Nursing Philosophy最新文献

{"title":"Empathy in a Brain-Death Nursing Practice Narrative from Lebanon: Folk-Psychological, Phenomenological, and Cognitive Science Perspectives.","authors":"Michael Clinton","doi":"10.1111/nup.70084","DOIUrl":"10.1111/nup.70084","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>For philosophers, psychologists, and cognitive scientists, folk psychology is a theory of social cognition that explains other people's behaviour by referring to their beliefs, desires, intentions, and other mental states. Although discussions continue about how the ability to understand others works, current research indicates that no single explanation is clearly better than others. I describe how everyday understanding, phenomenology, social ontology, and neuroscience come together to explain how nurses learn in clinical settings. A case study written by an ICU nurse provides a real‑world example of why folk psychology relies on non‑representational, embodied, and contextually situated social cognition. After clarifying the role of propositional attitudes in folk‑psychological reasoning, I draw on Edith Stein's phenomenology of empathy to describe the process through which the nurse decided to engage a distressed family to encourage them to donate their loved one's organs. I use Stein's social ontology and relational ethics to explain why the nurse found the situation she describes morally salient. Drawing on current debates in social cognition theory, I demonstrate how embodied attunement, affective resonance, and mirror-neuron mechanisms explain empathy and its development into sympathy and, potentially, compassionate nursing care. I conclude that social cognition theories integrate Stein's concepts of empathy and social ontology within a neuroscience-supported view of knowledge and relational ethics in nursing practice.</p>","PeriodicalId":49724,"journal":{"name":"Nursing Philosophy","volume":"27 2","pages":"e70084"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2026-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147787335","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Deleuzian Examination of Anorexia & Recovery: Opening up Possibilities for Conceptualizing Care.","authors":"Sydney Gaudet, Holly Symonds-Brown, Jude Spiers","doi":"10.1111/nup.70073","DOIUrl":"10.1111/nup.70073","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Anorexia, a type of eating disorder, holds the highest mortality rate of all mental illnesses. Contemporary etiological consensus reflected in eating disorder literature views anorexia as the result of an interplay between biological, psychological, and social factors. However, the current organization of inpatient care fails to reflect such complexity and remains bound by biomedical knowledge regimes. Within these regimes, recovery is defined within a curative, disease-oriented framework, one that yields recovery rates of less than fifty percent. The following article serves as a meta-cognitive exercise, drawing on the work of French philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. In particular, we use their ontology of immanence as a heuristic device to examine and challenge the hierarchical prioritization of biomedical ontological systems in how inpatient care and recovery for anorexia are conceptualized. As a result, we explore what an immanent conceptualization of inpatient care and recovery for anorexia might do to the organization of care and, by extension, the role of the nurse in eating disorder care.</p>","PeriodicalId":49724,"journal":{"name":"Nursing Philosophy","volume":"27 2","pages":"e70073"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2026-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12927134/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147272621","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Young Adults' Needs in Social Robot Assisted Medication Counselling: Applying Peplau's Interpersonal Relations Model.","authors":"Malin Andtfolk, Sara Rosenberg, Susanne Hägglund, Mattias Wingren, Andreas Lundell, Linda Estman","doi":"10.1111/nup.70074","DOIUrl":"10.1111/nup.70074","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The integration of robots into healthcare is an advancing field, with potential to enhance patient care, for example in medication counselling. Peplau's Interpersonal Relationship Model was adapted as a framework for the aim to explore the needs of young adults in relation to social robots in medication counselling. Peplau's model outlines the phases of the nurse-patient relationship and is emphasised through three key phases, such as Orientation phase, Working phase and Termination phase. Qualitative interviews with six young adults were analysed using deductive reflexive thematic analysis. The results suggest the following: In the orientation phase, the robot should offer reliable and clear communication and a neutral appearance to the young adult to create a trusting relation. In the working phase, the robot should utilise the individuals' resources to address their medication-related needs and begin to anticipate goals beyond the immediate problem. Finally, in the termination phase, the robot facilitates the transition to independence for the young adult to manage own medication without relying on the robot. This research contributes to the broader discourse on the intersection of technology and human caring, emphasising the importance of maintaining interpersonal relation in the digital age. Insights from this study informs the design and implementation of social robots in healthcare, ensuring that they effectively meet the needs of young adults and complement medication counselling.</p>","PeriodicalId":49724,"journal":{"name":"Nursing Philosophy","volume":"27 2","pages":"e70074"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2026-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12950275/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147327835","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Why Artificial Intelligence Cannot Replace the Nurse in Healthcare: A (Neo)Thomistic Approach.","authors":"Marcin Paweł Ferdynus","doi":"10.1111/nup.70064","DOIUrl":"10.1111/nup.70064","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Artificial intelligence (AI) plays an increasingly significant role in nursing care. Many scholars have not only discussed the nature of AI and the effects of its application in nursing practice, but also raised the question of whether AI can replace the nurse in healthcare. In this paper, I aim to demonstrate that the nature of AI is fundamentally distinct from the nature of the nurse, and therefore, AI cannot replace the nurse in the care of the patient. I present my argument in two main parts. In the first, I refer to the scholastic principle agere sequitur esse and to the classical conception of the human being as developed by (neo)Thomists. This means that the argument is grounded in the thought of Thomas Aquinas and certain representatives of neo-Thomism. According to the strategy adopted in this paper, the human being is understood as a person who elicits from within themselves specific personal acts. In the second part, I emphasize that, in contrast to the nurse, AI lacks several essential components that appear to be crucial for meeting the personal needs of patients. I conclude that, according to (neo)Thomistic assumptions, AI can neither replace the nurse nor be considered an equal partner, because it is not endowed with the personal capacities and components that are essential for providing proper care to the patient. The (neo)Thomistic perspective allows one to regard AI solely as a therapeutic tool.</p>","PeriodicalId":49724,"journal":{"name":"Nursing Philosophy","volume":"27 1","pages":"e70064"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146031490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Staying With the Trouble in Nursing 12.5 Hours at a Time.","authors":"Jamie Brian Smith","doi":"10.1111/nup.70060","DOIUrl":"10.1111/nup.70060","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This paper proposes a reconceptualisation of clinical care as a site from which philosophy is produced, rather than a domain to which it is applied. Centreing on a speculative vignette drawn from emergency nursing, I introduce the concept of the event of nursing to name those moments where relational, material, and institutional forces exceed protocol and call for situated, embodied ethical judgement. Through this lens, nursing practice is not the application of philosophical ethics, but an already-theorising practice; one that enacts, improvises, and sustains a posthuman ethics in real time. Drawing on Spinoza, Barad, Haraway, Braidotti, and Deleuze and Guattari, I argue that nursing's entangled thinking-feeling-doing constitutes a form of knowledge irreducible to either abstraction or procedure. I frame response-ability as the immanent composition of powers (conatus), read diffractively, tracing how care is produced through the navigation of competing temporalities, machinic infrastructures, and affective pressures. With the risks of epistemic violence of algorithmic governance and linear reasoning, I offer three speculative propositions: 'assemblage notes,' 'situated adequacy metrics,' and 'posthuman night rounds.' These gestures aim not to reform systems but to make legible the improvisational labour that sustains care amid constraint. The event of nursing, I suggest, offers philosophy a model of ethics grounded in affective intelligence, situated multiplicity, and infrastructural friction, a way of staying with the trouble, 12 h at a time.</p>","PeriodicalId":49724,"journal":{"name":"Nursing Philosophy","volume":"27 1","pages":"e70060"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12711605/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145776315","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Understanding Virtuous Person-Centred Nursing Care: A Neo-Aristotelean Perspective.","authors":"Jennifer Greenwood, Andrew Crowden","doi":"10.1111/nup.70059","DOIUrl":"10.1111/nup.70059","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Professional codes of ethics for nurses and midwives and the pedagogies they inform are often intellectualist; they assume implicitly that impartial practical reasoning selects the goal of moral deliberation as well as the means to its achievement. In this paper we argue that while the intellectual virtues and impartial moral deliberation are involved in moral decision-making in mature adults, the end is determined by a professional nurse's character, that is, by the influence of non-rational virtues. Such virtues include distinct nursing dispositions, excellences and regulative ideals which are triggered almost automatically in response to certain morally salient situations. Practical wisdom (phronesis) selects and guides the means to the aim and is ontologically interdependent with virtue and is guided by virtue. Although codes of ethics are useful, they often indicate that developers have misconstrued the nature of phronesis and its relationship to virtue. As such, many promote the development of technical expertise at the expense of holistic ethically sensitive person-centred care. Using insights from contemporary neo-Aristotelian interpretations we explicate these concepts and their relationship to show that the end of moral deliberation is non-negotiable. We argue that while person-centred care requires distinct technical competence and knowledge development it also includes an ineliminable emotional or affective component. Person centred patient care is most effective when practitioner thought and feeling operate as one. We use features of Irurita's typology of hands (soft, firm, hard and rough) to illustrate this claim. We conclude by briefly comparing virtue ethics with deontological and consequentialist moral theories and argue that truly ethical deontological and consequentialist responses also presuppose virtuous moral character.</p>","PeriodicalId":49724,"journal":{"name":"Nursing Philosophy","volume":"27 1","pages":"e70059"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"146031485","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Liquid Perception and Event and Nursing.","authors":"Miriam Bender","doi":"10.1111/nup.70062","DOIUrl":"10.1111/nup.70062","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>At the start of academic nursing in the United States, nurses philosophized. And they did it grandly. So grandly in fact that this entire period (beginning in the mid 1900s) has been called the era of grand nursing theory. Grand nursing theory attempted to express the conceptual side of nursing but struggled, not least in confusing philosophy with theory. Nevertheless, grand nursing theories are still actively promoted in nursing education, practice, and research, suggesting there is something to them that continues to resonate with nursing. This resonating something can be made more consistent when connected to the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze. For Deleuze philosophy is not a tracing of the actual in terms of theory. Rather, every actuality involves a 'shadowy and secret part,' which is its conceptuality, and which is the work of philosophy to construct. It is this conceptuality that speaks the shadowy part of an actuality, and which Deleuze calls an event. An analysis of a 2008 paper by grand nursing theorist Margaret Newman and colleagues demonstrates that they were trying to speak an event of nursing through creative gestures such as 'rhythmic fluctuations' and 'oscillating possibilities' and 'experiencing the infinite,' but were using outdated theory structures to formalize them, which made for distortions and denaturing effects. Reconsidering their creative gestures through a Deleuzian philosophy premised on movement and variation (rather than stasis and standardization) a concept of liquid perception is developed to express how nursing can be conceived as bearing witness to an event and counter-actualizing its emerging possibilities in the context of healthcare. It involves gaining a capacity to bear affects and thereby pass to different and more expansive thresholds of perception, which Deleuze defines as becoming subjected to an action, and affirms Newman and colleagues claim that 'relationship … emerge[s] as the central focus of the discipline.' Liquid perception expresses this relationality in terms of a practice of making actionable more and other things across more and other dimensions, thus expanding the very scope of what can become related, thus expanding the very potentiality of nursing. Importantly, liquid perception has nothing to do with putting forth a new grand theoretical truth of nursing. It constitutes a dynamic conceptualization that makes nursing visible without making prescriptions. Liquid perception is not a fact about nursing-it is a speaking of what remains shadowy and secret in nursing, which involves nursing's unique efficacy, and becoming worthy of its event.</p>","PeriodicalId":49724,"journal":{"name":"Nursing Philosophy","volume":"27 1","pages":"e70062"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12744894/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145851317","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Communal Knowing in Nursing: A Novel Pattern of Knowing From the African Philosophical Lens.","authors":"Jonathan Bayuo","doi":"10.1111/nup.70063","DOIUrl":"10.1111/nup.70063","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>African philosophical thoughts suggest that personhood is founded on and can be understood as emerging from the community. Thus, the community is essential to understanding personhood. In other words, we cannot know the person, without first knowing the community. This assertion brings to the fore a potentially novel pattern of knowing which has received limited attention in the discipline of nursing: communal knowing. This paper presents the authors preliminary thoughts on communal knowing as a novel pattern of knowing from the African philosophical perspective. Communal knowing, an epistemology deeply rooted in African philosophical traditions prioritizes interdependence, collective wisdom, and harmony over individualism. This approach to generating and transmitting knowledge is context-dependent and arises from dynamic social interactions, shared experiences, and the guidance of elders, ancestors, and community leaders. The primary aim of communal knowing is the restoration and preservation of social, spiritual, and environmental equilibrium-where healing is understood not as an isolated biological event but as the re-establishment of balance within the collective. Knowledge in this system is embedded in cultural symbols, oral traditions-such as proverbs, storytelling, poetry, and rituals-and expressive forms like Adinkra and Samai symbols, which encode values like unity, humility, resilience, and mutual support. These mediums serve as vehicles for moral education, critical reflection, and the reinforcement of virtues essential for communal well-being. The community itself acts as an educational institution, where learning is continuous, relational, and hierarchically structured-integrating the living with ancestral wisdom. This epistemology challenges Western individualistic models by framing knowledge as a process rather than a possession, inseparable from culture, spirituality, and relational contexts.</p>","PeriodicalId":49724,"journal":{"name":"Nursing Philosophy","volume":"27 1","pages":"e70063"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145967758","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Exploring Concepts of Action, Motives, and Intention in Nursing Through Anscombe's Philosophy.","authors":"Angela McClure","doi":"10.1111/nup.70047","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nup.70047","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Nursing ethics has long drawn on established frameworks such as principlism, care ethics, and relational approaches to guide practice. While these models provide valuable direction, they often overlook how the intentional structure of action shapes ethical meaning in clinical encounters. This article argues that Anscombe's philosophy, particularly her work on intention and action, offers the conceptual tools to enrich nursing ethics by grounding moral significance in action-guiding reasoning. Although her work has not been widely applied to nursing, it offers substantial potential to enhance ethical decision-making, patient-centered care, and holistic support. Drawing on her seminal text, Intention (1957), this paper examines Anscombe's concepts of intention, motives, and the distinction between intentional and non-intentional actions, as well as intentional omissions. These ideas provide a foundation for understanding intention as action-guiding reasoning rather than an internal mental state, an approach that deepens ethical reflection and promotes more intentional, virtuous nursing care. The paper also addresses Anscombe's rejection of the fact/value dichotomy, a distinction famously articulated by Hume (2022/1739), who argued that moral values cannot be derived from observable facts alone. Instead, Anscombe maintains that ethical meaning is embedded in the description of intentional action, a view that, when extended to nursing, offers a fresh perspective for clinical decision-making. Through applications to ethical dilemmas, communication, and holistic care, it Anscombe's philosophical perspective can enrich nursing and foster morally meaningful, intention-based practice that upholds both patient autonomy and professional integrity. This paper is organized into key sections addressing motives and action, intentional omissions, the fact/value distinction, clinical decision-making, communication, and holistic support.</p>","PeriodicalId":49724,"journal":{"name":"Nursing Philosophy","volume":"26 4","pages":"e70047"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145349584","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Fallacy of Person-Centred Care: Deconstructing the Discourse to Reimagine Practice.","authors":"Asam Latif, Nargis Gulzar","doi":"10.1111/nup.70043","DOIUrl":"10.1111/nup.70043","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Person-centred care dominates today's sociopolitical landscape, influencing the approach and conduct of healthcare institutions, organisations and practices. It seeks to elevate and transcend former biomedical models by centralising a person's needs, preferences and values in the care process. Positioned as the 'gold standard' approach, person-centred care has become a central attribute in shaping professional identities and public discourse, influencing the ethos, attitudes and behaviours of healthcare professionals. Despite its dogmatic prominence in policy and professional discourse, there are entrenched bureaucratic structures, organisational barriers and conflicting agendas that impede professional efforts to uphold patient agency and autonomy; this has resulted in inconsistencies in its understanding and implementation. Furthermore, the framework itself fails to empower healthcare professionals to challenge practice when it is felt that person-centred principles are compromised, rendering it little more than a rhetorical device used to promote self-interest, enhance professional status and power. Given this fallacy, this critique contends that person-centred care is effectively 'dead'; its demise regrettably orchestrated at the hands of those entrusted to deliver it. In line with a Derridean deconstructive approach, we also provocatively question whether the very concept was ever 'alive' to begin with and whose interest it ultimately served. While its demise may signal time for a paradigmatic shift, it also presents an opportunity to reimagine healthcare practice in a manner that aligns with a more authentic approach. Inspired by Nietzsche's concept of the Übermensch ('Over-man'), we propose a vision of the 'Über-professional', whose 'Will to Power' transcends institutional constraints and conventional practices. By embracing authenticity, the Über-professional model offers both opportunity and 'permission' for adoptees to recognise and resist practices when these conflict with the provision of care. It therefore empowers them to ensure that all voices are heard, preferences are respected and the interests of patients are fully represented in all care decisions.</p>","PeriodicalId":49724,"journal":{"name":"Nursing Philosophy","volume":"26 4","pages":"e70043"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2025-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12503392/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145245705","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}