信息技术与贷方竞争

IF 10.4 1区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Xavier Vives , Zhiqiang Ye
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们在一个空间模型中研究了信息技术(IT)如何影响贷款人竞争、企业家投资和福利。信息技术改进的效果取决于它是否会削弱贷款人与借款人之间的距离对监控成本的影响。如果削弱了,则会对企业家的投资和社会福利产生驼峰型影响。否则,竞争强度就不会发生变化,从而提高贷款人的利润、企业家的投资和社会福利。当企业家的道德风险问题严重时,信息技术引发的竞争更有可能减少投资和福利。我们还发现,贷款人的价格歧视并非福利最优。我们的研究结果与有关中小企业贷款的经验研究结果一致。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Information technology and lender competition
We study how information technology (IT) affects lender competition, entrepreneurs’ investment, and welfare in a spatial model. The effects of an IT improvement depend on whether it weakens the influence of lender–borrower distance on monitoring costs. If it does, it has a hump-shaped effect on entrepreneurs’ investment and social welfare. If not, competition intensity does not vary, improving lender profits, entrepreneurs’ investment, and social welfare. When entrepreneurs’ moral hazard problem is severe, IT-induced competition is more likely to reduce investment and welfare. We also find that lenders’ price discrimination is not welfare-optimal. Our results are consistent with received empirical work on lending to SMEs.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
15.80
自引率
4.50%
发文量
192
审稿时长
37 days
期刊介绍: The Journal of Financial Economics provides a specialized forum for the publication of research in the area of financial economics and the theory of the firm, placing primary emphasis on the highest quality analytical, empirical, and clinical contributions in the following major areas: capital markets, financial institutions, corporate finance, corporate governance, and the economics of organizations.
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