Neuroethics最新文献

{"title":"Perceptions on the Ethical and Legal Principles that Influence Global Brain Data Governance","authors":"Paschal Ochang, Damian Eke, Bernd Carsten Stahl","doi":"10.1007/s12152-024-09558-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-024-09558-1","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Advances in neuroscience and other disciplines are producing large-scale brain data consisting of datasets from multiple organisms, disciplines, and jurisdictions in different formats. However, due to the lack of an international data governance framework brain data is currently being produced under various contextual ethical and legal principles which may influence key stakeholders involved in the generation, collection, processing and sharing of brain data thereby raising ethical and legal challenges. In addition, despite the demand for a brain data governance framework that accounts for culture, there is a gap in empirical research and actions to understand how key stakeholders around the world view these issues using neuroscientists who are affected by these ethical and legal principles. Therefore, using the research question <i>how do ethical and legal principles influence data governance in neuroscience?</i> we attempt to understand the perceptions of key actors on the principles, issues and concerns that can arise from brain data research. We carried out interviews with 21 leading international neuroscientists. The analytical insights revealed key ethical and legal principles, areas of convergence, visibility, and the contextual issues and concerns that arise in brain data research around these principles. These issues and concerns circulate around intimately connected areas which include ethics, human rights, regulations, policies and guidelines, and participatory governance. Also, key contextual insights around animal research and ethics were identified. The research identifies key principles, issues, and concerns that need to be addressed in advancing the development of a framework for global brain data governance. By presenting contextual insights from neuroscientists across regions, the study contributes to informing discussions and shaping policies aimed at promoting responsible and ethical practices in brain data research. The research answers the call for a cross cultural study of global brain data governance and the results of the study will assist in understanding the issues and concerns that arise in brain data governance.</p>","PeriodicalId":49255,"journal":{"name":"Neuroethics","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-05-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140886728","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"What Happens After a Neural Implant Study? Neuroethics Expert Workshop on Post-Trial Obligations","authors":"Ishan Dasgupta, Eran Klein, Laura Y. Cabrera, Winston Chiong, Ashley Feinsinger, Joseph J. Fins, Tobias Haeusermann, Saskia Hendriks, Gabriel Lázaro-Muñoz, Cynthia Kubu, Helen Mayberg, Khara Ramos, Adina Roskies, Lauren Sankary, Ashley Walton, Alik S. Widge, Sara Goering","doi":"10.1007/s12152-024-09549-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-024-09549-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p>What happens at the end of a clinical trial for an investigational neural implant? It may be surprising to learn how difficult it is to answer this question. While new trials are initiated with increasing regularity, relatively little consensus exists on how best to conduct them, and even less on how to ethically end them. The landscape of recent neural implant trials demonstrates wide variability of what happens to research participants after an neural implant trial ends. Some former research participants continue to receive support for their devices (e.g., battery and component replacements, software updates, etc.). Others, when safe, have their neural implants removed through surgical explantation. Still others continue to live with a deactivated neural implant embedded in their body. In the United States, there are no uniform requirements to provide services, of any kind, after an neural implant study ends, and other nations are similarly facing this challenge. The existence of a post-trial gap in an expanding neural implant research ecosystem invites obvious questions: What is owed to neural implant research participants post-trial, and why has providing it been so difficult to accomplish in practice? To take a step forward on this difficult issue, we assembled one group of stakeholders – researchers funded for neuroethics grants by the National Institutes of Health – to explore possible starting points on one topic: ethical guidance for post-trial care of research participants in neural implant trials. Based on shared concerns discussed in the expert workshop the current paper is a call to action. It reports the key areas of convergence from the meeting and highlights important next steps towards developing much needed guidance.</p>","PeriodicalId":49255,"journal":{"name":"Neuroethics","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140809126","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Human Brain Organoid Transplantation: Testing the Foundations of Animal Research Ethics","authors":"Alexandre Erler","doi":"10.1007/s12152-024-09556-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-024-09556-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Alongside in vitro studies, researchers are increasingly exploring the transplantation of human brain organoids (HBOs) into non-human animals to study brain development, disease, and repair. This paper focuses on ethical issues raised by such transplantation studies. In particular, it investigates the possibility that they might yield enhanced brain function in recipient animals (especially non-human primates), thereby fundamentally altering their moral status. I assess the critique, raised by major voices in the bioethics and science communities, according to which such concerns are premature and misleading. I identify the assumptions underlying this skeptical critique, and mention some objections against them, followed by some possible replies. I proceed to argue that the skeptical position is ultimately implausible, because it presupposes an unreasonably high standard of full moral status. My argument appeals to David DeGrazia’s idea of a “borderline person”, and to the need for consistency with existing animal research regulations. I outline the practical implications of my view for the conduct of studies that might result in the development of full moral status in a transplanted animal. I also discuss some of the ethical implications of animal enhancement (particularly of rodents) below the threshold associated with full moral status. I conclude that far from being premature, further debate on these issues is urgently needed to help clarify the prospects that a neural chimera might attain full moral status in the foreseeable future, and the level of quality of life required to make it acceptable to knowingly create such a being via HBO transplantation.</p>","PeriodicalId":49255,"journal":{"name":"Neuroethics","volume":"30 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140617931","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Stream of Consciousness: Some Propositions and Reflections","authors":"Nicholas Royle","doi":"10.1007/s12152-024-09555-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-024-09555-4","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This short communication explores the idea of “stream of consciousness” and considers some of the ways in which scientific writing relies – even or perhaps especially insofar as it does not signal this fact – on the resources of literary language and literary thinking. Particular attention is given to notions of literal and figurative or metaphorical language, including “hydrological” and “ontic” metaphor. A crucial figure is simile (the “like”), discussed here in relation to the Thomas Nagel’s “What is it Like to Be a Bat?”, Todd Feinberg and Jon Mallatt’s <i>Consciousness Demystified,</i> and Anil Seth’s <i>Being You: A New Science of Consciousness</i>. Neuroethics cannot restrict itself to the domain of technology and the human. The deconstruction of anthropocentrism, already underway in literary modernism, calls for responsibility in relation to non-human as well as human life-forms. Virginia Woolf’s <i>Mrs Dalloway</i> provides rich and multifarious resources for exploring these issues. Woolf’s novel is considered as a kind of literary water music, in which sense and feeling is not limited to the human, and distinctions between consciousness and the environment are susceptible to dissolution. Woolf’s work is concerned with a conception of stream of consciousness as telepathic fluidity, as “merging minds” but without restitution of the individual or collective.</p>","PeriodicalId":49255,"journal":{"name":"Neuroethics","volume":"32 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140583624","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"“You shall have the thought”: habeas cogitationem as a New Legal Remedy to Enforce Freedom of Thinking and Neurorights","authors":"José M. Muñoz, José Ángel Marinaro","doi":"10.1007/s12152-024-09551-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-024-09551-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Despite its obvious advantages, the disruptive development of neurotechnology can pose risks to fundamental freedoms. In the context of such concerns, proposals have emerged in recent years either to design human rights de novo or to update the existing ones. These new rights in the age of neurotechnology are now widely referred to as “neurorights.” In parallel, there is a considerable amount of ongoing academic work related to updating the right to freedom of thought in order to include the protection of “freedom of thinking” (i.e., freedom of thought itself) and not only its social manifestations. Neurorights such as cognitive liberty, free will, mental freedom, and mental self-determination come into play here. Importantly, freedom of thought has often been considered a prerequisite for all the other fundamental freedoms and rights. In any case, just as other rights require additional legal instruments to guarantee their compliance, substantial neurorights will probably require specific complementary developments in procedural law. In relation to this, there is a long tradition of <i>habeas corpus</i> as an emergency remedy to enforce the rights of a citizen against illegal or arbitrary detention. More recently, the <i>habeas data</i> writ has been proposed and admitted in certain countries to guarantee a person’s ownership of their personal data. In this article, we propose to expand this procedural apparatus by incorporating a third habeas, which we call <i>habeas cogitationem</i>: a writ aimed primarily at enforcing the right to freedom of thinking (and, subsidiarily, the rest of neurorights) against direct, harmful interferences in a person’s thought process by both public and private perpetrators.</p>","PeriodicalId":49255,"journal":{"name":"Neuroethics","volume":"31 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140583592","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Revisiting Maher’s One-Factor Theory of Delusion, Again","authors":"Ema Sullivan-Bissett, Paul Noordhof","doi":"10.1007/s12152-024-09553-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-024-09553-6","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Chenwei Nie ([22]) argues against a Maherian one-factor approach to explaining delusion. We argue that his objections fail. They are largely based on a mistaken understanding of the approach (as committed to the claim that anomalous experience is <i>sufficient</i> for delusion). Where they are not so based, they instead rest on misinterpretation of recent defences of the position, and an underestimation of the resources available to the one-factor theory.</p>","PeriodicalId":49255,"journal":{"name":"Neuroethics","volume":"95 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140602212","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Health Aspirations for Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation (tDCS)","authors":"","doi":"10.1007/s12152-024-09547-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-024-09547-4","url":null,"abstract":"<h3>Abstract</h3> <p>Advances in neuroscience have enabled the transition of transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) from research and clinical settings to public use. For this primarily home-based context, tDCS has been popularized as a do-it-yourself (DIY) approach to improved cognition and wellness. The line between wellness and health is blurry, however, and little is known about how engagement with therapeutic tDCS impacts users’ interactions with other interventions such as clinical consultations, pharmacotherapy, complementary medicine, and even other neurotechnology. To close this gap, we collected data from the online content aggregator Reddit and analyzed posts pertaining to tDCS. Findings indicate that most users turn to Reddit to request information about tDCS as an adjunct, but not as a bypass, to ongoing or prior approaches. Posts suggest that mainstream medical care is viewed as necessary but not sufficient to address conditions such as depression and anxiety. Users discuss a mix of benefits and harms. This discourse provides valuable insights into the health practices, concerns and priorities of users, and new knowledge for informing applications of neurotechnology both inside and outside the therapeutic setting.</p>","PeriodicalId":49255,"journal":{"name":"Neuroethics","volume":"32 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140324981","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Psychological Process Underlying Attitudes Toward Human-Animal Chimeric Brain Research: An Empirical Investigation","authors":"Tetsushi Tanibe, Takumi Watanabe, Mineki Oguchi, Kazuki Iijima, Koji Ota","doi":"10.1007/s12152-024-09552-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-024-09552-7","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study adopted an empirical method to investigate lay people’s attitudes toward the bioethical issues of human-animal chimeric brains. The results of online surveys showed that (1) people did not entirely reject chimeric brain research, but showed slightly more negative responses than ordinary animal testing; and that (2) their ethical concerns arose in connection with the perception that chimerism in the brain would humanize the animal. This means that people’s psychology was consistent with the ethical argument that crossing the human-animal boundary would bring moral confusion to our society. Meanwhile, it was not in line with another argument that moral status depended on having high capacities, and that chimerism would cause a problem if it enhanced animals’ capacities. Furthermore, this study analyzed additional psychological factors related to people’s moral judgment and the relationship among those factors. Several psychological factors, such as the perception that chimeric brain research is unnatural, were identified as mediating the relationship between perception of animal humanization and ethical concerns about creating and using chimeric brains. Introducing an empirical approach to the ethics of human-animal chimeric brains brought two findings: (1) this study informed us of socially shared intuition regarding this novel technology; and (2) it unveiled the psychological processes behind people’s ethical concerns in more detail than they spontaneously mentioned. These findings will help to build normative arguments and future policies that are understandable and acceptable to society.</p>","PeriodicalId":49255,"journal":{"name":"Neuroethics","volume":"16 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140324751","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Psychedelic Therapy as Form of Life","authors":"Nicolas Langlitz, Alex K. Gearin","doi":"10.1007/s12152-024-09550-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-024-09550-9","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In the historical context of a crisis in biological psychiatry, psychedelic drugs paired with psychotherapy are globally re-emerging in research clinics as a potential transdiagnostic therapy for treating mood disorders, addictions, and other forms of psychological distress. The treatments are poised to soon shift from clinical trials to widespread service delivery in places like Australia, North America, and Europe, which has prompted ethical questions by social scientists and bioethicists. Taking a broader view, we argue that the ethics of psychedelic therapy concerns not simply how psychotherapies are different when paired with psychedelic drugs, but how psychedelic therapies shape and are shaped by different values, norms, and metaphysical commitments. Drawing from the published literature and interviews with seven psychedelic therapists working in clinical trials in the United States, Germany, Switzerland, and Australia, this article opens the black box of the treatments to consider the values and informal debates currently animating the therapies. Considering questions of patient autonomy, mechanisms of therapeutic action, and which therapies are best suited to pair with psychedelic substances, we examine the ethics of psychedelic therapy as an emergent form of life. To bring this form of life out in fuller relief, we conclude by comparing and contrasting it with ayahuasca use in Amazonian shamanism.</p>","PeriodicalId":49255,"journal":{"name":"Neuroethics","volume":"98 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140156666","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Case Against Organoid Consciousness","authors":"James Croxford, Tim Bayne","doi":"10.1007/s12152-024-09548-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-024-09548-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Neural organoids are laboratory-generated entities that replicate certain structural and functional features of the human brain. Most neural organoids are disembodied—completely decoupled from sensory input and motor output. As such, questions about their potential capacity for consciousness are exceptionally difficult to answer. While not disputing the need for caution regarding certain neural organoid types, this paper appeals to two broad constraints on any adequate theory of consciousness—the first involving the dependence of consciousness on embodiment; the second involving the dependence of consciousness on representations—to argue that disembodied neural organoids are not plausible candidates for consciousness.</p>","PeriodicalId":49255,"journal":{"name":"Neuroethics","volume":"142 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2024-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140152118","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}