Cognitive Psychology最新文献

{"title":"The intelligibility of consonants in American English infant-directed speech","authors":"Daniel Swingley","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2025.101766","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2025.101766","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>To begin learning their language, infants must locate words in the speech signal. Some models of word discovery presuppose that the discovery process depends on identifying phonetic segments (phones) in speech. To test the plausibility of models arguing that infants can reliably categorize consonants in speech, adult native speakers were asked to identify the consonant in vowel-consonant-vowel sequences extracted from spontaneous English infant-directed speech. Listeners could consistently identify some instances of consonants (for example, correctly indicating that an /s/ was an /s/). But many tokens (about half) were not consistently identifiable. Performance was significantly worse for codas than onsets. Providing the full utterance context in low-pass-filtered form did not aid recognition, nor did familiarization with the talker. In a second task, listeners were barely above chance in guessing whether a consonant was a word onset or a word-final coda. Performance on infant-directed speech was not markedly better than performance on a comparison set of adult-directed speech consonants. Erroneous responses frequently had little systematic resemblance to the correct answer. The results suggest that it is not plausible that infants can parse most utterances exhaustively into strings of uttered speech sounds and feed those strings into a statistical clustering mechanism.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"161 ","pages":"Article 101766"},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145294243","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Forest before trees? It depends on not only what you see, but also what you hear","authors":"Xiaoyu Tang ,&nbsp;Haoming Liu ,&nbsp;Heming Zhang ,&nbsp;Yufeng He ,&nbsp;Xinzhong Cui ,&nbsp;Wanlong Liu ,&nbsp;Yan Sun ,&nbsp;Jiaying Sun ,&nbsp;Jing Fu","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2025.101764","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2025.101764","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Prior researches on global–local processing have focused on hierarchical objects in the visual modality, while the real-world involves multisensory interactions. The present study investigated whether the simultaneous presentation of auditory stimuli influences the recognition of visually hierarchical objects. We added four types of auditory stimuli to the traditional visual hierarchical letters paradigm:<!--> <!-->no sound (visual-only), a pure tone, a spoken letter that was congruent with the required response (response-congruent), or a spoken letter that was incongruent with it (response-incongruent).<!--> <!-->The data were modeled using a hierarchical drift–diffusion model (HDDM). In Experiment 1, the participants were asked to discriminate the global or local visual letters accompanied by these sounds. Experiment 2 eliminated the global advantage effect by enlarging stimuli to isolate interference mechanisms. Results revealed that response-incongruent speech attenuated both the global advantage effect and robustly reduced the global interference effect across experiments. HDDM analysis demonstrated dual-stage modulation: 1) Perceptual delays during congruent local trials, indicating attentional capture; 2) Decision-stage disruption during local processing, reflecting impaired evidence accumulation for conflict resolution. Critically, only semantically incongruent speech altered decision dynamics, while pure tones affected only perceptual encoding. This study provides new insights into multisensory interactions, showing how auditory stimuli interfere with visual global local perception through attentional filtering mechanisms at different stages of processing.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"161 ","pages":"Article 101764"},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145011305","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Evaluating three independent-channels models of temporal-order and simultaneity judgment","authors":"Paul Kelber,&nbsp;Rolf Ulrich","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2025.101767","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2025.101767","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>How do people judge the temporal order and simultaneity/successiveness of events? Three candidate models can explain the theoretically constraining shapes of the psychometric functions observed in tasks with more complex response formats. First, the response-error model allows that internal states generated by a triggered-moments process are misreported due to finger errors, requiring that psychometric functions are parallel after empirically accounting for finger errors (parallelism) and that successiveness perception is necessary for temporal-order perception (necessity). Second, the two-stage model posits that two independent and serial processes generate simultaneity/successiveness and temporal-order judgments, requiring that temporal-order judgment accuracy does not depend on simultaneity/successiveness judgment accuracy (independence) and that simultaneity responses are not slower than order responses (seriality). Third, the two-threshold model formalizes the idea that the order threshold can be higher than the successiveness threshold, requiring necessity and that the order threshold is not lower than the successiveness threshold (threshold inequality). Five experiments evaluated these model assumptions against precise individual data collected with audio-visual and visual stimuli in temporal-order judgment, simultaneity judgment, ternary-response, and dual-response tasks. The response-error model was invalidated by near-universal violations of parallelism in 63/64 tests, and the two-stage model by consistent violations of independence (20/20) and predominant violations of seriality (30/44). By contrast, the threshold inequality in the two-threshold model was satisfied in 39/40 tests, whereas necessity was violated in 10/20 tests. Joint model fits across the four tasks also revealed that the two-threshold model provides the best general account of temporal judgment. We conclude that the two-threshold model is the least inadequate of the three candidate models, and consider a generalized two-threshold model with fluctuating criteria to address violations of necessity.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"161 ","pages":"Article 101767"},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145362891","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The psychophysics of compositionality: Relational scene perception occurs in a canonical order","authors":"Zekun Sun ,&nbsp;Chaz Firestone ,&nbsp;Alon Hafri","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2025.101765","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2025.101765","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We see not only objects and their features (e.g., glass vases or wooden tables) but also relations between them (e.g., a vase on a table). An emerging view accounts for such relational representations by positing that visual perception is compositional: Much like language, where words combine to form phrases and sentences, many visual representations contain discrete constituents that combine systematically. This perspective raises a fundamental question: What principles guide the composition of relational representations, and how are they built over time? Here, we tested the hypothesis that the mind constructs relational representations in a canonical order. Inspired by a distinction from cognitive linguistics, we predicted that ‘reference’ objects (typically large, stable, and able to physically control other objects; e.g., tables) take precedence over ‘figure’ objects (e.g., vases) during scene composition. In Experiment 1, participants who arranged items to match linguistic descriptions (e.g., “The vase is on the table”, “The table is supporting the vase”) consistently placed reference objects first (e.g., table, then vase). Experiments 2–5 extended these findings to visual recognition itself: participants were faster to verify scene descriptions when reference objects appeared before figure objects in a scene, rather than vice versa. This Reference-first advantage emerged rapidly (within 100 ms), persisted in a purely visual task, and reflected abstract principles (e.g., physical forces) beyond simple differences in size or shape. Our findings reveal psychophysical principles underlying compositionality in visual processing: the mind builds representations of object relations sequentially, guided by the objects’ roles in those relations.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"161 ","pages":"Article 101765"},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145267947","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Natural counting and measuring: The role of linguistic and referential cues in determining which quantity is “More”","authors":"Grace A. Coram ,&nbsp;Lance J. Rips","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2025.101756","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2025.101756","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>When we decide “Which is more?” for groups of physical objects or substances, we compare the groups along a quantitative dimension like numerosity or size. The nature of these comparisons is sometimes unclear, however, because the choice of dimension may be uncertain. To clarify this choice, people can rely on linguistic and referential indicators. One type of clue to the right dimension is a classifier or “quantizer” like “ounces” that appears with “more,” as in “Which has more in ounces?” The studies in this paper look at these quantizer-based comparisons, for the first time in an experimental context, and the extent to which they depend on the comparisons’ referents. Participants answered questions like these for pictures of simple objects that differed independently in their size and number. As expected, response times for their answers show robust effects of the quantizers in directing attention to number or measure. However, the quantizers did not always fully dictate this choice. First, some quantizers (e.g., “more in boxfuls/spoonfuls”) are ambiguous between a reading that emphasizes the number of containers (boxes or spoons) and a reading that emphasizes the measure of their contents. Second, the reading of even unambiguous quantifiers (e.g., “more in cubes”) can be swayed by the referents of the comparison (e.g., “more salt in cubes”). These results suggest that people may begin with a generalized sense of “more” that they narrow in response to the quantizer and the referent, considered in tandem. We offer a mathematical model of how this interpretation takes place.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"160 ","pages":"Article 101756"},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144810276","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Conceptualizing cognitive flexibility: Singular versus modular view – Which one holds up?","authors":"Yuval Himai ,&nbsp;Eyal Heled","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2025.101755","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2025.101755","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Cognitive flexibility (CF) refers to the ability to adapt thinking and behavior to new or changing demands. However, conceptions of CF disagree on its structure, whether it is a uniform or a modular ability composed of different subtypes. Within the modular view, it has also been suggested that subtypes are organized in a hierarchical structure, although perspectives regarding this organization are inconsistent. The present study aimed to explore these structural and hierarchical views by comparing a one-factor model to a three-factor model that divides CF into task switching, switching sets, and stimulus–response mapping. Additionally, the study sought to test whether these subtypes are distinct and hierarchically organized, whereby task switching is initially assumed to be the most demanding, and stimulus–response mapping the least challenging. 235 participants (126 women) took part in the study, and performed nine different CF tasks, divided equally among the 3 subtypes. Confirmatory factor analysis indicated that the one-factor model fit was not adequate in contrast to the three-factor model. The three subtypes were distinct and displayed a hierarchical organization, with switching sets being the most demanding, followed by task switching, which did not differ significantly from stimulus–response mapping. These findings support the modular view of CF, suggesting that it comprises three distinct subtypes. However, the organization of these subtypes should be understood as dynamic, rather than fixed in terms of cognitive demand. This study contributes to a more nuanced understanding of CF as a multidimensional ability.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"160 ","pages":"Article 101755"},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144813794","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Numerosity adaptation resists filtering: Insights from an illusory contour paradigm","authors":"Andrea Adriano ,&nbsp;Michaël Vande Velde","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2025.101757","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2025.101757","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The mechanisms underlying numerosity perception remain debated, with some theories proposing a dedicated system for segmented items and others suggesting reliance on low-level features like spatial-frequency or texture-density. Numerosity adaptation—where exposure to one array alters the perceived numerosity of a subsequent one—has been interpreted as evidence for a numerosity-specific mechanism. However, recent accounts argue that this effect may result from filtering previously processed information. To clarify the underlying mechanisms, we employed a novel adaptation paradigm using Ehrenstein-based illusory-dots as adaptors and real dots as test stimuli. This design allowed us to dissociate numerosity adaptation from low-level features or filtering, as the number of illusory-dots is negatively correlated with spatial-frequency content and, crucially, adaptors and test stimuli contain completely different items. Contrary to predictions from filtering or texture-based accounts, we found a significant increase in the PSE after adaptation, indicating a genuine numerosity-driven effect. Crucially, the point of maximal RTs uncertainty shifted in the same direction, suggesting sensory rather than decisional effects.</div><div>To corroborate these findings, in a second experiment, participants estimated the numerosity of grids containing either real or Ehrenstein-based illusory dots, presented in connected or unconnected configurations, keeping constant low-level cues between connectedness conditions. Connected items were consistently underestimated—regardless of stimulus type—confirming that Ehrenstein-based illusory dots are perceived as discrete units.</div><div>Together, these results provide strong evidence that numerosity adaptation is not driven by low-level visual features or filtering mechanisms, but by the perceived number of discrete items, supporting the existence of a numerosity-selective system.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"160 ","pages":"Article 101757"},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144860483","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Decision making under extinction risk","authors":"Maximilian Maier ,&nbsp;Adam J.L. Harris ,&nbsp;David Kellen ,&nbsp;Henrik Singmann","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2025.101735","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2025.101735","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In everyday life, people routinely make decisions that involve irredeemable risks such as death (e.g., while driving). Even though these decisions under extinction risk are common, practically important, and have different properties compared to the types of decisions typically studied by decision scientists, they have received little research attention. The present work advances the formal understanding of decision making under extinction risk by introducing a novel experimental paradigm, the Extinction Gambling Task (EGT). We derive optimal strategies for three different types of extinction and near-extinction events, and compare them to participants’ choices in three experiments. Leveraging computational modelling to describe strategies at the individual level, we document strengths and shortcomings in participants’ decisions under extinction risk. Specifically, we find that, while participants are relatively good in terms of the qualitative strategies they employ, their decisions are nevertheless affected by loss chasing, scope insensitivity, and opportunity cost neglect. We hope that by formalising decisions under extinction risk and providing a task to study them, this work will facilitate future research on an important topic that has been largely ignored.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"159 ","pages":"Article 101735"},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144470682","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Retrieving past experiences to inform novel decisions through a process of cascading episodic sampling","authors":"Achiel Fenneman ,&nbsp;Sarah T. Malamut ,&nbsp;Alan G. Sanfey","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2025.101744","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2025.101744","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We can guide our decisions in novel situations by drawing on our past experiences (episodic memories). While at times we can retrieve relevant episodes via cued recall, other situations may require a process of memory search. But what mechanisms underlie this search? In this work we synthesize six key principles concerning the storage and retrieval of episodic memories, and build on these principles to propose a cognitive mechanism which allows for the retrieval of relevant past experiences through a process of cascading recall. In this process, observing a stimulus triggers the cued recall of a past event. If this memory does not provide sufficient information to warrant a decision, then it next reinstates all the memory’s constituent features. These features then form the inputs to sample an additional memory in a subsequent recall step, which in turn reinstates its own features and so forth. This process continues until a suitable past experience is retrieved. We provide empirical support for key predictions of this cascading process through three online experiments in which participants interacted with unfamiliar stimuli. The results indicate that participants rely on cued recall of similar past experiences (experiment 1), and on indirectly related experiences when cued recall is not informative (experiment 2). Additionally, participants were substantially more likely to retrieve a predicted memory, and did so faster, when relying on cued recall versus cascadizng memory search (experiment 3). We conclude by discussing how this cascading recall process bridges several influential models of memory-based decision-making, as well as offering promising directions for future research.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"159 ","pages":"Article 101744"},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144243297","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Lossy encoding of distributions in judgment under uncertainty","authors":"Tadeg Quillien ,&nbsp;Neil Bramley ,&nbsp;Christopher G. Lucas","doi":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2025.101745","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.cogpsych.2025.101745","url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>People often make judgments about uncertain facts and events, for example ‘Germany will win the world cup’. Judgment under uncertainty is often studied with reference to a normative ideal according to which people should make guesses that have a high probability of being correct. According to this normative ideal, you should say that Germany will win the world cup if you think that Germany is in fact likely to win. We argue that in many cases, judgment under uncertainty is instead best conceived of as an act of lossy compression, where the goal is to efficiently encode a probability distribution, rather than express the probability of a single outcome. We test formal computational models derived from our theory, showing in four experiments that they accurately predict how people make and interpret guesses. Our account naturally explains why people dislike vacuously-correct guesses (like ‘Some country will win the world cup’), and sheds light on apparently sub-optimal patterns of judgment such as the conjunction fallacy.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50669,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Psychology","volume":"159 ","pages":"Article 101745"},"PeriodicalIF":3.0,"publicationDate":"2025-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144365333","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}