Generalized Immodesty Principles in Epistemic Utility Theory

Abstract

According to one of the better known constraints on epistemic utility functions, each probabilistically coherent function should be immodest in a particular sense: for any probabilistically coherent credence function P and any alternative Q ≠ P to P, the expected epistemic utility of P relative to P should be greater than that of Q relative to P. is constraint, oŸen known as Strict Propriety, is usually motivated by appealing to a combination of two independent claims. e rst is a certain kind of admissibility principle: that any probabilistically coherent function can sometimes be epistemically rational.1 e second is an abstract principle linking epistemic utility and rationality: that an epistemically rational credence function should always expect itself to be epistemically better than any of its alternatives.2 If we assume, as most typically do, that the alternatives to any probabilistically coherent function are all and only those credence functions with the same domain, these two principles arguably entail Strict Propriety. What happens if we enlarge the class of alternatives to include a wider range of probability functions, including some with a dišerent domain? is would strengthen the principle linking epistemic utility and rationality: it would no longer su›ce, for a credence function to be deemed epistemically rational, that it expects itself to be doing better, epistemically, than credence functions with the same domain. And this stronger principle would arguably give us a more plausible theory of epistemic rationality, at least on some ways of widening the range of alternatives. Suppose an agent with a credence function dened over a collection of propositions takes herself to be doing better, epistemically, than she would be by having another credence function dened over the same collection of propositions. But suppose she thinks she would be doing better, epistemically, having a credence function dened over a smaller collection of propositions— perhaps she thinks she would be doing better, epistemically, not having certain defective concepts and thus that she would be doing better, epistemically, simply