{"title":"The Ethics of Selective Mandatory Vaccination for COVID-19","authors":"B. Williams","doi":"10.1093/phe/phab028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/phe/phab028","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract With evidence of vaccine hesitancy in several jurisdictions, the option of making COVID-19 vaccination mandatory requires consideration. In this paper I argue that it would be ethical to make the COVID-19 vaccination mandatory for older people who are at highest risk of severe disease, but if this were to occur, and while there is limited knowledge of the disease and vaccines, there are not likely to be sufficient grounds to mandate vaccination for those at lower risk. Mandating vaccination for those at high risk of severe disease is justified on the basis of the harm principle, as there is evidence that this would remove the grave public health threat of COVID-19. The risk–benefit profile of vaccination is also more clearly in the interests of those at highest risk, so mandatory vaccination entails a less severe cost to them. Therefore, a selective mandate would create fairness in the distribution of risks. The level of coercion imposed by a mandate would need to be proportionate, and it is likely that multiple approaches will be needed to increase vaccine uptake. However, a selective mandate for COVID-19 vaccines is likely to be an ethical choice and should be considered by policy-makers.","PeriodicalId":49136,"journal":{"name":"Public Health Ethics","volume":"15 1","pages":"74 - 86"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46534500","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Public Health EthicsPub Date : 2021-10-29eCollection Date: 2021-11-01DOI: 10.1093/phe/phab026
David Shaw
{"title":"Noisy Autonomy: The Ethics of Audible and Silent Noise.","authors":"David Shaw","doi":"10.1093/phe/phab026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/phe/phab026","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In this paper, I summarize the medical evidence regarding the auditory and non-auditory effects of noise and analyse the ethics of noise and personal autonomy in the social environment using a variety of case studies. Key to this discussion is the fact that, contrary to the traditional definition of noise, sound can be noise without being annoying, as the evidence shows that some sounds can harm without being perceived. Ultimately, I develop a theory of 'noisy autonomy' with which to guide us in discussing the public health ethics of noise and other sounds.</p>","PeriodicalId":49136,"journal":{"name":"Public Health Ethics","volume":"14 3","pages":"288-297"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://ftp.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pub/pmc/oa_pdf/11/10/phab026.PMC8661078.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"39719273","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"We Should Not Use Randomization Procedures to Allocate Scarce Life-Saving Resources","authors":"Roberto Fumagalli","doi":"10.1093/phe/phab025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/phe/phab025","url":null,"abstract":"In the recent literature across philosophy, medicine and public health policy, many influential arguments have been put forward to support the use of randomization procedures (RAND) to allocate scarce life-saving resources (SLSR). In this paper, I provide a systematic categorization and a critical evaluation of these arguments. I shall argue that those arguments justify using RAND to allocate SLSR in fewer cases than their proponents maintain and that the relevant decision-makers should typically allocate SLSR directly to the individuals with the strongest claims to these resources rather than use RAND to allocate such resources.","PeriodicalId":49136,"journal":{"name":"Public Health Ethics","volume":"10 10","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138506809","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Beyond Surviving to Thriving: The Case for a ‘Compassion towards Thriving’ Approach in Public Mental Health Ethics","authors":"Phil Bielby","doi":"10.1093/phe/phab023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/phe/phab023","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In this article, I argue for a novel understanding of compassion—what I call a ‘compassion towards thriving’ approach—to inform public mental health ethics. The argument is developed through two main parts. In the first part, I develop an account of compassion towards thriving that builds upon Martha Nussbaum’s philosophical work on compassion. This account expands the ambit of compassion from a focus on the alleviation of existing suffering to the prevention of potential future suffering through the facilitation of personal growth based on a ‘psychosocial’ understanding of mental health. In the second part of the article, I discuss the aims of public mental health and examine compassion towards thriving’s normative synergies with existing approaches in public health ethics. I explain how compassion towards thriving supports a vision of public health ethics which is concerned with solidarity, social justice and flourishing. I then apply this compassion towards thriving approach to evaluate the ‘Every Mind Matters’ public mental health campaign in England, highlighting its affinities with the ethos of the campaign. I also identify and explain two ways in which the application of a compassion towards thriving approach could enhance its delivery.","PeriodicalId":49136,"journal":{"name":"Public Health Ethics","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41413104","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"‘Take the Pill, It Is Only Fair’! Contributory Fairness as an Answer to Rose’s Prevention Paradox","authors":"Jay A. Zameska","doi":"10.1093/phe/phab022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/phe/phab022","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 One proposal to significantly reduce cardiovascular disease is the idea of administering a ‘polypill’—a combination of drugs that reduce the risk of heart disease and carry few side effects—to everyone over the age of 55. Despite their promise, population strategies like the polypill have not been well-accepted. In this article, I defend the polypill (and consequently, other similar population strategies) by appealing to fairness. The argument focuses on the need to fairly distribute the costs to individuals. While the fact that population strategies like the polypill impose minor costs on everyone has primarily been used to criticize such strategies, I argue that it gives us a reason to support them. I argue that implementing a population strategy with the polypill contributes to the public good of ‘health system capacity’. I then explain that public goods have widely accepted obligations: they carry an obligation to fairly distribute the costs of the goods and prevent free-riding. Thus, we have at least one pro tanto moral reason to implement the polypill. As such, this article challenges the current literature on the topic, which has largely held adopting population strategies like the polypill to be unjustifiable.","PeriodicalId":49136,"journal":{"name":"Public Health Ethics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42393847","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Public Health EthicsPub Date : 2021-08-01eCollection Date: 2021-11-01DOI: 10.1093/phe/phab021
Bouke de Vries
{"title":"Autism and the Right to a Hypersensitivity-Friendly Workspace.","authors":"Bouke de Vries","doi":"10.1093/phe/phab021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/phe/phab021","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Many individuals on the autism spectrum are hypersensitive to certain sensory stimuli. For this group, as well as for non-autistic individuals with sensory processing disorders, being exposed to e.g. fluorescent lights, perfume odours, and various sounds and noises can be real torment. In this article, I consider the normative implications of such offence for the design of office spaces, which is a topic that has not received any attention from philosophers. After identifying different ways in which the senses of hypersensitive workers might be protected within these spaces, I show that many of such accommodations can be made at reasonable cost, before arguing that doing so ought to be a legal requirement.</p>","PeriodicalId":49136,"journal":{"name":"Public Health Ethics","volume":"14 3","pages":"281-287"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8661075/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"39719272","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Public Health EthicsPub Date : 2021-07-19eCollection Date: 2021-11-01DOI: 10.1093/phe/phab018
Alberto Giubilini, Francesca Minerva, Udo Schuklenk, Julian Savulescu
{"title":"The 'Ethical' COVID-19 Vaccine is the One that Preserves Lives: Religious and Moral Beliefs on the COVID-19 Vaccine.","authors":"Alberto Giubilini, Francesca Minerva, Udo Schuklenk, Julian Savulescu","doi":"10.1093/phe/phab018","DOIUrl":"10.1093/phe/phab018","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Although the COVID-19 pandemic is a serious public health and economic emergency, and although effective vaccines are the best weapon we have against it, there are groups and individuals who oppose certain kinds of vaccines because of personal moral or religious reasons. The most widely discussed case has been that of certain religious groups that oppose research on COVID-19 vaccines that use cell lines linked to abortions and that object to receiving those vaccine because of their moral opposition to abortion. However, moral opposition to COVID-19 vaccine research can be based on other considerations, both secular and religious. We argue that religious or personal moral objections to vaccine research are unethical and irresponsible, and in an important sense often irrational. They are unethical because of the risk of causing serious harm to other people for no valid reason; irresponsible because they run counter to individual and collective responsibilities to contribute to important public health goals; and in the case of certain kinds of religious opposition, they might be irrational because they are internally inconsistent. All in all, our argument translates into the rather uncontroversial claim that we should prioritize people's lives over religious freedom in vaccine research and vaccination roll out.</p>","PeriodicalId":49136,"journal":{"name":"Public Health Ethics","volume":"14 3","pages":"242-255"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2021-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8344725/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"39719270","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Against the Medicalization of Public Health (Ethics)","authors":"D. Goldberg","doi":"10.1093/phe/phab024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/phe/phab024","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":49136,"journal":{"name":"Public Health Ethics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42289374","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}