no measurable impact on the rate at which localities recovered from the Great Depression.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"163 ","pages":"Article 103968"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2024-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142696384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Andreas Aristidou , Aleksandar Giga , Suk Lee , Fernando Zapatero
{"title":"Aspirational utility and investment behavior","authors":"Andreas Aristidou , Aleksandar Giga , Suk Lee , Fernando Zapatero","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103970","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103970","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We explore the extent to which aspirations – such as those forged in the course of social interactions – explain ‘puzzling’ behavioral patterns in investment decisions. We motivate an aspirational utility, reminiscent of Friedman and Savage (1948), where social considerations (<em>e.g.</em>, status concerns) provide an economic foundation for aspirations. We show this utility can explain a range of observed investor behaviors, such as the demand for both right- and left-skewed assets; aspects of the disposition effect; and patterns in stock-market participation consistent with empirical observations. We corroborate our theoretical findings with two novel laboratory experimental studies, where we observed participants’ preference for skewness in risky lotteries shift as lab-induced aspirations shifted.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"163 ","pages":"Article 103970"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2024-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142652143","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Arbitrage-based recovery","authors":"Ferenc Horvath","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103969","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103969","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We develop a novel recovery theorem based on no-arbitrage principles. To implement our Arbitrage-Based Recovery Theorem empirically, one needs to observe the Arrow–Debreu prices only for one single maturity. We perform several different density tests and mean prediction tests using more than 26 years of S&P 500 options data, and we find evidence that our method can correctly recover the probability distribution of the S&P 500 index return on a monthly horizon, despite the presence of a non-trivial permanent SDF component.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"163 ","pages":"Article 103969"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2024-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142652142","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Gig labor: Trading safety nets for steering wheels","authors":"Vyacheslav Fos , Naser Hamdi , Ankit Kalda , Jordan Nickerson","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103956","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103956","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Using administrative data on credit profiles matched with unemployment insurance (UI) for individuals in the U.S., we show that laid-off workers with access to Uber rely less on household debt, experience fewer delinquencies, and are less likely to apply for UI benefits. Our empirical strategy exploits both the staggered market entry of Uber across cities and the differential benefit of its entry across car owners based on car age, a key eligibility requirement of the platform. We conclude that the introduction of Uber reduced reliance on these alternative means of smoothing extreme income shocks.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"163 ","pages":"Article 103956"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2024-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142652141","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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