Cognitive Neuropsychology最新文献

{"title":"Cognitive and communicative pressures in the emergence of grammatical structure: A closer look at whether number sense is encoded in privileged ways.","authors":"Francesca Franzon, Chiara Zanini, Rosa Rugani","doi":"10.1080/02643294.2020.1802241","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02643294.2020.1802241","url":null,"abstract":"In a recent article, Everett (2019) proposed a culture-centered account of the distribution of the observed values for an almost universal grammatical feature, morphological Number (Haspelmath, 201...","PeriodicalId":50670,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Neuropsychology","volume":"37 5-6","pages":"355-358"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02643294.2020.1802241","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"38309738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Can the English <i>stand</i> the bottle like the Dutch? Effects of relational categories on object perception.","authors":"Monique Flecken,&nbsp;Geertje van Bergen","doi":"10.1080/02643294.2019.1607272","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02643294.2019.1607272","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Does language influence how we perceive the world? This study examines how linguistic encoding of relational information by means of verbs implicitly affects visual processing, by measuring perceptual judgements behaviourally, and visual perception and attention in EEG. Verbal systems can vary cross-linguistically: Dutch uses posture verbs to describe inanimate object configurations (<i>the bottle stands/lies on the table</i>). In English, however, such use of posture verbs is rare (<i>the bottle is on the table</i>). Using this test case, we ask (1) whether previously attested language-perception interactions extend to more complex domains, and (2) whether differences in linguistic usage probabilities affect perception. We report three nonverbal experiments in which Dutch and English participants performed a picture-matching task. Prime and target pictures contained object configurations (e.g., a bottle on a table); in the critical condition, prime and target showed a mismatch in object position (standing/lying). In both language groups, we found similar responses, suggesting that probabilistic differences in linguistic encoding of relational information do not affect perception.</p>","PeriodicalId":50670,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Neuropsychology","volume":"37 5-6","pages":"271-287"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02643294.2019.1607272","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"37396140","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Whorfian brain: Neuroscientific approaches to linguistic relativity.","authors":"Panos Athanasopoulos,&nbsp;Aina Casaponsa","doi":"10.1080/02643294.2020.1769050","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02643294.2020.1769050","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Modern approaches to the Whorfian linguistic relativity question have reframed it from one of whether language shapes our thinking or not, to one that tries to understand the factors that contribute to the extent and nature of any observable influence of language on perception. The current paper demonstrates that such understanding is significantly enhanced by moving the evidentiary basis toward a more biologically grounded empirical arena. We review recent neuroscientific evidence using a variety of methodological techniques that reveal the functional organisation and temporal distribution of the ubiquitous relationship between language and cognitive processing in the human brain.</p>","PeriodicalId":50670,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Neuropsychology","volume":"37 5-6","pages":"393-412"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02643294.2020.1769050","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"37994606","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Grammatical number is sufficiently explained by communicative needs.","authors":"Caleb Everett","doi":"10.1080/02643294.2020.1824992","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02643294.2020.1824992","url":null,"abstract":"Franzon, Zanini and Rugani offer a useful clarification of their viewpoint expressed in earlier work. (Franzon et al., 2020; Franson et al. 2019) Their account might be encapsulated as follows: A) ...","PeriodicalId":50670,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Neuropsychology","volume":"37 5-6","pages":"359-362"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02643294.2020.1824992","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"38450272","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Grounding language in the neglected senses of touch, taste, and smell.","authors":"Laura J Speed,&nbsp;Asifa Majid","doi":"10.1080/02643294.2019.1623188","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02643294.2019.1623188","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Grounded theories hold sensorimotor activation is critical to language processing. Such theories have focused predominantly on the dominant senses of sight and hearing. Relatively fewer studies have assessed mental simulation within touch, taste, and smell, even though they are critically implicated in communication for important domains, such as health and wellbeing. We review work that sheds light on whether perceptual activation from lesser studied modalities contribute to meaning in language. We critically evaluate data from behavioural, imaging, and cross-cultural studies. We conclude that evidence for sensorimotor simulation in touch, taste, and smell is weak. Comprehending language related to these senses may instead rely on simulation of emotion, as well as crossmodal simulation of the \"higher\" senses of vision and audition. Overall, the data suggest the need for a refinement of embodiment theories, as not all sensory modalities provide equally strong evidence for mental simulation.</p>","PeriodicalId":50670,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Neuropsychology","volume":"37 5-6","pages":"363-392"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02643294.2019.1623188","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"37357168","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Interactions between language, thought, and perception: Cognitive and neural perspectives.","authors":"Bradford Z Mahon, David Kemmerer","doi":"10.1080/02643294.2020.1829578","DOIUrl":"10.1080/02643294.2020.1829578","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p><b>ABSTRACT</b> The role that language plays in shaping non-linguistic cognitive and perceptual systems has been the subject of much theoretical and experimental attention over the past half-century. Understanding how language interacts with non-linguistic systems can provide insight into broader constraints on cognitive and brain organization. The papers that form this volume investigate various ways in which linguistic structure can interact with and influence how speakers think about and perceive the world, and the related issue of the constraints that in turn shape linguistic representations. These theoretical and empirical contributions support deeper understanding of the interactions between language, thought, and perception, and motivate new approaches for developing directional predictions at both the neural and cognitive levels.</p>","PeriodicalId":50670,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Neuropsychology","volume":"37 5-6","pages":"235-240"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"38585823","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Words, thoughts, and brains.","authors":"Barbara C Malt","doi":"10.1080/02643294.2019.1599335","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02643294.2019.1599335","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Knowledge of the world is fundamental to human thought and ability to navigate the world, and a large literature has accumulated on the neuroscience of semantic memory. Because language serves as one of the most important interfaces between the private world of thought and other people, researchers often tap into semantic memory through word-based tasks. But this approach fails to acknowledge crucial distinctions between word meaning and general-purpose, non-linguistic knowledge. This article will discuss the relation between words and non-linguistic representations, drawing in part on evidence about cross-linguistic lexical diversity. It will argue that a more nuanced consideration of the language-thought interface is needed in the neuroscience of concepts.</p>","PeriodicalId":50670,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Neuropsychology","volume":"37 5-6","pages":"241-253"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02643294.2019.1599335","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"37135464","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Communicative need in colour naming.","authors":"Noga Zaslavsky,&nbsp;Charles Kemp,&nbsp;Naftali Tishby,&nbsp;Terry Regier","doi":"10.1080/02643294.2019.1604502","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02643294.2019.1604502","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Colour naming across languages has traditionally been held to reflect the structure of colour perception. At the same time, it has often, and increasingly, been suggested that colour naming may be shaped by patterns of communicative need. However, much remains unknown about the factors involved in communicative need, how need interacts with perception, and how this interaction may shape colour naming. Here, we engage these open questions by building on general information-theoretic principles. We present a systematic evaluation of several factors that may reflect need, and that have been proposed in the literature: capacity constraints, linguistic usage, and the visual environment. Our analysis suggests that communicative need in colour naming is reflected more directly by capacity constraints and linguistic usage than it is by the statistics of the visual environment.</p>","PeriodicalId":50670,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Neuropsychology","volume":"37 5-6","pages":"312-324"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02643294.2019.1604502","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"37186507","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Toward a standard model of consciousness: Reconciling the attention schema, global workspace, higher-order thought, and illusionist theories","authors":"M. Graziano, Arvid Guterstam, Branden J. Bio, Andrew I. Wilterson","doi":"10.1080/02643294.2019.1670630","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02643294.2019.1670630","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Here we examine how people’s understanding of consciousness may have been shaped by an implicit theory of mind. This social cognition approach may help to make sense of an apparent divide between the physically incoherent consciousness we think we have and the complex, rich, but mechanistic consciousness we may actually have. We suggest this approach helps reconcile some of the current cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness. We argue that a single, coherent explanation of consciousness is available and has been for some time, encompassing the views of many researchers, but is not yet recognized. It is obscured partly by terminological differences, and partly because researchers view isolated pieces of it as rival theories. It may be time to recognize that a deeper, coherent pool of ideas, a kind of standard model, is available to explain multiple layers of consciousness and how they relate to specific networks within the brain.","PeriodicalId":50670,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Neuropsychology","volume":"37 1","pages":"155 - 172"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2020-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02643294.2019.1670630","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43319950","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"But AST really is illusionism.","authors":"Susan Blackmore","doi":"10.1080/02643294.2020.1729112","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02643294.2020.1729112","url":null,"abstract":"I applaud Graziano and colleagues (2020) for their bold theoretical leap. Attention and consciousness have long been confused and their relationships confusing. A complex brain needs to deploy attention efficiently, and this requires an effective and constantly updated model of what it is attending to and how. This new approach—equating m-consciousness, or subjective experience, with the model of attention —provides a welcome new way to approach the muddle. At its simplest, “awareness is a model of attention” (p. 21). Yet I wish the authors had clearly admitted that AST really is a form of illusionism. Ordinary dictionaries typically define “illusion” not as something that does not exist but as something that is not what it seems to be—precisely what the authors claim when they say “m-consciousness... does not exist as such. Or at least, it is not what we think it is”. (p. 13). If they had stuck to m-consciousness as the single process deserving the name “consciousness”, its illusory nature would have been obvious. But instead they have two types of consciousness. Their simple and tempting equation is that i-consciousness is the information and m-consciousness is a partial model of that information. In other words, the mysterious, subjective, what-it’s-like kind of consciousness—the kind that worries us so much—is a partial model of mechanistic information processing. Why then call i-consciousness “consciousness” at all? Perhaps this is because of the connection they make with global workspace theories. M-consciousness, they say, does not model all information, or all attentional processes going on in the brain; it specifically models information in the global workspace. As they put it, “GW is an account of i-consciousness” and information (for example about an apple) “has entered the global workspace and thus entered consciousness” (p. 6). But we need to ask precisely what this “entering” means and in what sense the “contents” now deserve to be called “conscious”. There is a real problem with the notion of conscious contents, and I have long argued that consciousness is not a kind of container that has “contents” inside it (Blackmore, 2002). In modelling ongoing processes of attention, rather than specific items or “contents” such as apples, AST might seem to escape this problem which would be a huge advantage. Yet, by also calling i-consciousness “consciousness” they remain stuck with it. Indeed, it seems perverse to go along with GWT in the belief that the contents of the GW are the contents of consciousness, even if this is only i-consciousness and not the mysterious, subjective, m-consciousness. GWT has always been ambiguous in an important sense, and even authors such as Baars (1997) and Dehaene (2014) do not clearly distinguish between two possible, fundamentally different, interpretations. One interpretation relies on a magical transformation: something enters the GW “and then it “becomes conscious” or “enters consciousness”” with no expl","PeriodicalId":50670,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Neuropsychology","volume":"37 3-4","pages":"206-208"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02643294.2020.1729112","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"37648738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}