Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy最新文献

{"title":"Shepherd’s Case for the Demonstrability of Causal Principles","authors":"Maité Cruz","doi":"10.3998/ergo.5183","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.5183","url":null,"abstract":"Shepherd’s philosophy centers on her rejection of Hume’s arguments against the demonstrability of causal principles. According to Shepherd, the causal maxim—everything that begins to exist must have a cause—is demonstratively true. She begins her first major philosophical work with a proof of this maxim. While scholars have complained that the proof seems blatantly circular, a closer look at Shepherd’s texts and their Lockean background dispels this worry. Shepherd’s premises are motivated not by the causal maxim or her theory of causation, but by a metaphysics that distinguishes between substances and affections and by an empirical understanding of a ‘beginning of existence.’","PeriodicalId":504477,"journal":{"name":"Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"26 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140427528","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Islands of Perspectival Thought: A Case Study","authors":"Daniel Morgan","doi":"10.3998/ergo.5181","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.5181","url":null,"abstract":"This paper has two aims. The first concerns the question of whether there is any essential involvement of perspectival thought in intentional agency. I defend the view that the answer is ‘no’ for one kind of perspectival thought, and ‘yes’ for a different kind. Agency does not depend on de se thought, but it does depend on de nunc thought. The second aim of the paper is to defend a claim about the significance of this de se–de nunc contrast as a case study. I argue that the contrast is best explained by a picture on which different kinds of perspectival thought are seen as islands. On this picture, an account of the conceptual role of one kind of perspectival thought won’t settle much about any other kind of perspectival thought. The picture is proposed as a replacement for the standard picture, on which perspectival thought is seen as a natural cognitive kind.","PeriodicalId":504477,"journal":{"name":"Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"74 10","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140424151","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Internalism and Externalism in Early Modern Epistemology","authors":"Nathan Rockwood","doi":"10.3998/ergo.5180","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.5180","url":null,"abstract":"Do Descartes, Locke, and Hume have an internalist or externalist view of epistemic justification? Internalism is, roughly, the view that a belief that p is justified by a mental state, such as the awareness of evidence. By contrast, externalism is, roughly, the view that a belief that p is justified by facts about the belief-forming process, such as the reliability of the belief-forming process. I argue that they all think that the awareness of evidence is required for justification, but none of them think that the awareness of evidence alone is sufficient for justification. Similarly, I argue that they all think that reliability of the belief-forming process is required for justification, but none of them think reliability alone is sufficient for justification. So, neither a fully internalist position nor a fully externalist position adequately captures their views of justification; rather, both the supporting evidence and the reliability of the belief-forming process explain why we should hold those beliefs, and hence explain why those beliefs are justified. Thus, they each have a partly internalist, partly externalist view of justification. ","PeriodicalId":504477,"journal":{"name":"Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"35 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140425608","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Correction Notice for \"Epistemic Exploitation\" by Nora Berenstain (Ergo, 2016, Vol. 3)","authors":"","doi":"10.3998/ergo.5640","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.5640","url":null,"abstract":"In Nora Berenstain's \"Epistemic Exploitation\" (Ergo, 2016, Vol. 3, DOI 10.3998/ergo.12405314.0003.022) at the time of publication, Carmita Wood was mistakenly described as “a Black woman.” The author regrets this error. As of February 2024, the footnote containing this description has been removed. This article described Carmita Wood as a Black woman on the basis of a mistaken description in Constance Backhouse, “Sexual Harassment: A Feminist Phrase that Transformed the Workplace” (Canadian Journal of Women and Law (2012) 24(2): 275-300), which has since been corrected (2022).","PeriodicalId":504477,"journal":{"name":"Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"52 5-6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139853224","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Correction Notice for \"Epistemic Exploitation\" by Nora Berenstain (Ergo, 2016, Vol. 3)","authors":"","doi":"10.3998/ergo.5640","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.5640","url":null,"abstract":"In Nora Berenstain's \"Epistemic Exploitation\" (Ergo, 2016, Vol. 3, DOI 10.3998/ergo.12405314.0003.022) at the time of publication, Carmita Wood was mistakenly described as “a Black woman.” The author regrets this error. As of February 2024, the footnote containing this description has been removed. This article described Carmita Wood as a Black woman on the basis of a mistaken description in Constance Backhouse, “Sexual Harassment: A Feminist Phrase that Transformed the Workplace” (Canadian Journal of Women and Law (2012) 24(2): 275-300), which has since been corrected (2022).","PeriodicalId":504477,"journal":{"name":"Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139793566","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Generalized Immodesty Principles in Epistemic Utility Theory","authors":"Alejandro Pérez Carballo","doi":"10.3998/ergo.4661","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.4661","url":null,"abstract":"According to one of the better known constraints on epistemic utility functions, each probabilistically coherent function should be immodest in a particular sense: for any probabilistically coherent credence function P and any alternative Q ≠ P to P, the expected epistemic utility of P relative to P should be greater than that of Q relative to P. is constraint, oŸen known as Strict Propriety, is usually motivated by appealing to a combination of two independent claims. e rst is a certain kind of admissibility principle: that any probabilistically coherent function can sometimes be epistemically rational.1 e second is an abstract principle linking epistemic utility and rationality: that an epistemically rational credence function should always expect itself to be epistemically better than any of its alternatives.2 If we assume, as most typically do, that the alternatives to any probabilistically coherent function are all and only those credence functions with the same domain, these two principles arguably entail Strict Propriety. What happens if we enlarge the class of alternatives to include a wider range of probability functions, including some with a dišerent domain? is would strengthen the principle linking epistemic utility and rationality: it would no longer su›ce, for a credence function to be deemed epistemically rational, that it expects itself to be doing better, epistemically, than credence functions with the same domain. And this stronger principle would arguably give us a more plausible theory of epistemic rationality, at least on some ways of widening the range of alternatives. Suppose an agent with a credence function dened over a collection of propositions takes herself to be doing better, epistemically, than she would be by having another credence function dened over the same collection of propositions. But suppose she thinks she would be doing better, epistemically, having a credence function dened over a smaller collection of propositions— perhaps she thinks she would be doing better, epistemically, not having certain defective concepts and thus that she would be doing better, epistemically, simply","PeriodicalId":504477,"journal":{"name":"Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"32 10","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139181024","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Individual as an Object of Love: The Property View of Love Meets the Hegelian View of Properties","authors":"Joe Saunders, Robert Stern","doi":"10.3998/ergo.4642","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.4642","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we do two things: first, we offer a metaphysical account of what it is to be an individual person through Hegel’s understanding of the concrete universal; and second, we show how this account of an individual can help in thinking about love. The aim is to show that Hegel’s distinctive account of individuality and universality can do justice to two intuitions about love which appear to be in tension: on the one hand, that love can involve a response to properties that an individual possesses; but on the other hand, what it is to love someone is not just to love their properties, but to love them as the distinct individual they are. We claim that Hegel’s conception of the relation between individuals and their properties, which relies on his account of the concrete universal, can resolve this tension and make sense of this aspect of love.","PeriodicalId":504477,"journal":{"name":"Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"243 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139216827","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Towards Ideal Understanding","authors":"Mario Hubert, F. Malfatti","doi":"10.3998/ergo.4651","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.4651","url":null,"abstract":"What does it take to understand a phenomenon ideally, or to the highest conceivable extent? In this paper, we answer this question by arguing for five necessary conditions for ideal understanding: (i) sufficient representational accuracy, (ii) intelligibility, (iii) sufficient truth, (iv) reasonable endorsement, and (v) fit. Even if one disagrees that there is some form of ideal understanding, these five conditions can be regarded as sufficient conditions for a particularly deep level of understanding. We then argue that grasping, novel predictions, and transparency are not reasonable conditions for ideal understanding.","PeriodicalId":504477,"journal":{"name":"Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"7 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139215326","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"An Adam Smithian Account of Humanity","authors":"Nir Ben-Moshe","doi":"10.3998/ergo.4662","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.4662","url":null,"abstract":"In The Sources of Normativity, Korsgaard argues for what can be called “The Universality of Humanity Claim” (UHC), according to which valuing humanity in one’s own person entails valuing it in that of others. However, Korsgaard’s reliance on the claim that reasons are essentially public in her attempt to demonstrate the truth of UHC has been repeatedly criticized. I offer a sentimentalist defense, based on Adam Smith’s moral philosophy, of a qualified, albeit adequate, version of UHC. In particular, valuing my humanity, understood as (my awareness of) my perspective and the reasons determined from within it, entails valuing your humanity, understood as (your awareness of) your perspective and the reasons determined from within it. Given Korsgaard’s emphasis on the publicity of reasons in her argument for UHC, I also discuss the role of reasons in my account. I argue that the relative weights of (at least some of) an agent’s reasons are determined from within a shared evaluative point of view, namely, the standpoint of what Smith calls “the impartial spectator.” These reasons have normative authority over and constrain the agent’s private reasons, that is, those that are determined from within her own particular evaluative point of view.","PeriodicalId":504477,"journal":{"name":"Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139226703","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Moral and Moorean Incoherencies","authors":"Andrés Soria-Ruiz, Nils Franzén","doi":"10.3998/ergo.4665","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.4665","url":null,"abstract":"It has been argued that moral assertions involve the possession, on the part of the speaker, of appropriate non-cognitive attitudes. Thus, uttering ‘murder is wrong’ invites an inference that the speaker disapproves of murder. In this paper, we present the result of 4 empirical studies concerning this phenomenon. We assess the acceptability of constructions in which that inference is explicitly canceled, such as ‘murder is wrong but I don’t disapprove of it’; and we compare them to similar constructions involving ‘think’ instead of ‘disapprove’—that is, Moore paradoxes (‘murder is wrong but I don’t think that it is wrong’). Our results indicate that the former type of constructions are largely infelicitous, although not as infelicitous as their Moorean counterparts.","PeriodicalId":504477,"journal":{"name":"Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139221570","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}