环境、社会和治理贷款

IF 10.4 1区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Financial Economics Pub Date : 2025-09-04 DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104150

Sehoon Kim , Nitish Kumar , Jongsub Lee , Junho Oh

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引用次数: 0

摘要

企业越来越多地通过与可持续发展相关的贷款（sll）进行借贷，合同将利差与ESG绩效挂钩。sll在披露与可持续性相关的合同细节的透明度方面差异很大，并且倾向于向具有优越ESG概况的借款人发放。虽然高透明度的中小抵押贷款借款人保持了这一绩效，但低透明度的中小抵押贷款借款人在发行后的ESG绩效显著恶化。无论是高透明度还是低透明度的借款人，都要为获得sll支付大量费用。结果与高透明度的借款人使用SLL来“证明”其先前存在的ESG承诺一致，但低透明度的借款人使用空的SLL标签进行“绿色清洗”。有关撤资、重新谈判和股市反应的证据进一步支持了这些解释。

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ESG lending

Firms increasingly borrow via sustainability-linked loans (SLLs), contractually tying spreads to their ESG performance. SLLs vary widely in transparency of disclosure regarding sustainability-related contract details and tend to be issued to borrowers with superior ESG profiles. While high-transparency SLL borrowers maintain this performance, low-transparency SLL borrowers exhibit significantly deteriorating ESG performance after issuance. Both high- and low-transparency borrowers pay substantial fees to obtain SLLs. The results are consistent with high-transparency borrowers using SLLs to “certify” their preexisting ESG commitments, but low-transparency borrowers “greenwashing” with empty SLL labels. Evidence on drawdowns, renegotiations, and stock market reactions further supports these interpretations.

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来源期刊

Journal of Financial Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

15.80

自引率

4.50%

发文量

192

审稿时长

37 days

期刊介绍： The Journal of Financial Economics provides a specialized forum for the publication of research in the area of financial economics and the theory of the firm, placing primary emphasis on the highest quality analytical, empirical, and clinical contributions in the following major areas: capital markets, financial institutions, corporate finance, corporate governance, and the economics of organizations.