Political corruption, political responsiveness and public trust: Testing the implicit exchange hypothesis

The question of why electoral punishment of corrupt politicians fails to materialize continues to captivate scholars and practitioners. In this research, I draw upon implicit exchange theory to demonstrate that corrupt politicians may retain public trust if they are seen as responsive to the constituency. Analyses of survey data from 590 local business owners in two municipalities in Thailand reveal that political corruption negatively affected public trust, while political responsiveness had a positive effect. Furthermore, as expected, political responsiveness neutralized the trust-eroding effect of political corruption. Specifically, citizens showed higher levels of trust for politicians perceived as “corrupt but responsive” than for those considered “less corrupt but less responsive.” The results were observed after considering the influence of politician competence and local government performance. These findings paint a rather somber view, suggesting that political corruption in the presence of political responsiveness may create a “façade” of politicians' trustworthiness.