心灵是魔术吗?瓦苏班杜(Vasubandhu)和斯提拉玛提(Sthiramati)"唯意识论 "中的意识幻觉

Amit Chaturvedi
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摘要

意识幻觉论者大胆地认为,现象意识从根本上说并不存在,它只是看起来存在而已。对他们来说,拥有意识质点的私人内心生活的印象只不过是一种认知错误,是纯粹物理大脑的魔术把戏。一些现象现实主义者指责幻觉主义是现代西方科学主义和过度热衷自然主义的副产品。然而,杰伊-加菲尔德从古典瑜伽行派佛教哲学家瓦苏班杜那里明确获得支持,从而认可了幻觉主义。在本文中,我将评估加菲尔德的幻觉论解释在多大程度上准确地捕捉了瓦苏班杜及其注释者斯提拉摩提在其现存梵文作品中的观点。事实证明,瓦苏班杜(Vasubandhu)和斯提拉玛提(Sthiramati)与当代幻觉学家的观点一致,都认为认知/语言过程的无意识因果基础是产生具有明显现象内容的表象状态幻觉的原因。在他们将心灵理解为 "对不存在之物的想象"(abhūtaparikalpa)的构成性理解中,我提出了可能的候选现象--心灵表象(pratibhāsa)、情感感觉体验(vedanā)和 "内在光亮"(prakṛtiprabhāsvara)--并考虑了幻觉论解释者可能的回应。我的结论是,瓦苏班杜(Vasubandhu)和斯提拉玛提(Sthiramati)似乎确实是现象意识的强烈幻觉论者,尤其是在假定现象状态本质上是表象的情况下。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Is the Mind a Magic Trick? Illusionism about Consciousness in the “Consciousness-Only” Theory of Vasubandhu and Sthiramati
Illusionists about consciousness boldly argue that phenomenal consciousness does not fundamentally exist—it only seems to exist. For them, the impression of having a private inner life of conscious qualia is nothing more than a cognitive error, a conjuring trick put on by a purely physical brain. Some phenomenal realists have accused illusionism of being a byproduct of modern Western scientism and overzealous naturalism. However, Jay Garfield has endorsed illusionism by explicitly drawing support from the classical Yogācāra Buddhist philosopher Vasubandhu. In this paper, I assess the degree to which Garfield’s illusionist interpretation accurately captures the views of Vasubandhu and his commentator Sthiramati in their extant Sanskrit works. As it turns out, Vasubandhu and Sthiramati converge with contemporary illusionists in taking an unconscious causal basis of cognitive/linguistic processes to be responsible for generating the illusion of representational states with apparently phenomenal contents. Within their constitutive understanding of the mind as the “imagination of what is non-existent” (abhūtaparikalpa), I raise possible candidates for what might seem to be real instances of phenomenality—mental appearances (pratibhāsa), affective sensory experience (vedanā), and “intrinsic luminosity” (prakṛtiprabhāsvara)—and consider possible responses on behalf of an illusionist interpreter. I conclude that Vasubandhu and Sthiramati really do appear to be strong illusionists about phenomenal consciousness, particularly if phenomenal states are assumed to be essentially representational.
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