{"title":"Rules versus discretion in capital regulation","authors":"Urban Jermann , Haotian Xiang","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104060","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104060","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study capital regulation in a dynamic model for bank deposits. Capital regulation addresses banks’ incentive for excessive leverage that dilutes depositors, but preserves some dilution to reduce bank defaults. We show theoretically that capital regulation is subject to a time inconsistency problem. In a model with non-maturing deposits where optimal withdrawals make deposits endogenously long-term, we find commitment to have important effects on the optimal level and cyclicality of capital adequacy. Our results call for a systematic framework that limits capital regulators’ discretion.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"169 ","pages":"Article 104060"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143783417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Tania Babina , Saleem Bahaj , Greg Buchak , Filippo De Marco , Angus Foulis , Will Gornall , Francesco Mazzola , Tong Yu
{"title":"Customer data access and fintech entry: Early evidence from open banking","authors":"Tania Babina , Saleem Bahaj , Greg Buchak , Filippo De Marco , Angus Foulis , Will Gornall , Francesco Mazzola , Tong Yu","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103950","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103950","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Open banking (OB) empowers bank customers to share their financial transaction data with fintechs and other banks. New cross-country data shows 49 countries adopted OB policies, privacy preferences predict policy adoption, and adoption spurs fintech entry. UK microdata shows that OB enables: (i) consumers to access both financial advice and credit; (ii) SMEs to establish new lending relationships. In a calibrated model, OB universally improves welfare through entry and product improvements when used for advice. When used for credit, OB promotes entry and competition by reducing adverse selection, but higher prices for costlier or privacy-conscious consumers partially offset these benefits.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"169 ","pages":"Article 103950"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143783418","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Strategic digitization in currency and payment competition","authors":"Lin William Cong , Simon Mayer","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104055","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104055","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We model the competition between digital forms of fiat money and private digital money. Countries digitize their currencies–by upgrading existing or launching new payment systems (including CBDCs)–to compete with foreign fiat currencies and private digital money. A pecking order emerges: less dominant currencies digitize earlier, reflecting a first-mover advantage; dominant currencies delay digitization until they face competition; the weakest currencies forgo digitization. However, delayed digitization allows private digital money to gain widespread adoption, eventually weakening fiat money’s role. We highlight how geopolitical considerations, stablecoins, and interoperability between fiat and private digital money shape the dynamics of currency competition.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"168 ","pages":"Article 104055"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143768534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Francisco Gomes , Cameron Peng , Oksana Smirnova , Ning Zhu
{"title":"Reaching for yield: Evidence from households","authors":"Francisco Gomes , Cameron Peng , Oksana Smirnova , Ning Zhu","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104057","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104057","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The literature has documented “reaching for yield”—the phenomenon of investing more in risky assets when interest rates drop—among institutional investors. We analyze detailed transaction data from a large brokerage firm to provide direct field evidence that individual investors also exhibit this behavior. Consistent with models of portfolio choice with labor income, reaching for yield is more pronounced among younger and less-wealthy individuals. Consistent with prospect theory, reaching for yield is more pronounced when investors are trading at a loss. Finally, we observe and discuss the phenomenon of “reverse reaching for yield.”</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"168 ","pages":"Article 104057"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143758969","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Carlo Altavilla , Miguel Boucinha , Lorenzo Burlon , Mariassunta Giannetti , Julian Schumacher
{"title":"Central bank liquidity reallocation and bank lending: Evidence from the tiering system","authors":"Carlo Altavilla , Miguel Boucinha , Lorenzo Burlon , Mariassunta Giannetti , Julian Schumacher","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104058","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104058","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We document that the reallocation of central bank reserves towards banks with higher liquidity needs fosters credit supply. Exploiting the ECB's tiered reserve remuneration system for identification, we show that this system encouraged banks with low reserve holdings to obtain more reserves through the money market. Concomitantly, these banks reduced their securities holdings and extended more credit. We estimate that the reallocation of one euro of reserves towards banks with ex ante low reserve holdings resulted in an increase in credit supply of about 15 cents.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"168 ","pages":"Article 104058"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143768533","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Anne Haubo Dyhrberg , Andriy Shkilko , Ingrid M. Werner
{"title":"The retail execution quality landscape","authors":"Anne Haubo Dyhrberg , Andriy Shkilko , Ingrid M. Werner","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104051","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104051","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We demonstrate that off-exchange (wholesaler) executions provide significant cost savings to retail investors. Wholesaler concentration has raised regulatory concerns; however, we show that the largest wholesalers offer the lowest costs due to economies of scale. The entry of a new large wholesaler reduces incumbent scale economies, resulting in higher execution costs. Most retail brokers route to multiple wholesalers and actively monitor their performance, rewarding those offering lower execution costs with more volume. While retail investors benefit from the current landscape across all stocks, those trading small stocks benefit the most.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"168 ","pages":"Article 104051"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143758970","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Understanding the strength of the dollar","authors":"Zhengyang Jiang , Robert J. Richmond , Tony Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104052","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104052","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We attribute variation in the strength of the U.S. dollar and its covariance with other currencies to economic primitives using a global asset demand system. We take global investor savings, asset supply, and monetary policy as exogenous primitives, and show how these variables explain dollar exchange rate behavior. Prior to the global financial crisis, global savings and demand shifts explain dollar depreciation, whereas post-crisis they explain dollar appreciation. Interest rates and cross-border bank loans explain short-term fluctuations in the dollar, but decline in significance over longer horizons. When explaining the dollar factor structure, we find that global savings explain common variations across dollar exchange rates, whereas investor demand shifts account for cross-sectional heterogeneity in dollar betas.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"168 ","pages":"Article 104052"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2025-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143758971","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Benchmarking benchmarks","authors":"James Brugler , Marta Khomyn , Tālis Putniņs̆","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104018","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104018","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Financial benchmarks such as LIBOR underpin the pricing of trillions of dollars of contracts around the world. We evaluate the quality of benchmark prices using a state-space model to separate information from noise. Applying the method to LIBOR benchmarks and their replacements, we find that alternative reference rates (ARRs) are less noisy in four of the five currencies. However, the USD ARR is considerably more noisy, resulting in billions of dollars of noise-related wealth transfers between contract counterparties. We show that benchmark reforms such as expanding the reference market and using a trimmed mean can reduce noise in ARRs.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"168 ","pages":"Article 104018"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2025-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143705762","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fintech entry, lending market competition, and welfare","authors":"Xavier Vives , Zhiqiang Ye","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104040","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104040","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We provide a spatial framework to study competition between banks and fintechs in the lending market and examine the impact on investment and welfare. Based on the key differences between banks and fintechs, we derive results consistent with the empirical evidence available. We find that fintechs with inferior monitoring efficiency can successfully enter because of their superior flexibility in pricing and that higher bank concentration leads to higher fintech loan volume. If fintechs and banks have similar funding costs, fintech borrowers pay lower loan rates and have higher default rates than bank borrowers with similar characteristics; however, the result will flip if fintechs have much higher funding costs than banks. The advantage of fintechs in offering convenience can also induce them to charge higher loan rates than banks. Fintech entry will improve welfare if fintechs have high monitoring efficiency and inter-fintech competition intensity is intermediate. Fintech entry may induce banks’ exit and reduce investment; however, it will increase investment if inter-fintech competition is intense enough.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"168 ","pages":"Article 104040"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2025-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143677615","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Investor demand, firm investment, and capital misallocation","authors":"Jaewon Choi , Xu Tian , Yufeng Wu , Mahyar Kargar","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104039","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104039","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Fluctuations in investor demand significantly affect firms’ valuation and access to capital. To quantify their real effects, we develop a dynamic investment model, incorporating both the demand and supply sides of capital. Strong investor demand relaxes financial constraints and facilitates equity issuance and investment, while weak demand encourages opportunistic share repurchases, crowding out investment. We estimate the model using indirect inference, matching the endogenous relationship between investor demand and firm policies. Our estimation reveals that demand fluctuations are important drivers of firm-level investment and economy-wide capital misallocation, accounting for 26.9% of dispersion in MPK and 23.4% of productivity losses.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"168 ","pages":"Article 104039"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4,"publicationDate":"2025-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143632201","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}