{"title":"实现理想的理解","authors":"Mario Hubert, F. Malfatti","doi":"10.3998/ergo.4651","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"What does it take to understand a phenomenon ideally, or to the highest conceivable extent? In this paper, we answer this question by arguing for five necessary conditions for ideal understanding: (i) sufficient representational accuracy, (ii) intelligibility, (iii) sufficient truth, (iv) reasonable endorsement, and (v) fit. Even if one disagrees that there is some form of ideal understanding, these five conditions can be regarded as sufficient conditions for a particularly deep level of understanding. We then argue that grasping, novel predictions, and transparency are not reasonable conditions for ideal understanding.","PeriodicalId":504477,"journal":{"name":"Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"7 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Towards Ideal Understanding\",\"authors\":\"Mario Hubert, F. Malfatti\",\"doi\":\"10.3998/ergo.4651\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"What does it take to understand a phenomenon ideally, or to the highest conceivable extent? In this paper, we answer this question by arguing for five necessary conditions for ideal understanding: (i) sufficient representational accuracy, (ii) intelligibility, (iii) sufficient truth, (iv) reasonable endorsement, and (v) fit. Even if one disagrees that there is some form of ideal understanding, these five conditions can be regarded as sufficient conditions for a particularly deep level of understanding. We then argue that grasping, novel predictions, and transparency are not reasonable conditions for ideal understanding.\",\"PeriodicalId\":504477,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy\",\"volume\":\"7 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-11-28\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.4651\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.4651","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
What does it take to understand a phenomenon ideally, or to the highest conceivable extent? In this paper, we answer this question by arguing for five necessary conditions for ideal understanding: (i) sufficient representational accuracy, (ii) intelligibility, (iii) sufficient truth, (iv) reasonable endorsement, and (v) fit. Even if one disagrees that there is some form of ideal understanding, these five conditions can be regarded as sufficient conditions for a particularly deep level of understanding. We then argue that grasping, novel predictions, and transparency are not reasonable conditions for ideal understanding.
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