Jonathan Brogaard , Nataliya Gerasimova , Maximilian Rohrer
{"title":"The effect of female leadership on contracting from Capitol Hill to Main Street","authors":"Jonathan Brogaard , Nataliya Gerasimova , Maximilian Rohrer","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103817","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103817","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper provides novel evidence that female politicians increase the proportion of US government procurement contracts allocated to women-owned firms. For identification, we use a regression discontinuity design on a sample of mixed-gender elections in the US House of Representatives. The effect grows over a female representative's tenure and concentrates in female representatives who are on powerful congressional committees. Changes in the pool of and behavior by government contractors cannot explain the result. The more gender-balanced representation in government contracting is not associated with economic costs.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"155 ","pages":"Article 103817"},"PeriodicalIF":8.9,"publicationDate":"2024-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140031120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Limited attention to detail in financial markets: Evidence from reduced-form and structural estimation","authors":"Henrik Cronqvist , Tomislav Ladika , Elisa Pazaj , Zacharias Sautner","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103811","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103811","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We show that firm valuations fell after a key expense became more visible in financial statements. FAS 123-R required firms to deduct option compensation costs from earnings, instead of disclosing them in footnotes. Firms that granted high option pay experienced earnings reductions, while fundamentals remained unchanged. These firms were more likely to miss earnings forecasts, and they experienced recommendation downgrades and valuation declines. Our findings suggest that market participants exhibited limited attention to option costs before FAS 123-R. As we reuse the FAS 123-R natural experiment, we show how one can address confounding channels by integrating reduced-form and structural estimation.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"154 ","pages":"Article 103811"},"PeriodicalIF":8.9,"publicationDate":"2024-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304405X24000345/pdfft?md5=8d3b9f63ff2bc7f4efe231fb7d54ffbd&pid=1-s2.0-S0304405X24000345-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140023998","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Demand-and-supply imbalance risk and long-term swap spreads","authors":"Samuel G. Hanson , Aytek Malkhozov , Gyuri Venter","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103814","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103814","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We develop and test a model in which swap spreads are determined by end users' demand for and constrained intermediaries' supply of long-term interest rate swaps. Swap spreads reflect compensation both for using scarce intermediary capital and for bearing convergence risk—i.e., the risk spreads will widen due to a future demand-and-supply imbalance. We show that a proxy for the intermediated quantity of swaps—dealers' net position in Treasuries—flipped sign during the Global Financial Crisis when swap spreads turned negative and that this variable predicts the excess returns on swap spread trades. Exploiting our model's sign restrictions, we identify shifts in demand and supply and find that both contribute significantly to the volatility of swap spreads.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"154 ","pages":"Article 103814"},"PeriodicalIF":8.9,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139999661","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Persistent and transitory components of firm characteristics: Implications for asset pricing","authors":"Fahiz Baba-Yara , Martijn Boons , Andrea Tamoni","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103808","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103808","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study the horizon dimension of cross-sectional return predictability using a model where characteristics contain both persistent and transitory components. We test the implications of this model for the average returns of popular characteristic-based trading strategies at short versus long horizons after portfolio formation. Our evidence supports the claim that the relative compensation for persistent and transitory components varies across characteristics, in both magnitude and sign. Benchmark factor models cannot explain the returns of portfolios sorted on characteristics where either the persistent or transitory component is dominant. Finally, we discuss implications for the long-term discount rates of firms.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"154 ","pages":"Article 103808"},"PeriodicalIF":8.9,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304405X2400031X/pdfft?md5=5dd2bb4216f08f8f285655488a2442dd&pid=1-s2.0-S0304405X2400031X-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139999660","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Quoc-Anh Do , Roberto Galbiati , Benjamin Marx , Miguel A. Ortiz Serrano
{"title":"J'Accuse! Antisemitism and financial markets in the time of the Dreyfus Affair","authors":"Quoc-Anh Do , Roberto Galbiati , Benjamin Marx , Miguel A. Ortiz Serrano","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103809","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103809","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study the stock market performance of firms with Jewish board members during the “Dreyfus Affair” in 19th century France. In a context of widespread latent antisemitism, initial accusations made against the Jewish officer Alfred Dreyfus led to short-lived abnormal negative returns for Jewish-connected firms. However, investors betting on these firms earned higher returns during the period corresponding to Dreyfus' rehabilitation, starting with the publication of the famous op-ed <em>J'Accuse!</em> in 1898. Our conceptual framework illustrates how diminishing antisemitic biases among investors might plausibly explain these effects. Our paper provides novel insights on how antisemitism can increase and decrease over short periods of time at the highest socio-economic levels in response to certain events, which in turn can affect firm value in financial markets.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"154 ","pages":"Article 103809"},"PeriodicalIF":8.9,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304405X24000321/pdfft?md5=5235e1f1551fec04b94b65dffeb08ab1&pid=1-s2.0-S0304405X24000321-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140013995","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The proxy advisory industry: Influencing and being influenced","authors":"Chong Shu","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103810","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103810","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper develops two new methods to infer a mutual fund's proxy advisors from SEC filings. It then applies these methods to characterize features of the proxy advice industry from 2007 to 2021: (i) As of 2021, ISS and Glass Lewis collectively control approximately 90 percent of the market. During this period, the market share of ISS remains stable, while that of Glass Lewis has increased. (ii) When a proxy advisor issues a recommendation opposing management, its customers are approximately 20 percentage points more likely to also oppose management compared to other investors. (iii) Funds that subscribe to both proxy advisors tend to vote more similarly to the recommendations of the advisor whose voting platform they use. (iv) Proxy advisors often change their advisory stance when investors disagree with their previous advice. I offer suggestive evidence that this adaptation reflects both learning from informed investors and a desire by proxy advisors to align with the preferences of their customers.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"154 ","pages":"Article 103810"},"PeriodicalIF":8.9,"publicationDate":"2024-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139975628","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Markus Baldauf , Joshua Mollner , Bart Zhou Yueshen
{"title":"Siphoned apart: A portfolio perspective on order flow segmentation","authors":"Markus Baldauf , Joshua Mollner , Bart Zhou Yueshen","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103807","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103807","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study liquidity supply in fragmented markets. Market makers intermediate heterogeneous order flows, trading off spread revenue against inventory costs. Applying our model to payment for order flow (PFOF), we demonstrate that portfolio-based considerations of inventory management incentivize market makers to segment retail orders by siphoning them off-exchange. Banning order flow segmentation reduces total welfare, can make trading more costly for all investors, and can resolve a prisoner's dilemma among market makers. These results differentiate our inventory-based model from the existing information-based theories of PFOF.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"154 ","pages":"Article 103807"},"PeriodicalIF":8.9,"publicationDate":"2024-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304405X24000308/pdfft?md5=0682fc27553a4b32b7262e57423aed8f&pid=1-s2.0-S0304405X24000308-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139925797","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Investment when new capital is hard to find","authors":"Olivier Darmouni , Andrew Sutherland","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103806","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103806","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We examine how a fixed capital supply shortage affects firm investment. Using equipment transaction–level data, we find pandemic-driven production disruptions significantly altered capital reallocation patterns across firms. A surge in used capital trading activity softened the investment decline, as firms acquired used capital from distant and dissimilar counterparts. Younger firms were disproportionately affected even though they rarely purchase new capital: while in normal times older firms sell their capital to younger firms, following a supply shortage, older firms compete for used capital, pricing out younger firms. Our evidence highlights the crucial role of secondary markets and distributive externalities for corporate investment.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"154 ","pages":"Article 103806"},"PeriodicalIF":8.9,"publicationDate":"2024-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139744243","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Motivating collusion","authors":"Sangeun Ha , Fangyuan Ma , Alminas Žaldokas","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103798","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103798","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We examine how executive compensation can be designed to facilitate product market collusion. We look at the 2013 decision to close several regional offices of the U.S. Department of Justice, which lowered antitrust enforcement for firms located near these closed offices. We argue this made collusion more appealing to shareholders, and find that these firms increased the sensitivity of executive pay to local rivals' performance, consistent with rewarding the managers for colluding with them. The affected CEOs were also granted longer vesting periods, which provides long-term incentives that could foster collusive arrangements.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"154 ","pages":"Article 103798"},"PeriodicalIF":8.9,"publicationDate":"2024-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139737464","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ben Charoenwong , Zachary T. Kowaleski , Alan Kwan , Andrew G. Sutherland
{"title":"RegTech: Technology-driven compliance and its effects on profitability, operations, and market structure","authors":"Ben Charoenwong , Zachary T. Kowaleski , Alan Kwan , Andrew G. Sutherland","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103792","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103792","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Compliance-driven investments in technology—or “RegTech”—are growing rapidly. To understand the effects on the financial sector, we study firms’ responses to new internal control requirements. Affected firms make significant investments in ERP and hardware. These expenditures then enable complementary investments that are leveraged for noncompliance purposes, leading to modest savings from avoided customer complaints and misconduct. IT budgets rise and profits fall, especially at small firms, and acquisition activity and market concentration increase. Our results illustrate how regulation can directly and indirectly affect technology adoption, which in turn affects noncompliance functions and market structure.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"154 ","pages":"Article 103792"},"PeriodicalIF":8.9,"publicationDate":"2024-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139726425","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}