{"title":"Moderate Utility","authors":"Junnan He, Paulo Natenzon","doi":"10.1257/aeri.20230085","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20230085","url":null,"abstract":"Hotelling’s and Salop’s spatial competition models, as well as nested logit, covariance probit, elimination-by-aspects, and several other well-known discrete choice models, belong to the class of moderate utility models, where binary choices are a function of the ratio between utility difference and a product differentiation index satisfying the properties of a distance metric. We provide a behavioral foundation for this class of models. Our main result establishes that moderate utility has a single, directly testable implication: choice probabilities are moderately transitive. We use our characterization to show how the model achieves a useful compromise between explanatory power and predictive power. (JEL C25, D11, D91)","PeriodicalId":504102,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review: Insights","volume":"3 12","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141229030","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Irrelevance of Fee Structures for Certification","authors":"Martin Pollrich, Roland Strausz","doi":"10.1257/aeri.20220698","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20220698","url":null,"abstract":"In models of certification, possible restrictions on the nature of the fee structures are commonly analyzed. We show that they are irrelevant for the certifier’s ability to maximize profits and trade efficiency. Our results establish that certification schemes involve two substitutable dimensions—the fee structure and the disclosure rule. In the context of a canonical unit good certification setup, these dimensions act as perfect substitutes for achieving trade efficiency and (monotone) distributions of rents; adjustments in the disclosure dimension can fully mitigate restrictions in the fee dimension, but these changes do affect market transparency. (JEL D82, D83, G24, G28)","PeriodicalId":504102,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review: Insights","volume":"113 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140088658","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Francisco Amaral, Martin Dohmen, Sebastian Kohl, M. Schularick
{"title":"Interest Rates and the Spatial Polarization of Housing Markets","authors":"Francisco Amaral, Martin Dohmen, Sebastian Kohl, M. Schularick","doi":"10.1257/aeri.20220367","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20220367","url":null,"abstract":"Rising within-country differences in house values are a much-debated trend in the United States and internationally. Using new long-run regional data for 15 advanced economies, we show that standard explanations linking growing price dispersion to rent dispersion are contradicted by an important stylized fact: rent dispersion has increased far less than price dispersion. We propose a new explanation: a uniform decline in real risk-free interest rates can have heterogeneous spatial effects on house values. Falling real safe rates disproportionately push up prices in large agglomerations where initial rent-price ratios are low, leading to housing market polarization on the national level. (JEL E43, R21, R31)","PeriodicalId":504102,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review: Insights","volume":" 917","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140091777","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Anthony A. DeFusco, Brandon Enriquez, Maggie Yellen
{"title":"Wage Garnishment in the United States: New Facts from Administrative Payroll Records","authors":"Anthony A. DeFusco, Brandon Enriquez, Maggie Yellen","doi":"10.1257/aeri.20220487","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20220487","url":null,"abstract":"Wage garnishment allows creditors to deduct money from workers’ paychecks to repay defaulted debts. We document new facts about wage garnishment between 2014 and 2019 using data from a large payroll processor that distributes paychecks to approximately 20 percent of US private-sector workers. By 2019, over 1 in every 100 workers was being garnished for delinquent debt. The average garnished worker experiences garnishment for five months, during which approximately 11 percent of gross earnings is remitted to their creditor(s). The beginning of a garnishment is associated with an increase in job turnover but no intensive margin change in hours worked. (JEL G51, J22, J63)","PeriodicalId":504102,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review: Insights","volume":"29 20","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140277749","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Cash and Conflict: Large-Scale Experimental Evidence from Niger","authors":"Patrick Premand, Dominic Rohner","doi":"10.1257/aeri.20230069","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20230069","url":null,"abstract":"Conflict undermines development, while adverse economic shocks, in turn, can increase conflict risk. Policy interventions such as cash transfers could attenuate conflict risk by raising poor households’ opportunity costs. However, cash transfers may also trigger looting, and expanding government programs may attract attacks to undermine state legitimacy. We study the net effect across these forces based on the large-scale randomization of a government-led cash transfer program and georeferenced conflict events. Cash transfers did not yield greater pacification but—if anything—triggered a short-term increase in conflict events (by 0.63 percentage points), substantially driven by terrorist attacks by foreign rebel groups. (JEL D72, D74, H53, I38, O15, O17)","PeriodicalId":504102,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review: Insights","volume":" 21","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140091370","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Gabriel Brown, Morgan Hardy, I. Mbiti, J. Mccasland, Isabelle Salcher
{"title":"Can Financial Incentives to Firms Improve Apprenticeship Training? Experimental Evidence from Ghana","authors":"Gabriel Brown, Morgan Hardy, I. Mbiti, J. Mccasland, Isabelle Salcher","doi":"10.1257/aeri.20220696","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20220696","url":null,"abstract":"We use a field experiment to test whether financial incentives can improve the quality of apprenticeship training. Trainers (firm owners) in the treatment group participated in a tournament incentive scheme where they received a payment based on their apprentices’ rank-order performance on a skills assessment. Trainers in the control group received a fixed payment based on their apprentices’ participation in the assessment. Performance on the assessment was higher in the treatment group. Two years later, treated apprentices scored 0.15σ higher on a low-stakes oral skills test and earned 24 percent more in total earnings, driven by higher self-employment profits. (JEL D22, D82, J24, J31, M53, O12)","PeriodicalId":504102,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review: Insights","volume":" 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140091407","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Steady-State Social Distancing and Vaccination","authors":"Christopher Avery, Frederick Chen, David McAdams","doi":"10.1257/aeri.20220699","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20220699","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes an economic-epidemiological model of infectious disease where it is possible to become infected more than once and individual agents make endogenous choices of social distancing and vaccine adoption. Protective actions adopted by any one person reduce future risks to other people. The positive externalities associated with these behaviors provide motivation for vaccine and social-distancing subsidies, but subsidizing one protective action reduces incentives for other protective actions. A vaccine subsidy increases vaccine adoption and reduces steady-state infection prevalence; a social distancing subsidy can either increase or reduce steady-state infection prevalence. (JEL D62, D91, I12, I18)","PeriodicalId":504102,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review: Insights","volume":"113 34","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140089640","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Detecting Mother-Father Differences in Spending on Children: A New Approach Using Willingness-to-Pay Elicitation","authors":"Rebecca Dizon-Ross, S. Jayachandran","doi":"10.1257/aeri.20220159","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20220159","url":null,"abstract":"This paper tests whether mothers and fathers differ in their spending on daughters relative to sons by comparing their willingness to pay (WTP) for specific goods for their children. This method, which we apply in Uganda, offers more precision than the standard method of examining expenditure effects of mothers’ versus fathers’ income. We find that fathers have a lower WTP for their daughters’ than their sons’ human capital but mothers do not. Altruism plays a role: fathers’ but not mothers’ WTP for goods that simply bring joy to their daughters is lower than their WTP for such goods for sons. (JEL D64, G51, J12, J13, J16, O12)","PeriodicalId":504102,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review: Insights","volume":"9 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139190379","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A. N. Fernando, Niharika Singh, Gabriel Tourek, Martin Abel, Jie Bai, Justin Bloesch, Emily Breza, Taryn Dinkelman, Kevin Donovan, Joe Kaboski, Asim Khwaja, Maciej Kotowski, Kanika Mahajan, Kunal Mangal, David McKenzie, Suresh Naidu, Amanda Pal-lais, Patrizio Piraino, Gautam Rao, Mahvish Shaukat
{"title":"Hiring Frictions and the Promise of Online Job Portals: Evidence from India","authors":"A. N. Fernando, Niharika Singh, Gabriel Tourek, Martin Abel, Jie Bai, Justin Bloesch, Emily Breza, Taryn Dinkelman, Kevin Donovan, Joe Kaboski, Asim Khwaja, Maciej Kotowski, Kanika Mahajan, Kunal Mangal, David McKenzie, Suresh Naidu, Amanda Pal-lais, Patrizio Piraino, Gautam Rao, Mahvish Shaukat","doi":"10.1257/aeri.20220566","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20220566","url":null,"abstract":"Despite the growing prominence of online job portals, firms remain reluctant to hire outside traditional recruitment networks. We find that experimentally providing firms with a combination of advertising and the ability to verify applicant identity increases portal-based hiring by 68 percent and the likelihood of filling a vacancy by 11 percent. Advertising attracts more skilled applicants, while verification enables the screening of unfamiliar applicants. Portal-based hires are retained beyond the standard assessment period, suggesting that they are well suited to the vacancies. Firms assigned only advertising also attract more skilled applicants, but providing neither advertising nor verification alone increases hiring. (JEL D22, J23, J24, J63, M51, O15)","PeriodicalId":504102,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review: Insights","volume":"131 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139193600","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Christopher Blattman, Sebastian Chaskel, Julian C. Jamison, Margaret Sheridan
{"title":"Cognitive Behavioral Therapy Reduces Crime and Violence over Ten Years: Experimental Evidence","authors":"Christopher Blattman, Sebastian Chaskel, Julian C. Jamison, Margaret Sheridan","doi":"10.1257/aeri.20220427","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20220427","url":null,"abstract":"Several small, short-term, or nonexperimental studies show that cognitive behavioral–informed interventions reduce antisocial behaviors over one to two years, but persistence research is rare. We followed 999 high-risk men in Liberia ten years after randomization into eight weeks of low-cost, nonspecialist-led therapy; $200 cash; both; or neither. A decade later, antisocial behaviors (such as robbery and drug selling) fell 0.2 standard deviations from therapy alone—significantly greater than the one-year impacts. Meanwhile, men who received therapy plus cash were 0.25 standard deviations less antisocial—similar to one-year results. In both cases, impacts were concentrated in men exhibiting highest baseline risk. (JEL D91, K42, O15, O17)","PeriodicalId":504102,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review: Insights","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139194361","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}