IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.最新文献_第4页

Understanding binary-Goppa decoding 了解二进制戈帕解码

IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch. Pub Date : 2024-04-09 DOI: 10.62056/angy4fe-3

D. Bernstein

引用次数: 5

Verifiable FHE via Lattice-based SNARKs 通过基于网格的 SNARKs 实现可验证的 FHE

IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch. Pub Date : 2024-04-09 DOI: 10.62056/a6ksdkp10

S. Atapoor, Karim Baghery, Hilder V. L. Pereira, Jannik Spiessens

{"title":"Verifiable FHE via Lattice-based SNARKs","authors":"S. Atapoor, Karim Baghery, Hilder V. L. Pereira, Jannik Spiessens","doi":"10.62056/a6ksdkp10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.62056/a6ksdkp10","url":null,"abstract":"Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) is a prevalent cryptographic primitive that allows for computation on encrypted data. In various cryptographic protocols, this enables outsourcing computation to a third party while retaining the privacy of the inputs to the computation. However, these schemes make an honest-but-curious assumption about the adversary. Previous work has tried to remove this assumption by combining FHE with Verifiable Computation (VC). Recent work has increased the flexibility of this approach by introducing integrity checks for homomorphic computations over rings. However, efficient FHE for circuits of large multiplicative depth also requires non-ring computations called maintenance operations, i.e. modswitching and keyswitching, which cannot be efficiently verified by existing constructions. We propose the first efficiently verifiable FHE scheme that allows for arbitrary depth homomorphic circuits by utilizing the double-CRT representation in which FHE schemes are typically computed, and using lattice-based SNARKs to prove components of this computation separately, including the maintenance operations. Therefore, our construction can theoretically handle bootstrapping operations. We also present the first implementation of a verifiable computation on encrypted data for a computation that contains multiple ciphertext-ciphertext multiplications. Concretely, we verify the homomorphic computation of an approximate neural network containing three layers and >100 ciphertexts in less than 1 second while maintaining reasonable prover costs.","PeriodicalId":508905,"journal":{"name":"IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.","volume":"28 1","pages":"32"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140723304","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

CCA Security with Short AEAD Tags 使用 AEAD 短标签的 CCA 安全性

IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch. Pub Date : 2024-04-09 DOI: 10.62056/aevua69p1

Mustafa Khairallah

{"title":"CCA Security with Short AEAD Tags","authors":"Mustafa Khairallah","doi":"10.62056/aevua69p1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.62056/aevua69p1","url":null,"abstract":"The size of the authentication tag represents a significant overhead for applications that are limited by bandwidth or memory. Hence, some authenticated encryption designs have a smaller tag than the required privacy level, which was also suggested by the NIST lightweight cryptography standardization project. In the ToSC 2022, two papers have raised questions about the IND-CCA security of AEAD schemes in this situation. These papers show that (a) online AE cannot provide IND-CCA security beyond the tag length, and (b) it is possible to have IND-CCA security beyond the tag length in a restricted Encode-then-Encipher framework. In this paper, we address some of the remaining gaps in this area. Our main result is to show that, for a fixed stretch, Pseudo-Random Injection security implies IND-CCA security as long as the minimum ciphertext size is at least as large as the required IND-CCA security level. We also show that this bound is tight and that any AEAD scheme that allows empty plaintexts with a fixed stretch cannot achieve IND-CCA security beyond the tag length. Next, we look at the weaker notion of MRAE security, and show that two-pass schemes that achieve MRAE security do not achieve IND-CCA security beyond the tag size. This includes SIV and rugged PRPs.","PeriodicalId":508905,"journal":{"name":"IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.","volume":"53 1","pages":"23"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140725115","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Simple Three-Round Multiparty Schnorr Signing with Full Simulatability 具有完全可模拟性的简单三轮多方施诺尔签约

IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch. Pub Date : 2024-04-09 DOI: 10.62056/a36c0l5vt

Yehuda Lindell

{"title":"Simple Three-Round Multiparty Schnorr Signing with Full Simulatability","authors":"Yehuda Lindell","doi":"10.62056/a36c0l5vt","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.62056/a36c0l5vt","url":null,"abstract":"In a multiparty signing protocol, also known as a threshold signature scheme, the private signing key is shared amongst a set of parties and only a quorum of those parties can generate a signature. Research on multiparty signing has been growing in popularity recently due to its application to cryptocurrencies. Most work has focused on reducing the number of rounds to two, and as a result: (a) are not fully simulatable in the sense of MPC real/ideal security definitions, and/or (b) are not secure under concurrent composition, and/or (c) utilize non-standard assumptions of different types in their proofs of security. In this paper, we describe a simple three-round multiparty protocol for Schnorr signatures that is secure for any number of corrupted parties; i.e., in the setting of a dishonest majority. The protocol is fully simulatable, secure under concurrent composition, and proven secure in the standard model or random-oracle model (depending on the instantiations of the commitment and zero-knowledge primitives). The protocol realizes an ideal Schnorr signing functionality with perfect security in the ideal commitment and zero-knowledge hybrid model (and thus the only assumptions needed are for realizing these functionalities).\u0000 In our presentation, we do not assume that all parties begin with the message to be signed, the identities of the participating parties and a unique common session identifier, since this is often not the case in practice. Rather, the parties achieve consensus on these parameters as the protocol progresses.","PeriodicalId":508905,"journal":{"name":"IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.","volume":"13 6","pages":"374"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140726955","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 29

Multiparty Private Set Intersection Cardinality and Its Applications 多方私有集合交集卡方及其应用

IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch. Pub Date : 2024-04-01 DOI: 10.56553/popets-2024-0041

Ni Trieu, Avishay Yanai, Jiahui Gao

{"title":"Multiparty Private Set Intersection Cardinality and Its Applications","authors":"Ni Trieu, Avishay Yanai, Jiahui Gao","doi":"10.56553/popets-2024-0041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.56553/popets-2024-0041","url":null,"abstract":"We describe a new paradigm for multi-party private set intersection cardinality (PSI-CA) that allows $n$ parties to compute the intersection size of their datasets without revealing any additional information. We explore a variety of instantiations of this paradigm. By operating under the assumption that a particular subset of parties refrains from collusion, our protocols avoid computationally expensive public-key operations and are secure in the presence of a semi-honest adversary. We demonstrate the practicality of our PSI-CA with an implementation. For $n=16$ parties with data-sets of $2^{20}$ items each, our server-aided variant takes 71 seconds. Interestingly, in the server-less setting, the same task takes only 7 seconds. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first `special purpose' implementation of a multi-party PSI-CA from symmetric-key techniques (i.e. an implementation that does not rely on a generic underlying MPC).We study two interesting applications -- heatmap computation and associated rule learning (ARL) -- that can be computed securely using a dot-product as a building block. We analyse the performance of securely computing heatmap and ARL using our protocol and compare that to the state-of-the-art.","PeriodicalId":508905,"journal":{"name":"IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.","volume":"268 2","pages":"735"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140780417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 6

Defining and Controlling Information Leakage in US Equities Trading 界定和控制美国股票交易中的信息泄露

IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch. Pub Date : 2024-04-01 DOI: 10.56553/popets-2024-0054

Arthur Américo, Allison Bishop, Paul Cesaretti, Garrison Grogan, Adam McKoy, Robert Moss, Lisa Oakley, Marcel Ribeiro, Mohammad Shokri

引用次数: 0

NOTRY: deniable messaging with retroactive avowal NOTRY：可否认的信息传递与追溯宣誓

IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch. Pub Date : 2024-04-01 DOI: 10.56553/popets-2024-0056

Faxing Wang, Shaanan N. Cohney, R. Wahby, Joseph Bonneau

引用次数: 0

Delegated Private Matching for Compute 计算的委托私有匹配

IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch. Pub Date : 2024-04-01 DOI: 10.56553/popets-2024-0040

Dimitris Mouris, Daniel Masny, Ni Trieu, Shubho Sengupta, Prasad Buddhavarapu, Benjamin M. Case

{"title":"Delegated Private Matching for Compute","authors":"Dimitris Mouris, Daniel Masny, Ni Trieu, Shubho Sengupta, Prasad Buddhavarapu, Benjamin M. Case","doi":"10.56553/popets-2024-0040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.56553/popets-2024-0040","url":null,"abstract":"Private matching for compute (PMC) establishes a match between two datasets owned by mutually distrusted parties (C and P) and allows the parties to input more data for the matched records for arbitrary downstream secure computation without rerunning the private matching component. The state-of-the-art PMC protocols only support two parties and assume that both parties can participate in computationally intensive secure computation. We observe that such operational overhead limits the adoption of these protocols to solely powerful entities as small data owners or devices with minimal computing power will not be able to participate.\u0000 We introduce two protocols to delegate PMC from party P to untrusted cloud servers, called delegates, allowing multiple smaller P parties to provide inputs containing identifiers and associated values. Our Delegated Private Matching for Compute protocols, called DPMC and DsPMC, establish a join between the datasets of party C and multiple delegators P based on multiple identifiers and compute secret shares of associated values for the identifiers that the parties have in common. We introduce a rerandomizable encrypted oblivious pseudorandom function (OPRF) primitive, called EO, which allows two parties to encrypt, mask, and shuffle their data. Note that EO may be of independent interest. Our DsPMC protocol limits the leakages of DPMC by combining our EO scheme and secure three-party shuffling. Finally, our implementation demonstrates the efficiency of our constructions by outperforming related works by approximately 10x for the total protocol execution and by at least 20x for the computation on the delegators.","PeriodicalId":508905,"journal":{"name":"IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.","volume":"78 ","pages":"12"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140770281","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

Multipars: Reduced-Communication MPC over Z2k Multipars：Z2k 上的减少通信 MPC

IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch. Pub Date : 2024-04-01 DOI: 10.56553/popets-2024-0038

Sebastian Hasler, Pascal Reisert, Marc Rivinius, Ralf Küsters

{"title":"Multipars: Reduced-Communication MPC over Z2k","authors":"Sebastian Hasler, Pascal Reisert, Marc Rivinius, Ralf Küsters","doi":"10.56553/popets-2024-0038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.56553/popets-2024-0038","url":null,"abstract":"In recent years, actively secure SPDZ-like protocols for dishonest majority, like SPDZ2k, Overdrive2k, and MHz2k, over base rings Z2k have become more and more efficient. In this paper, we present a new actively secure MPC protocol Multipars that outperforms these state-of-the-art protocols over Z2k by more than a factor of 2 in the two-party setup in terms of communication. Multipars is the first actively secure N-party protocol over Z2k that is based on linear homomorphic encryption (LHE) in the offline phase (instead of oblivious transfer or somewhat homomorphic encryption in previous works). The strong performance of Multipars relies on a new adaptive packing for BGV ciphertexts that allows us to reduce the parameter size of the encryption scheme and the overall communication cost. Additionally, we use modulus switching for further size reduction, a new type of enhanced CPA security over Z2k, a truncation protocol for Beaver triples, and a new LHE-based offline protocol without sacrificing over Z2k. We have implemented Multipars and therewith provide the fastest preprocessing phase over Z2k. Our evaluation shows that Multipars offers at least a factor of 8 lower communication costs and up to a factor of 15 faster runtime in the WAN setting compared to the currently best available actively secure MPC implementation over Z2k.","PeriodicalId":508905,"journal":{"name":"IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.","volume":"67 9","pages":"1932"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140795354","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Quantum Implementation of AIM: Aiming for Low-Depth AIM 的量子实现：以低深度为目标

IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch. Pub Date : 2024-03-27 DOI: 10.3390/app14072824

K. Jang, Dukyoung Kim, Yujin Oh, Sejin Lim, Yujin Yang, Hyunji Kim, Hwajeong Seo

引用次数: 1