Cognitive Psychology最新文献

{"title":"Recruitment of magnitude representations to understand graded words","authors":"Sashank Varma ,&nbsp;Emily M. Sanford ,&nbsp;Vijay Marupudi ,&nbsp;Olivia Shaffer ,&nbsp;R. Brooke Lea","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101673","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101673","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Language understanding and mathematics understanding are two fundamental forms of human thinking. Prior research has largely focused on the question of how language shapes mathematical thinking. The current study considers the converse question. Specifically, it investigates whether the magnitude representations that are thought to anchor understanding of number are also recruited to understand the meanings of graded words. These are words that come in scales (e.g., <em>Anger</em>) whose members can be ordered by the degree to which they possess the defining property (e.g., <em>calm</em>, <em>annoyed</em>, <em>angry</em>, <em>furious</em>). Experiment 1 uses the comparison paradigm to find evidence that the distance, ratio, and boundary effects that are taken as evidence of the recruitment of magnitude representations extend from numbers to words. Experiment 2 uses a similarity rating paradigm and multi-dimensional scaling to find converging evidence for these effects in graded word understanding. Experiment 3 evaluates an alternative hypothesis – that these effects for graded words simply reflect the statistical structure of the linguistic environment – by using machine learning models of distributional word semantics: LSA, word2vec, GloVe, counterfitted word vectors, BERT, RoBERTa, and GPT-2. These models fail to show the full pattern of effects observed of humans in Experiment 2, suggesting that more is needed than mere statistics. This research paves the way for further investigations of the role of magnitude representations in sentence and text comprehension, and of the question of whether language understanding and number understanding draw on shared or independent magnitude representations. It also informs the role of machine learning models in cognitive psychology research.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"153 ","pages":"Article 101673"},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141879798","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Task imprinting: Another mechanism of representational change?","authors":"Mirko Thalmann ,&nbsp;Theo A.J. Schäfer ,&nbsp;Stephanie Theves ,&nbsp;Christian F. Doeller ,&nbsp;Eric Schulz","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101670","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101670","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Research from several areas suggests that mental representations adapt to the specific tasks we carry out in our environment. In this study, we propose a mechanism of adaptive representational change, <em>task imprinting</em>. Thereby, we introduce a computational model, which portrays task imprinting as an adaptation to specific task goals via selective storage of helpful representations in long-term memory. We test the main qualitative prediction of the model in four behavioral experiments using healthy young adults as participants. In each experiment, we assess participants’ baseline representations in the beginning of the experiment, then expose participants to one of two tasks intended to shape representations differently according to our model, and finally assess any potential change in representations. Crucially, the tasks used to measure representations differ in the amount that strategic, judgmental processes play a role. The results of Experiments 1 and 2 allow us to exclude the option that representations used in more perceptual tasks become biased categorically. The results of Experiment 4 make it likely that people strategically decide given the specific task context whether they use categorical information or not. One signature of representational change was however observed: category learning practice increased the perceptual sensitivity over and above mere exposure to the same stimuli.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"152 ","pages":"Article 101670"},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0010028524000410/pdfft?md5=af7b0524f6fb619e19c3f608734457b2&pid=1-s2.0-S0010028524000410-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141602082","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The fusion point of temporal binding: Promises and perils of multisensory accounts","authors":"Annika L. Klaffehn ,&nbsp;Oliver Herbort ,&nbsp;Roland Pfister","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101662","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101662","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Performing an action to initiate a consequence in the environment triggers the perceptual illusion of temporal binding. This phenomenon entails that actions and following effects are perceived to occur closer in time than they do outside the action-effect relationship. Here we ask whether temporal binding can be explained in terms of multisensory integration, by assuming either multisensory fusion or partial integration of the two events. We gathered two datasets featuring a wide range of action-effect delays as a key factor influencing integration. We then tested the fit of a computational model for multisensory integration, the statistically optimal cue integration (SOCI) model. Indeed, qualitative aspects of the data on a group-level followed the principles of a multisensory account. By contrast, quantitative evidence from a comprehensive model evaluation indicated that temporal binding cannot be reduced to multisensory integration. Rather, multisensory integration should be seen as one of several component processes underlying temporal binding on an individual level.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"151 ","pages":"Article 101662"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0010028524000331/pdfft?md5=618f770b916a33a013d847542c6483a0&pid=1-s2.0-S0010028524000331-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141072828","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Cognitive complexity explains processing asymmetry in judgments of similarity versus difference","authors":"Nicholas Ichien ,&nbsp;Nyusha Lin ,&nbsp;Keith J. Holyoak ,&nbsp;Hongjing Lu","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101661","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101661","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Human judgments of similarity and difference are sometimes asymmetrical, with the former being more sensitive than the latter to relational overlap, but the theoretical basis for this asymmetry remains unclear. We test an explanation based on the type of information used to make these judgments (relations versus features) and the comparison process itself (similarity versus difference). We propose that asymmetries arise from two aspects of cognitive complexity that impact judgments of similarity and difference: processing relations between entities is more cognitively demanding than processing features of individual entities, and comparisons assessing difference are more cognitively complex than those assessing similarity. In Experiment 1 we tested this hypothesis for both verbal comparisons between word pairs, and visual comparisons between sets of geometric shapes. Participants were asked to select one of two options that was either more similar to or more different from a standard. On <em>unambiguous</em> trials, one option was unambiguously more similar to the standard; on <em>ambiguous</em> trials, one option was more featurally similar to the standard, whereas the other was more relationally similar. Given the higher cognitive complexity of processing relations and of assessing difference, we predicted that detecting <em>relational difference</em> would be particularly demanding. We found that participants (1) had more difficulty detecting relational difference than they did relational similarity on unambiguous trials, and (2) tended to emphasize relational information more when judging similarity than when judging difference on ambiguous trials. The latter finding was replicated using more complex story stimuli (Experiment 2). We showed that this pattern can be captured by a computational model of comparison that weights relational information more heavily for similarity than for difference judgments.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"151 ","pages":"Article 101661"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140643550","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Repeated rock, paper, scissors play reveals limits in adaptive sequential behavior","authors":"Erik Brockbank ,&nbsp;Edward Vul","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101654","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101654","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>How do people adapt to others in adversarial settings? Prior work has shown that people often violate rational models of adversarial decision-making in repeated interactions. In particular, in <em>mixed strategy equilibrium (MSE)</em> games, where optimal action selection entails choosing moves randomly, people often do not play randomly, but instead try to <em>outwit</em> their opponents. However, little is known about the adaptive reasoning that underlies these deviations from random behavior. Here, we examine strategic decision-making across repeated rounds of rock, paper, scissors, a well-known MSE game. In experiment 1, participants were paired with bot opponents that exhibited distinct stable move patterns, allowing us to identify the bounds of the complexity of opponent behavior that people can detect and adapt to. In experiment 2, bot opponents instead exploited stable patterns in the human participants’ moves, providing a symmetrical bound on the complexity of patterns people can revise in their own behavior. Across both experiments, people exhibited a robust and flexible attention to <em>transition patterns</em> from one move to the next, exploiting these patterns in opponents and modifying them strategically in their own moves. However, their adaptive reasoning showed strong limitations with respect to more sophisticated patterns. Together, results provide a precise and consistent account of the surprisingly limited scope of people’s adaptive decision-making in this setting.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"151 ","pages":"Article 101654"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140641101","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Optimizing competence in the service of collaboration","authors":"Yang Xiang ,&nbsp;Natalia Vélez ,&nbsp;Samuel J. Gershman","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101653","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101653","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In order to efficiently divide labor with others, it is important to understand what our collaborators can do (i.e., their <em>competence</em>). However, competence is not static—people get better at particular jobs the more often they perform them. This plasticity of competence creates a challenge for collaboration: For example, is it better to assign tasks to whoever is most competent now, or to the person who can be trained most efficiently “on-the-job”? We conducted four experiments (<span><math><mrow><mi>N</mi><mo>=</mo><mn>396</mn></mrow></math></span>) that examine how people make decisions about whom to train (Experiments 1 and 3) and whom to recruit (Experiments 2 and 4) to a collaborative task, based on the simulated collaborators’ starting expertise, the training opportunities available, and the goal of the task. We found that participants’ decisions were best captured by a <em>planning</em> model that attempts to maximize the returns from collaboration while minimizing the costs of hiring and training individual collaborators. This planning model outperformed alternative models that based these decisions on the agents’ current competence, or on how much agents stood to improve in a single training step, without considering whether this training would enable agents to succeed at the task in the long run. Our findings suggest that people do not recruit and train collaborators based solely on their current competence, nor solely on the opportunities for their collaborators to improve. Instead, people use an intuitive theory of competence to balance the costs of hiring and training others against the benefits to the collaboration.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"150 ","pages":"Article 101653"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140145334","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The structure and development of explore-exploit decision making","authors":"Madeline B. Harms ,&nbsp;Yuyan Xu ,&nbsp;C. Shawn Green ,&nbsp;Kristina Woodard ,&nbsp;Robert Wilson ,&nbsp;Seth D. Pollak","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101650","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101650","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>A critical component of human learning reflects the balance people must achieve between focusing on the utility of what they know versus openness to what they have yet to experience. How individuals decide whether to explore new options versus exploit known options has garnered growing interest in recent years. Yet, the component processes underlying decisions to explore and whether these processes change across development remain poorly understood. By contrasting a variety of tasks that measure exploration in slightly different ways, we found that decisions about whether to explore reflect (a) random exploration that is not explicitly goal-directed and (b) directed exploration to purposefully reduce uncertainty. While these components similarly characterized the decision-making of both youth and adults, younger participants made decisions that were less strategic, but more exploratory and flexible, than those of adults. These findings are discussed in terms of how people adapt to and learn from changing environments over time.<!--> <!-->Data has been made available in the Open Science Foundation platform (<span>osf.io</span><svg><path></path></svg>).</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"150 ","pages":"Article 101650"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140069658","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The perceptual timescape: Perceptual history on the sub-second scale","authors":"Peter A. White","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101643","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101643","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>There is a high-capacity store of brief time span (∼1000 ms) which information enters from perceptual processing, often called iconic memory or sensory memory. It is proposed that a main function of this store is to hold recent perceptual information in a temporally segregated representation, named the perceptual timescape. The perceptual timescape is a continually active representation of change and continuity over time that endows the perceived present with a perceived history. This is accomplished primarily by two kinds of time marking information: time distance information, which marks all items of information in the perceptual timescape according to how far in the past they occurred, and ordinal temporal information, which organises items of information in terms of their temporal order. Added to that is information about connectivity of perceptual objects over time. These kinds of information connect individual items over a brief span of time so as to represent change, persistence, and continuity over time. It is argued that there is a one-way street of information flow from perceptual processing either to the perceived present or directly into the perceptual timescape, and thence to working memory. Consistent with that, the information structure of the perceptual timescape supports postdictive reinterpretations of recent perceptual information. Temporal integration on a time scale of hundreds of milliseconds takes place in perceptual processing and does not draw on information in the perceptual timescape, which is concerned with temporal segregation, not integration.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"149 ","pages":"Article 101643"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0010028524000148/pdfft?md5=45d9c7d9c51eea04bcfcbcf1c5412693&pid=1-s2.0-S0010028524000148-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140041713","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Infants can use temporary or scant categorical information to individuate objects","authors":"Yi Lin ,&nbsp;Maayan Stavans ,&nbsp;Xia Li ,&nbsp;Renée Baillargeon","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101640","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101640","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In a standard individuation task, infants see two different objects emerge in alternation from behind a screen. If they can assign distinct categorical descriptors to the two objects, they expect to see both objects when the screen is lowered; if not, they have no expectation at all about what they will see (i.e., two objects, one object, or no object). Why is contrastive categorical information critical for success at this task? According to the <em>kind</em> account, infants must decide whether they are facing a single object with changing properties or two different objects with stable properties, and access to permanent, intrinsic, kind information for each object resolves this difficulty. According to the <em>two-system</em> account, however, contrastive categorical descriptors simply provide the object-file system with unique tags for individuating the two objects and for communicating about them with the physical-reasoning system. The two-system account thus predicts that <em>any type of contrastive categorical information, however temporary or scant it may be,</em> should induce success at the task. Two experiments examined this prediction. Experiment 1 tested 14-month-olds (<em>N</em> = 96) in a standard task using two objects that differed only in their featural properties. Infants succeeded at the task when the object-file system had access to contrastive <em>temporary</em> categorical descriptors derived from the objects’ distinct causal roles in preceding support events (e.g., formerly a support, formerly a supportee). Experiment 2 tested 9-month-olds (<em>N</em> = 96) in a standard task using two objects infants this age typically encode as merely featurally distinct. Infants succeeded when the object-file system had access to <em>scant</em> categorical descriptors derived from the objects’ prior inclusion in static arrays of similarly shaped objects (e.g., block-shaped objects, cylinder-shaped objects). These and control results support the two-system account’s claim that in a standard task, contrastive categorical descriptors serve to provide the object-file system with unique tags for the two objects.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"149 ","pages":"Article 101640"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139984398","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"What’s in a sample? Epistemic uncertainty and metacognitive awareness in risk taking","authors":"Sebastian Olschewski ,&nbsp;Benjamin Scheibehenne","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101642","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2024.101642","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In a fundamentally uncertain world, sound information processing is a prerequisite for effective behavior. Given that information processing is subject to inevitable cognitive imprecision, decision makers should adapt to this imprecision and to the resulting epistemic uncertainty when taking risks. We tested this metacognitive ability in two experiments in which participants estimated the expected value of different number distributions from sequential samples and then bet on their own estimation accuracy. Results show that estimates were imprecise, and this imprecision increased with higher distributional standard deviations. Importantly, participants adapted their risk-taking behavior to this imprecision and hence deviated from the predictions of Bayesian models of uncertainty that assume perfect integration of information. To explain these results, we developed a computational model that combines Bayesian updating with a metacognitive awareness of cognitive imprecision in the integration of information. Modeling results were robust to the inclusion of an empirical measure of participants’ perceived variability. In sum, we show that cognitive imprecision is crucial to understanding risk taking in decisions from experience. The results further demonstrate the importance of metacognitive awareness as a cognitive building block for adaptive behavior under (partial) uncertainty.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"149 ","pages":"Article 101642"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2024-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0010028524000136/pdfft?md5=944b561cc48bb314c003ee766d3d38cd&pid=1-s2.0-S0010028524000136-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139941835","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}