{"title":"多方私有集合交集卡方及其应用","authors":"Ni Trieu, Avishay Yanai, Jiahui Gao","doi":"10.56553/popets-2024-0041","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We describe a new paradigm for multi-party private set intersection cardinality (PSI-CA) that allows $n$ parties to compute the intersection size of their datasets without revealing any additional information. We explore a variety of instantiations of this paradigm. By operating under the assumption that a particular subset of parties refrains from collusion, our protocols avoid computationally expensive public-key operations and are secure in the presence of a semi-honest adversary. We demonstrate the practicality of our PSI-CA with an implementation. For $n=16$ parties with data-sets of $2^{20}$ items each, our server-aided variant takes 71 seconds. Interestingly, in the server-less setting, the same task takes only 7 seconds. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first `special purpose' implementation of a multi-party PSI-CA from symmetric-key techniques (i.e. an implementation that does not rely on a generic underlying MPC).We study two interesting applications -- heatmap computation and associated rule learning (ARL) -- that can be computed securely using a dot-product as a building block. We analyse the performance of securely computing heatmap and ARL using our protocol and compare that to the state-of-the-art.","PeriodicalId":508905,"journal":{"name":"IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.","volume":"268 2","pages":"735"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"6","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Multiparty Private Set Intersection Cardinality and Its Applications\",\"authors\":\"Ni Trieu, Avishay Yanai, Jiahui Gao\",\"doi\":\"10.56553/popets-2024-0041\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We describe a new paradigm for multi-party private set intersection cardinality (PSI-CA) that allows $n$ parties to compute the intersection size of their datasets without revealing any additional information. We explore a variety of instantiations of this paradigm. By operating under the assumption that a particular subset of parties refrains from collusion, our protocols avoid computationally expensive public-key operations and are secure in the presence of a semi-honest adversary. We demonstrate the practicality of our PSI-CA with an implementation. For $n=16$ parties with data-sets of $2^{20}$ items each, our server-aided variant takes 71 seconds. Interestingly, in the server-less setting, the same task takes only 7 seconds. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first `special purpose' implementation of a multi-party PSI-CA from symmetric-key techniques (i.e. an implementation that does not rely on a generic underlying MPC).We study two interesting applications -- heatmap computation and associated rule learning (ARL) -- that can be computed securely using a dot-product as a building block. We analyse the performance of securely computing heatmap and ARL using our protocol and compare that to the state-of-the-art.\",\"PeriodicalId\":508905,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.\",\"volume\":\"268 2\",\"pages\":\"735\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-04-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"6\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.56553/popets-2024-0041\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.56553/popets-2024-0041","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Multiparty Private Set Intersection Cardinality and Its Applications
We describe a new paradigm for multi-party private set intersection cardinality (PSI-CA) that allows $n$ parties to compute the intersection size of their datasets without revealing any additional information. We explore a variety of instantiations of this paradigm. By operating under the assumption that a particular subset of parties refrains from collusion, our protocols avoid computationally expensive public-key operations and are secure in the presence of a semi-honest adversary. We demonstrate the practicality of our PSI-CA with an implementation. For $n=16$ parties with data-sets of $2^{20}$ items each, our server-aided variant takes 71 seconds. Interestingly, in the server-less setting, the same task takes only 7 seconds. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first `special purpose' implementation of a multi-party PSI-CA from symmetric-key techniques (i.e. an implementation that does not rely on a generic underlying MPC).We study two interesting applications -- heatmap computation and associated rule learning (ARL) -- that can be computed securely using a dot-product as a building block. We analyse the performance of securely computing heatmap and ARL using our protocol and compare that to the state-of-the-art.