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Scripts and Social Cognition 脚本与社会认知
Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-29 DOI: 10.3998/ergo.5191
Gen Eickers
{"title":"Scripts and Social Cognition","authors":"Gen Eickers","doi":"10.3998/ergo.5191","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.5191","url":null,"abstract":"To explain how social cognition normally serves us in real life, we need to ask which factors contribute to specific social interactions. Recent accounts, and mostly pluralistic models, have started incorporating contextual and social factors in explanations of social cognition. In this paper, I further motivate the importance of contextual and identity factors for social cognition. This paper presents scripts as an alternative resource in social cognition that can account for contextual and identity factors. Scripts are normative and context-sensitive knowledge structures that describe behavior in terms of corresponding events, situations, social roles, individuals, or mental state types in a way that guides action. The script approach presented here builds on recent accounts of social cognition but points out important differences and possible advantages it has over them: for example, the script approach focuses even more strongly on context and identity.","PeriodicalId":504477,"journal":{"name":"Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"11 13","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140410392","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Moral Responsibility While Dreaming 做梦时的道德责任
Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-29 DOI: 10.3998/ergo.5190
Robert Cowan
{"title":"Moral Responsibility While Dreaming","authors":"Robert Cowan","doi":"10.3998/ergo.5190","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.5190","url":null,"abstract":"Are subjects ever morally responsible for their dreams? In this paper I argue that if, as some theories of dreams entail, dreaming subjects sometimes express agency while they dream, then they are sometimes morally responsible for what they do and are potentially worthy of praise and blame while they dream and after they have awoken. I end by noting the practical and theoretical implications of my argument.","PeriodicalId":504477,"journal":{"name":"Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"1982 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140416835","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Is the Mind a Magic Trick? Illusionism about Consciousness in the “Consciousness-Only” Theory of Vasubandhu and Sthiramati 心灵是魔术吗？瓦苏班杜（Vasubandhu）和斯提拉玛提（Sthiramati）"唯意识论 "中的意识幻觉
Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-29 DOI: 10.3998/ergo.5189
Amit Chaturvedi
{"title":"Is the Mind a Magic Trick? Illusionism about Consciousness in the “Consciousness-Only” Theory of Vasubandhu and Sthiramati","authors":"Amit Chaturvedi","doi":"10.3998/ergo.5189","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.5189","url":null,"abstract":"Illusionists about consciousness boldly argue that phenomenal consciousness does not fundamentally exist—it only seems to exist. For them, the impression of having a private inner life of conscious qualia is nothing more than a cognitive error, a conjuring trick put on by a purely physical brain. Some phenomenal realists have accused illusionism of being a byproduct of modern Western scientism and overzealous naturalism. However, Jay Garfield has endorsed illusionism by explicitly drawing support from the classical Yogācāra Buddhist philosopher Vasubandhu. In this paper, I assess the degree to which Garfield’s illusionist interpretation accurately captures the views of Vasubandhu and his commentator Sthiramati in their extant Sanskrit works. As it turns out, Vasubandhu and Sthiramati converge with contemporary illusionists in taking an unconscious causal basis of cognitive/linguistic processes to be responsible for generating the illusion of representational states with apparently phenomenal contents. Within their constitutive understanding of the mind as the “imagination of what is non-existent” (abhūtaparikalpa), I raise possible candidates for what might seem to be real instances of phenomenality—mental appearances (pratibhāsa), affective sensory experience (vedanā), and “intrinsic luminosity” (prakṛtiprabhāsvara)—and consider possible responses on behalf of an illusionist interpreter. I conclude that Vasubandhu and Sthiramati really do appear to be strong illusionists about phenomenal consciousness, particularly if phenomenal states are assumed to be essentially representational.","PeriodicalId":504477,"journal":{"name":"Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"9 8","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140412709","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Neutrality, Cultural Literacy, and Arts Funding 中立、文化素养和艺术资助
Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-29 DOI: 10.3998/ergo.5192
Jack Alexander Hume
{"title":"Neutrality, Cultural Literacy, and Arts Funding","authors":"Jack Alexander Hume","doi":"10.3998/ergo.5192","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.5192","url":null,"abstract":"Despite the widespread presence of public arts funding in liberal societies, some liberals find it unjustified. According to the Neutrality Objection, arts funding preferences some ways of life. One way to motivate this challenge is to say that a public goods-styled justification, although it could relieve arts funding of these worries of partiality, cannot be argued for coherently or is, in the end, too susceptible to impressions of partiality. I argue that diversity-based arts funding can overcome this challenge, because it invests in non-excludable infrastructure that fosters cultural literacy. We all have some interest as citizens in living in a society which fosters cultural literacy, seeing as this helps others to understand us, supports us to understand ourselves, and helps alleviate confusion and alienation we feel toward social difference. While some of these benefits can be enjoyed by those who make and consume art, they are also gained by those who don’t, because arts funding affects the makeup of public spaces and the communicative practices we all use to make sense of the world.","PeriodicalId":504477,"journal":{"name":"Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140412883","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Satisficers Still Get Away with Murder! 满足者依然逍遥法外
Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-29 DOI: 10.3998/ergo.5184
J. Slater
{"title":"Satisficers Still Get Away with Murder!","authors":"J. Slater","doi":"10.3998/ergo.5184","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.5184","url":null,"abstract":"Recently, a few attempts have been made to rehabilitate satisficing consequentialism. One strategy, initially shunned by Tim Mulgan, is to suggest that agents must produce an outcome at least as good as they could at a particular level of effort. The effort-satisficer is able to avoid some of the problem cases usually deemed fatal to the view. Richard Yetter Chappell has proposed a version of effort-satisficing that not only avoids those problem cases, but has some independent plausibility. In this paper, I argue that we should be concerned by verdicts the effort-satisficer delivers that are too permissive. Revising a problem for the traditional outcome-satisficer, I argue that Chappell’s willpower satisficing, and more generally, any effort-satisficer, must implausibly condone murder in many cases. This seems like a serious issue for any attempts at rehabilitating satisficing consequentialism in this way. After presenting my objection, I consider some ways an effort-satisficer might attempt to revise the account to avoid these problems, but argue that none of these can succeed.","PeriodicalId":504477,"journal":{"name":"Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"2015 34","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140416198","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Susan Stebbing on Logical Positivism and Communication 苏珊-斯蒂宾（Susan Stebbing）谈逻辑实证主义与传播
Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-29 DOI: 10.3998/ergo.5185
Paul L. Franco
{"title":"Susan Stebbing on Logical Positivism and Communication","authors":"Paul L. Franco","doi":"10.3998/ergo.5185","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.5185","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I look at Susan Stebbing’s articles and reviews that critically engage logical positivism. These appeared before the publication of A. J. Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic and helped shape the early British reception of logical positivism. I highlight Stebbing’s adoption of G. E. Moore’s tripartite distinction between knowing a proposition, understanding it, and giving an analysis of it and, in light of this distinction, her focus on whether the principle of verifiability can ground a plausible account of communication. Stebbing thinks not, and I reconstruct her reasons, as well as her own account of communication. In doing this, I relate her criticisms to her rejection of methodological solipsism and her dissatisfaction with the logical positivist treatment of statements about other minds and the past. I also argue that Stebbing’s work provides a bridge to later criticisms of logical positivism by ordinary language philosophers. Foregrounding Stebbing’s engagement with logical positivism, especially her focus on communication, paints a fuller picture of how the logical positivists came to be part of analytic philosophy despite having different concerns than many of the British philosophers engaging their work.","PeriodicalId":504477,"journal":{"name":"Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"26 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140411861","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Multiverse Theodicy Meets Population Ethics 多元宇宙神论与人口伦理学
Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-29 DOI: 10.3998/ergo.5193
Han Li, Bradford Saad, Bradford Saad
{"title":"The Multiverse Theodicy Meets Population Ethics","authors":"Han Li, Bradford Saad, Bradford Saad","doi":"10.3998/ergo.5193","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.5193","url":null,"abstract":"The multiverse theodicy proposes to reconcile the existence of God and evil by supposing that God created all and only the creation-worthy universes and that some universes like ours are, despite their evils, creation-worthy. Drawing on work in population ethics, this paper develops a novel challenge to the multiverse theodicy. Roughly, the challenge contends that the axiological underpinnings of the multiverse theodicy harbor a ‘mere addition paradox’: the assumption that creating creation-worthy universes would always make the world better turns out to have morally repugnant consequences akin to those of the assumption that adding worthwhile lives to a population would always make the overall welfare of the population better. Further, the challenge leverages this difficulty into an argument against God’s having created all and only the creation-worthy universes, and hence against the multiverse theodicy. Responses to this challenge are considered but found wanting, largely because of commitments of the multiverse theodicy that have no analogs in population ethics.","PeriodicalId":504477,"journal":{"name":"Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"70 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140415483","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
What’s So Special About Reasoning? Rationality, Belief Updating, and Internalism 推理有什么特别？理性、信念更新与内部主义
Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-27 DOI: 10.3998/ergo.5182
Wade Munroe
{"title":"What’s So Special About Reasoning? Rationality, Belief Updating, and Internalism","authors":"Wade Munroe","doi":"10.3998/ergo.5182","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.5182","url":null,"abstract":"In updating our beliefs on the basis of our background attitudes and evidence we frequently employ objects in our environment to represent pertinent information. For example, we may write our premises and lemmas on a whiteboard to aid in a proof or move the beads of an abacus to assist in a calculation. In both cases, we generate extramental (that is, occurring outside of the mind) representational states, and, at least in the case of the abacus, we operate over these states in light of their contents (e.g., the integers represented by the beads) to generate new representations. In this paper, I argue that our belief updating processes and the grounds of their rational evaluation are partly constituted by extramental representations and operations. In other words, we don’t merely update our attitudes through an internal process of reasoning on the basis of available evidence. If we are to accurately understand and rationally evaluate our belief updating processes and resultant attitudes, we need to examine how we representationally appropriate our extramental environment in the updating process.","PeriodicalId":504477,"journal":{"name":"Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"54 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140426777","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Let's See You Do Better: An Essay on the Standing to Criticize 让我们看到你做得更好关于批评资格的论文
Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-27 DOI: 10.3998/ergo.5178
Patrick Todd
{"title":"Let's See You Do Better: An Essay on the Standing to Criticize","authors":"Patrick Todd","doi":"10.3998/ergo.5178","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.5178","url":null,"abstract":"In response to criticism, we often say – in these or similar words – “Let’s see you do better!” Prima facie, it looks like this response is a challenge of a certain kind – a challenge to prove that one has what has recently been called standing. More generally, the data here seems to point a certain kind of norm of criticism: be better. Slightly more carefully: One must: criticize x with respect to standard s only if one is better than x with respect to standard s. In this paper, I defend precisely this norm of criticism – an underexplored norm that is nevertheless ubiquitous in our lives, once we begin looking for it. The be better norm is, I hope to show, continuously invoked in a wide range of ordinary settings, can undergird and explain the widely endorsed non-hypocrisy condition on the standing to blame, and apparent counterexamples to the norm are no such counterexamples at all. I further contend that, given some plausible principles, my previous “moral commitment” account of the moral standing to blame will be extensionally equivalent to the be better norm.  ","PeriodicalId":504477,"journal":{"name":"Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"78 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140426926","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Busting the Ghost of Neutral Counterparts 破除中性对手的幽灵
Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2024-02-27 DOI: 10.3998/ergo.5179
Jen Foster
{"title":"Busting the Ghost of Neutral Counterparts","authors":"Jen Foster","doi":"10.3998/ergo.5179","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.5179","url":null,"abstract":"Slurs have been standardly assumed to bear a very direct, very distinctive semantic relationship to what philosophers have called “neutral counterpart” terms. I argue that this is mistaken: the general relationship between paradigmatic slurs and their “neutral counterparts” should be assumed to be the same one that obtains between ‘chick flick’ and ‘romantic comedy’, as well a huge number of other more prosaic pairs of derogatory and “less derogatory” expressions. The most plausible general relationship between these latter expressions — and thus, I argue, between paradigmatic slurs and “neutral counterpart” terms — is one of overlap in presumed extension, grounded in overlap in associated stereotypes. The resulting framework has the advantages of being simple, unified, and, unlike its orthodox rivals, neatly accommodating of a much wider range of data than has previously been considered. More importantly, it positions us to better understand, identify, and confront the insidious mechanisms of ordinary bigotry.","PeriodicalId":504477,"journal":{"name":"Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"41 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140427323","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
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