Hiring Frictions and the Promise of Online Job Portals: Evidence from India

A. N. Fernando, Niharika Singh, Gabriel Tourek, Martin Abel, Jie Bai, Justin Bloesch, Emily Breza, Taryn Dinkelman, Kevin Donovan, Joe Kaboski, Asim Khwaja, Maciej Kotowski, Kanika Mahajan, Kunal Mangal, David McKenzie, Suresh Naidu, Amanda Pal-lais, Patrizio Piraino, Gautam Rao, Mahvish Shaukat
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Abstract

Despite the growing prominence of online job portals, firms remain reluctant to hire outside traditional recruitment networks. We find that experimentally providing firms with a combination of advertising and the ability to verify applicant identity increases portal-based hiring by 68 percent and the likelihood of filling a vacancy by 11 percent. Advertising attracts more skilled applicants, while verification enables the screening of unfamiliar applicants. Portal-based hires are retained beyond the standard assessment period, suggesting that they are well suited to the vacancies. Firms assigned only advertising also attract more skilled applicants, but providing neither advertising nor verification alone increases hiring. (JEL D22, J23, J24, J63, M51, O15)
招聘摩擦与在线招聘门户网站的前景:来自印度的证据
尽管在线招聘门户网站的地位日益突出,但企业仍然不愿意在传统招聘网络之外进行招聘。我们在实验中发现,为企业提供广告和验证求职者身份的能力,可以将基于门户网站的招聘提高 68%,将填补空缺的可能性提高 11%。广告吸引了更多有技能的求职者,而验证功能则能筛选不熟悉的求职者。通过门户网站招聘的人员在标准评估期后仍被留用,这表明他们非常适合空缺职位。只做广告的公司也能吸引更多熟练的申请人,但既不做广告也不进行核实的公司则不能增加招聘。(JEL D22, J23, J24, J63, M51, O15)
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