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The political economy of open contracting reforms in low‐ and middle‐income countries 中低收入国家开放式承包改革的政治经济学
Governance Pub Date : 2024-09-04 DOI: 10.1111/gove.12897
Isabelle Adam, Elizabeth Dávid‐Barrett, Mihály Fazekas
{"title":"The political economy of open contracting reforms in low‐ and middle‐income countries","authors":"Isabelle Adam, Elizabeth Dávid‐Barrett, Mihály Fazekas","doi":"10.1111/gove.12897","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12897","url":null,"abstract":"Transparency reforms make government contracting more open and amenable to public scrutiny, helping to improve public spending efficiency. But they are also politically sensitive, complex and highly technical, which makes them especially difficult to implement if state capacity is weak. Our research on nine low‐ and middle‐income countries in Africa and Asia systematically assesses progress in improving the legal framework for procurement transparency and implementing systems that allow open access to data, between 2008 and 2019. Through interviews with key informants, we explore the reasons for progress or its absence, finding that success relies on strong leadership commitment, broad coalitions of state and non‐state actors, and sufficient technical capacity. Leadership commitment ensures that implementing bodies have the appropriate mandate and resources, while broad coalitions sustain commitment and harness external technical assistance. Both factors are best achieved by framing the reforms as a way of improving efficiency rather than fighting corruption.","PeriodicalId":501138,"journal":{"name":"Governance","volume":"83 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142175158","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
In court we trust? Political affinity and citizen's attitudes toward court's decisions 我们信任法院？政治亲和力与公民对法院判决的态度
Governance Pub Date : 2024-08-18 DOI: 10.1111/gove.12898
Carlos Pereira, André Klevenhusen, Lúcia Barros
{"title":"In court we trust? Political affinity and citizen's attitudes toward court's decisions","authors":"Carlos Pereira, André Klevenhusen, Lúcia Barros","doi":"10.1111/gove.12898","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12898","url":null,"abstract":"This article investigates the role of citizen political affinities in shaping attitudes towards judicial decisions in corruption cases involving politicians. Although emerging research suggests that decisions regarding a high‐ranking politician can reduce general citizen trust in courts, there is no systematic evidence examining how political affinities differentially affect confidence in court decisions depending on the accused politician. We conducted a survey experiment during a 2022 presidential election rally in Brazil at a time of heightened affective polarization and corruption. We presented respondents with vignettes detailing a fictional corruption scheme and trial outcomes (acquittal or conviction) involving key political figures, including Presidents Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Jair Bolsonaro. The results indicate that when a court decision is consistent with citizens' electoral preferences, they are more inclined to trust the court decision and vice versa.","PeriodicalId":501138,"journal":{"name":"Governance","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142175160","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
A red flag for public goods? The correlates of civil society restrictions 公共产品的红旗？公民社会限制的相关因素
Governance Pub Date : 2024-08-17 DOI: 10.1111/gove.12894
Hannah Smidt, Neil J. Mitchell, Kristin M. Bakke
{"title":"A red flag for public goods? The correlates of civil society restrictions","authors":"Hannah Smidt, Neil J. Mitchell, Kristin M. Bakke","doi":"10.1111/gove.12894","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12894","url":null,"abstract":"Governments increasingly restrict civil society organizations (CSOs). Different theories converge on the expectation that CSOs are important for public goods. A largely unexplored implication is that increased restrictions on CSOs will signal the under‐delivery of public goods. Using data on government‐imposed restrictions on CSOs for a global sample of countries, we test this implication. Controlling for unobserved cross‐country heterogeneity, temporal shocks, and confounding variables, we find that the accumulation of restrictions on CSOs negatively correlate with public goods‐oriented government spending and positively correlate with corruption and clientelism in the future. Our evidence also suggests that the mechanism underpinning these findings is that persistent restrictions on CSOs negatively correlate with engaged society and, to some extent, protest. While global governance actors warn of the negative consequences of restrictions on CSOs, our analyses provide evidence that restrictions are indeed a red flag for governments' failure to live up to their public goods commitment.","PeriodicalId":501138,"journal":{"name":"Governance","volume":"105 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142175161","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Drivers of transnational administrative coordination on super‐wicked policy issues: The role of institutional homophily 在超级棘手的政策问题上进行跨国行政协调的驱动因素：机构同质性的作用
Governance Pub Date : 2024-08-10 DOI: 10.1111/gove.12896
Daniel Carelli
{"title":"Drivers of transnational administrative coordination on super‐wicked policy issues: The role of institutional homophily","authors":"Daniel Carelli","doi":"10.1111/gove.12896","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12896","url":null,"abstract":"In European governance, transnational administrative networks have become crucial for addressing complex cross‐border challenges, supplementing formal harmonization efforts with informal collaborative mechanisms. However, little attention has been given to their role in addressing super‐wicked policy problems, where formal structures and political prioritization are lacking despite pressing temporal deadlines and substantial costs for future generations. This study investigates the drivers of administrative coordination in Europe within such contexts, using the case of antimicrobial resistance as a case study. Employing a mixed‐method approach, including Logistic Regression Quadratic Assignment Procedure and a qualitative analysis based on originally collected expert survey and interview data, the research uncovers a notable trend: countries with similar levels of institutional quality are four times more likely to establish connections. This selective coordination dynamic is shaped by domestic circumstances, politico‐administrative considerations, and the pursuit of pragmatic, implementable policy solutions, with important implications for the ongoing struggle against antibiotic resistance.","PeriodicalId":501138,"journal":{"name":"Governance","volume":"11 23","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141920605","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
European union funding of interest groups: Reassessing the balancing function and the promotion of good organizational practices 欧盟对利益集团的资助：重新评估平衡职能和促进良好组织做法
Governance Pub Date : 2024-08-08 DOI: 10.1111/gove.12895
R. Salgado, Marcel Hanegraaff, Michele Crepaz
{"title":"European union funding of interest groups: Reassessing the balancing function and the promotion of good organizational practices","authors":"R. Salgado, Marcel Hanegraaff, Michele Crepaz","doi":"10.1111/gove.12895","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12895","url":null,"abstract":"The question of the legitimacy of government funding of interest groups as a democratic practice has been extensively discussed by scholars. On the one hand, research suggests that well‐resourced interest groups are better equipped to capture European Union (EU) funds, raising some questions regarding the elitist character of the EU system of interest representation. On the other hand, EU funds have been found to address imbalances in the system of interest representation by directing funding streams toward underrepresented citizen groups. The present study contributes to this open discussion, by 1) analyzing to which extent findings from previous studies can be replicated with a more nuanced research design and by employing the largest existing dataset on interest groups and EU funding, and by 2) testing new hypotheses inspired by an alternative theoretical focus to mainstream approaches: associative democracy. To do so, we use data from the Comparative Interest Group Survey, a dataset of almost 2500 organizations across eight EU countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, Portugal, Slovenia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic and Poland) and at the EU level. Our results offer two main contributions. By replicating recent studies, our findings nuance conclusions drawn this far regarding existing biases in the EU system of interest representation: it is true that rich and experienced interest groups are more likely to obtain EU funding. However, EU funding is also more likely to be allocated to NGOs, especially when they operate in business‐dominated policy areas. Moreover, we find that EU funds are not as concentrated in EU‐15 member states as previously thought. Finally, inspired by associative democracy, we show that EU funding is more often allocated where good practices are in place. These include membership representation as core function and membership influence over internal decision‐making processes.","PeriodicalId":501138,"journal":{"name":"Governance","volume":"49 10","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141928193","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
E‐government and citizen‐state relations: Evidence from a randomized information campaign with the Botswana Unified Revenue Service 电子政务与公民-国家关系：博茨瓦纳统一税务局随机信息宣传活动的证据
Governance Pub Date : 2024-08-02 DOI: 10.1111/gove.12893
Sebastian Ziaja, Markus Geray, David Sebudubudu, Armin von Schiller
{"title":"E‐government and citizen‐state relations: Evidence from a randomized information campaign with the Botswana Unified Revenue Service","authors":"Sebastian Ziaja, Markus Geray, David Sebudubudu, Armin von Schiller","doi":"10.1111/gove.12893","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12893","url":null,"abstract":"E‐government services are often heralded as a silver bullet for governments willing to engage more meaningfully with citizens. Evidence on the effectiveness of these measures for improving citizen‐state relations is scarce, however. Most studies examining e‐government focus on efficiency considerations; few consider potential effects on citizen‐state relations. The present study analyses the effect of an information treatment about the availability of e‐government services on citizen perceptions of government responsiveness. We conducted an experiment in cooperation with the Botswana Unified Revenue Service that randomly assigned registered taxpayers to receive a short message on their mobile phones. Our results indicate that the treatment has a significant, positive effect on the perception that the government addresses citizen needs, and more so for respondents with lower income. The findings suggest that, by affecting how citizens assess political realities, e‐government can play an important role in shaping citizen‐state relations.","PeriodicalId":501138,"journal":{"name":"Governance","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141881289","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Relational dynamics under close supervision: Examining transnational cooperation in regulatory oversight 密切监督下的关系动态：考察监管中的跨国合作
Governance Pub Date : 2024-07-26 DOI: 10.1111/gove.12892
Carlos Bravo‐Laguna, David Levi‐Faur
{"title":"Relational dynamics under close supervision: Examining transnational cooperation in regulatory oversight","authors":"Carlos Bravo‐Laguna, David Levi‐Faur","doi":"10.1111/gove.12892","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12892","url":null,"abstract":"The increasing institutionalization of regulatory oversight worldwide has not resulted in the creation of numerous formal channels of transnational regulatory oversight cooperation. Despite its puzzling nature, this circumstance has barely attracted scholarly attention. Additionally, the study of cooperation across transgovernmental regulatory networks with actors having low autonomy from central governments remains under‐researched. We fill these literature gaps by applying insights from the policy networks literature to identify drivers of transnational regulatory oversight cooperation. Combining Exponential Random Graph Models with semi‐structured interviews, we show that commonalities in administrative traditions drive cooperation. Innovative bodies become sources of best practices. Conversely, exchanges between countries with similar regulatory oversight settings or preferences are rare, perhaps due to their low independence from their political principals. These results suggest that regulatory oversight actors use relational opportunities and general country features as cues for transnational cooperation, instead of adopting strategic partnerships with better matches.","PeriodicalId":501138,"journal":{"name":"Governance","volume":"81 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141779959","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Political tax cycles in the US states: Opportunism versus ideological sincerity in governors' revenue proposals 美国各州的政治税收周期：州长税收提案中的机会主义与意识形态诚意
Governance Pub Date : 2024-07-26 DOI: 10.1111/gove.12886
James W. Douglas, John Szmer, Ringa Raudla
{"title":"Political tax cycles in the US states: Opportunism versus ideological sincerity in governors' revenue proposals","authors":"James W. Douglas, John Szmer, Ringa Raudla","doi":"10.1111/gove.12886","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12886","url":null,"abstract":"Do politicians behave opportunistically regarding their tax proposals during the election cycle, or do they maintain ideological sincerity? We examine U.S. governors' revenue proposals between the years of 1989 and 2018 to assess gubernatorial behavior during election years. We find that governors, in general, do indeed follow a political budget cycle where they request lower revenues during election years. However, this finding is largely driven by Democratic governors asking for significantly lower revenues during election years when compared to non‐election years. Republican governors are more ideologically sincere, maintaining behaviors that are consistent across the election cycle.","PeriodicalId":501138,"journal":{"name":"Governance","volume":"112 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141779958","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Political corruption, political responsiveness and public trust: Testing the implicit exchange hypothesis 政治腐败、政治响应力和公众信任：检验隐性交换假说
Governance Pub Date : 2024-07-26 DOI: 10.1111/gove.12888
Wisanupong Potipiroon
{"title":"Political corruption, political responsiveness and public trust: Testing the implicit exchange hypothesis","authors":"Wisanupong Potipiroon","doi":"10.1111/gove.12888","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12888","url":null,"abstract":"The question of why electoral punishment of corrupt politicians fails to materialize continues to captivate scholars and practitioners. In this research, I draw upon implicit exchange theory to demonstrate that corrupt politicians may retain public trust if they are seen as responsive to the constituency. Analyses of survey data from 590 local business owners in two municipalities in Thailand reveal that political corruption negatively affected public trust, while political responsiveness had a positive effect. Furthermore, as expected, political responsiveness neutralized the trust‐eroding effect of political corruption. Specifically, citizens showed higher levels of trust for politicians perceived as “corrupt but responsive” than for those considered “less corrupt but less responsive.” The results were observed after considering the influence of politician competence and local government performance. These findings paint a rather somber view, suggesting that political corruption in the presence of political responsiveness may create a “façade” of politicians' trustworthiness.","PeriodicalId":501138,"journal":{"name":"Governance","volume":"43 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141779818","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Limiting bureaucratic discretion? Analyzing the design and exercise of administrative judicial review in the welfare sector 限制官僚自由裁量权？分析福利部门行政司法审查的设计和行使
Governance Pub Date : 2024-07-24 DOI: 10.1111/gove.12891
Karin Leijon, Linda Moberg
{"title":"Limiting bureaucratic discretion? Analyzing the design and exercise of administrative judicial review in the welfare sector","authors":"Karin Leijon, Linda Moberg","doi":"10.1111/gove.12891","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12891","url":null,"abstract":"This article develops a framework for understanding how the design of administrative judicial review can circumscribe the discretion of different bureaucratic actors. The framework proposes that bureaucratic discretion is limited to a great extent if courts can (i) overturn bureaucratic decisions on substantive grounds, (ii) review decisions associated with high economic costs, and (iii) issue detailed instructions for how rulings are to be implemented. Applying the framework to the Swedish case, we first show that the legislative design of the judicial review process allows administrative courts to greatly limit the discretion of senior officials and street‐level bureaucrats. Second, we show that Swedish courts defer to the expertise of bureaucratic actors in the welfare sector by sparingly overturning decisions. However, when courts actually overturn decisions, they frequently limit bureaucratic discretion by issuing detailed judgments in high‐cost cases, possibly undermining the conditions for good governance.","PeriodicalId":501138,"journal":{"name":"Governance","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141779961","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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