{"title":"Born on the wrong side of the tracks: Exploring the causal effects of segregation on infant health","authors":"Hoa Vu , Tiffany L. Green , Laura E.T. Swan","doi":"10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102876","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102876","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Prior research has found that a high level of residential racial segregation, or the degree to which racial/ethnic groups are isolated from one another, is associated with worsened infant health outcomes, particularly among non-Hispanic (NH) Black infant populations. However, because exposure to segregation is non-random, it is unclear whether and to what extent segregation is causally linked to infant health. To overcome this empirical limitation, we leverage exogenous variation in the placement of railroad tracks in the 19th century to predict contemporary segregation, an approach first introduced by Ananat (2011). In alignment with prior literature, we find that residential segregation has statistically significant associations with negative birth outcomes among Black infant populations in the area. Using OLS methods underestimates the negative impacts of segregation on infant health. We fail to detect comparable effects on health outcomes among NH White infant populations. Further, we identify several key mechanisms by which residential segregation could influence health outcomes among Black infant populations, including lower access to prenatal care during the first trimester, higher levels of anti-Black prejudice, greater transportation barriers, and increased food insecurity. Given that poor birth outcomes have adverse effects on adults’ health and well-being, the findings suggest that in-utero exposure to residential segregation could have important implications for Black–White inequality over the life course.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50186,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Health Economics","volume":"95 ","pages":"Article 102876"},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140279372","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Analyzing health outcomes measured as bounded counts","authors":"John Mullahy","doi":"10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102875","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102875","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper assesses analytical strategies that respect the bounded-count nature of health outcomes encountered often in empirical applications. Absent in the literature is a comprehensive discussion and critique of strategies for analyzing and understanding such data. The paper's goal is to provide an in-depth consideration of prominent issues arising in and strategies for undertaking such analyses, emphasizing the merits and limitations of various analytical tools empirical researchers may contemplate. Three main topics are covered. First, bounded-count health outcomes' measurement properties are reviewed and their implications assessed. Second, issues arising when bounded-count outcomes are the objects of concern in evaluations are described. Third, the (conditional) probability and moment structures of bounded-count outcomes are derived and corresponding specification and estimation strategies presented with particular attention to partial effects. Many questions may be asked of such data in health research and a researcher's choice of analytical method is often consequential.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50186,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Health Economics","volume":"95 ","pages":"Article 102875"},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140198523","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Pricing above value: Selling to a market with selection problems","authors":"Jan Boone","doi":"10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102868","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102868","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper shows that selection incentives in downstream markets distort upstream prices. It is possible for inputs to be priced above the value that the good has for final consumers. We apply this idea to pharmaceutical companies selling drugs to a health insurance market with selection problems. We specify the conditions under which drugs are sold at prices exceeding treatment value. Another feature of the model is an excessive private incentive to reduce market size, e.g. in the form of personalized medicine.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50186,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Health Economics","volume":"94 ","pages":"Article 102868"},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167629624000134/pdfft?md5=3b0eb6b82621a6630d212e193c7dc27a&pid=1-s2.0-S0167629624000134-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140042619","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Tapio Haaga , Petri Böckerman , Mika Kortelainen , Janne Tukiainen
{"title":"Effects of nurse visit copayment on primary care use: Do low-income households pay the price?","authors":"Tapio Haaga , Petri Böckerman , Mika Kortelainen , Janne Tukiainen","doi":"10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102866","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102866","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Nurses are increasingly providing primary care, yet the literature on cost-sharing has paid little attention to nurse visits. We employ a staggered difference-in-differences design to examine the effects of adopting a 10-euro copayment for nurse visits on the use of public primary care among Finnish adults. We find that the copayment reduced nurse visits by 9%–10% during a one-year follow-up. There is heterogeneity by income in absolute terms, but not in relative terms. The spillover effects on general practitioner (GP) use are negative but small, with varying statistical significance. We also analyze the subsequent nationwide abolition of the copayment. However, we refrain from drawing causal conclusions from this due to the lack of credibility in the parallel trends assumption. Overall, our analysis suggests that moderate copayments can create a greater barrier to access for low-income individuals. We also provide an example of using a pre-analysis plan for retrospective observational data.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50186,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Health Economics","volume":"94 ","pages":"Article 102866"},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167629624000110/pdfft?md5=f90765e39ac888abea9a4bef3e5877e3&pid=1-s2.0-S0167629624000110-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140000038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Safer sex? The effect of AIDS risk on birth rates","authors":"Melissa K. Spencer","doi":"10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102867","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102867","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Behavioral adjustments to mitigate increasing risk of STIs can increase or decrease the likelihood of pregnancy. This paper measures the effects of the arrival and spread of AIDS across U.S. cities in the 1980s and 1990s on births and abortions. I show that the AIDS epidemic increased the birth rate by 0.55 percent and the abortion rate by 1.77 percent. I find support for two underlying mechanisms to explain the increase in pregnancies. Some women opted into monogamous partnerships in response to the AIDS epidemic, with a corresponding increase in the marriage rate and improvement in infant health. Others switched from prescription contraceptive methods to condoms. These behavioral changes lowered the incidence of other sexually transmitted infections, but increased both planned and unplanned pregnancies.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50186,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Health Economics","volume":"95 ","pages":"Article 102867"},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140069547","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Optimal intertemporal curative drug expenses: The case of hepatitis C in France","authors":"Pierre Dubois, Thierry Magnac","doi":"10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102861","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102861","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We study intertemporal tradeoffs that health authorities face when considering the control of an epidemic using innovative curative medical treatments. We set up a dynamically controlled susceptible–infected–recovered (SIR) model for an epidemic in which patients can be asymptomatic, and we analyze the optimality conditions of the sequence of cure expenses decided by health authorities at the onset of the drug innovation process. We show that analytical conclusions are ambiguous because of their dependence on parameter values. As an application, we focus on the case study of hepatitis C, the treatment for which underwent a major upheaval when curative drugs were introduced in 2014. We calibrate our controlled SIR model using French data and simulate optimal policies. We show that the optimal policy entails some front loading of the intertemporal budget. The analysis demonstrates how beneficial intertemporal budgeting can be compared to non-forward-looking constant budget allocation.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50186,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Health Economics","volume":"94 ","pages":"Article 102861"},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139748720","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jeannette Brosig-Koch , Heike Hennig-Schmidt , Nadja Kairies-Schwarz , Johanna Kokot , Daniel Wiesen
{"title":"A new look at physicians’ responses to financial incentives: Quality of care, practice characteristics, and motivations","authors":"Jeannette Brosig-Koch , Heike Hennig-Schmidt , Nadja Kairies-Schwarz , Johanna Kokot , Daniel Wiesen","doi":"10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102862","DOIUrl":"10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102862","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>There is considerable controversy about what causes (in)effectiveness of physician performance pay in improving the quality of care. Using a behavioral experiment with German primary-care physicians, we study the incentive effect of performance pay on service provision and quality of care. To explore whether variations in quality are based on the incentive scheme and the interplay with physicians’ real-world profit orientation and patient-regarding motivations, we link administrative data on practice characteristics and survey data on physicians’ attitudes with experimental data. We find that, under performance pay, quality increases by about 7pp compared to baseline capitation. While the effect increases with the severity of illness, the bonus level does not significantly affect the quality of care. Data linkage indicates that primary-care physicians in high-profit practices provide a lower quality of care. Physicians’ other-regarding motivations and attitudes are significant drivers of high treatment quality.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50186,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Health Economics","volume":"94 ","pages":"Article 102862"},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167629624000079/pdfft?md5=d933d7930a44452363910b6bbc41cf32&pid=1-s2.0-S0167629624000079-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139830941","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The value of improving insurance quality: Evidence from long-run Medicaid attrition","authors":"Ajin Lee , Boris Vabson","doi":"10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102865","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102865","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The US government increasingly provides public health insurance coverage through private firms. We examine associated welfare implications for beneficiaries, using a ‘revealed preference’ framework based on beneficiaries’ program attrition rates. Focusing on the Medicaid program in New York State, we exploit quasi-random variation in the initial assignment at birth to public versus private Medicaid based on birth weight. We find that infants assigned to private Medicaid at birth are less likely to subsequently leave Medicaid. We provide suggestive evidence that reduced attrition reflects beneficiary responses to improved program quality, rather than alternative mechanisms such as private Medicaid plans reducing re-enrollment barriers.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50186,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Health Economics","volume":"94 ","pages":"Article 102865"},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139737507","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The causal effect of a health treatment on beliefs, stated preferences and memories","authors":"Alberto Prati , Charlotte Saucet","doi":"10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102864","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102864","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The paper estimates the causal effect of a health treatment on patients’ beliefs, preferences and memories about the treatment. It exploits a natural experiment which occurred in the United Kingdom during the COVID-19 vaccination campaign. UK residents could choose to opt into the vaccination program, but not which vaccine they received. The assignment to a vaccine offered little objective information for learning about its qualities, but triggered strong psychological demand for reassuring beliefs. We surveyed a sample of UK residents about their beliefs on the different COVID-19 vaccines <em>before</em> and <em>after</em> receiving their jab. <em>Before</em> vaccination, individuals exhibit similar prior beliefs and stated preferences about the different vaccines. <em>After</em> vaccination, however, they update their beliefs overly optimistically about the safety and effectiveness of the vaccine they received, state that they would have chosen it if they could, and have distorted memories about their past beliefs. These results cannot be explained by conventional experience effects. At the aggregated level, they show that random assignment to a health treatment predicts a polarization of opinions about its quality. At the individual level, these findings provide evidence in line with the predictions of motivated beliefs and over-inference from weak signals in a real-world health setting.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50186,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Health Economics","volume":"94 ","pages":"Article 102864"},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167629624000092/pdfft?md5=c7a46500a516ba9d4c412c5ac72bf185&pid=1-s2.0-S0167629624000092-main.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139731609","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Financial incentives and private health insurance demand on the extensive and intensive margins","authors":"Nathan Kettlewell , Yuting Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102863","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102863","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In countries with dual public and private healthcare systems, individuals are often incentivized to purchase private health insurance through subsidies and penalty. We use administrative data from Australia to study how high-income earners respond on both the intensive and extensive margins to the simultaneous withdrawal of a premium subsidy, and the increase of a tax penalty. We estimate regression discontinuity models by exploiting discontinuous changes in the penalty and subsidy rates. Our setting is particularly interesting because means testing creates different incentives at the extensive and intensive margins. Specifically, we could expect to see higher take-up of insurance coupled with downgrading to less expensive plans. We find evidence that the penalty – despite being large in value – only has a modest effect on take-up. Our results show little evidence of downgrading, which is consistent with a low price elasticity for the high-income earners we study.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":50186,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Health Economics","volume":"94 ","pages":"Article 102863"},"PeriodicalIF":3.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139727261","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}