Gabriel Brown, Morgan Hardy, I. Mbiti, J. Mccasland, Isabelle Salcher
{"title":"对企业的财政激励能否改善学徒培训?来自加纳的实验证据","authors":"Gabriel Brown, Morgan Hardy, I. Mbiti, J. Mccasland, Isabelle Salcher","doi":"10.1257/aeri.20220696","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We use a field experiment to test whether financial incentives can improve the quality of apprenticeship training. Trainers (firm owners) in the treatment group participated in a tournament incentive scheme where they received a payment based on their apprentices’ rank-order performance on a skills assessment. Trainers in the control group received a fixed payment based on their apprentices’ participation in the assessment. Performance on the assessment was higher in the treatment group. Two years later, treated apprentices scored 0.15σ higher on a low-stakes oral skills test and earned 24 percent more in total earnings, driven by higher self-employment profits. (JEL D22, D82, J24, J31, M53, O12)","PeriodicalId":504102,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review: Insights","volume":" 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Can Financial Incentives to Firms Improve Apprenticeship Training? Experimental Evidence from Ghana\",\"authors\":\"Gabriel Brown, Morgan Hardy, I. Mbiti, J. Mccasland, Isabelle Salcher\",\"doi\":\"10.1257/aeri.20220696\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We use a field experiment to test whether financial incentives can improve the quality of apprenticeship training. Trainers (firm owners) in the treatment group participated in a tournament incentive scheme where they received a payment based on their apprentices’ rank-order performance on a skills assessment. Trainers in the control group received a fixed payment based on their apprentices’ participation in the assessment. Performance on the assessment was higher in the treatment group. Two years later, treated apprentices scored 0.15σ higher on a low-stakes oral skills test and earned 24 percent more in total earnings, driven by higher self-employment profits. (JEL D22, D82, J24, J31, M53, O12)\",\"PeriodicalId\":504102,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"American Economic Review: Insights\",\"volume\":\" 6\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-03-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"American Economic Review: Insights\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20220696\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"American Economic Review: Insights","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20220696","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Can Financial Incentives to Firms Improve Apprenticeship Training? Experimental Evidence from Ghana
We use a field experiment to test whether financial incentives can improve the quality of apprenticeship training. Trainers (firm owners) in the treatment group participated in a tournament incentive scheme where they received a payment based on their apprentices’ rank-order performance on a skills assessment. Trainers in the control group received a fixed payment based on their apprentices’ participation in the assessment. Performance on the assessment was higher in the treatment group. Two years later, treated apprentices scored 0.15σ higher on a low-stakes oral skills test and earned 24 percent more in total earnings, driven by higher self-employment profits. (JEL D22, D82, J24, J31, M53, O12)