{"title":"Unexpected quantum indeterminacy","authors":"Andrea Oldofredi","doi":"10.1007/s13194-024-00574-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00574-9","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Recent philosophical discussions about metaphysical indeterminacy have been substantiated with the idea that quantum mechanics, one of the most successful physical theories in the history of science, provides explicit instances of worldly indefiniteness. Against this background, several philosophers underline that there are alternative formulations of quantum theory in which such indeterminacy has no room and plays no role. A typical example is Bohmian mechanics in virtue of its clear particle ontology. Contrary to these latter claims, this paper aims at showing that different pilot-wave theories do in fact instantiate diverse forms of metaphysical indeterminacy. Namely, I argue that there are various questions about worldly states of affairs that cannot be determined by looking exclusively at their ontologies and dynamical laws. Moreover, it will be claimed that Bohmian mechanics generates a new form of <i>modal</i> indeterminacy. Finally, it will be concluded that ontological clarity and indeterminacy are not mutually exclusive, i.e., the two can coexist in the same theory.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"50 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140097091","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Contrast classes and agreement in climate modeling","authors":"Corey Dethier","doi":"10.1007/s13194-024-00577-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00577-6","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In an influential paper, Wendy Parker argues that agreement across climate models isn’t a reliable marker of confirmation in the context of cutting-edge climate science. In this paper, I argue that while Parker’s conclusion is generally correct, there is an important class of exceptions. Broadly speaking, agreement is not a reliable marker of confirmation when the hypotheses under consideration are mutually consistent—when, e.g., we’re concerned with overlapping ranges. Since many cutting-edge questions in climate modeling require making distinctions between mutually consistent hypotheses, agreement across models will be generally unreliable in this domain. In cases where we are only concerned with mutually exclusive hypotheses, by contrast, agreement across climate models is plausibly a reliable marker of confirmation.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"81 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140053616","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The epistemic status of reproducibility in political fact-checking","authors":"Alejandro Fernández-Roldan, David Teira","doi":"10.1007/s13194-024-00575-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00575-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Fact-checking agencies assess and score the truthfulness of politicians’ claims to foster their electoral accountability. Fact-checking is sometimes presented as a quasi-scientific activity, based on reproducible verification protocols that would guarantee an unbiased assessment. We will study these verification protocols and discuss under which conditions fact-checking could achieve effective reproducibility. Through an analysis of the methodological norms in verification protocols, we will argue that achieving reproducible fact-checking may not help much in rendering politicians accountable. Political fact-checkers do not deliver either reproducibility or accountability today, and there are reasons to think that traditional quality journalism may serve liberal democracies better.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"97 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139938916","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jaana Eigi-Watkin, Katrin Velbaum, Edit Talpsepp, Endla Lõhkivi
{"title":"How interdisciplinary researchers see themselves: plurality of understandings of interdisciplinarity within a field and why it matters","authors":"Jaana Eigi-Watkin, Katrin Velbaum, Edit Talpsepp, Endla Lõhkivi","doi":"10.1007/s13194-024-00572-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00572-x","url":null,"abstract":"<p>It is widely acknowledged that interdisciplinarity (ID) is very diverse. Our contribution is a demonstration that considerable diversity exists also on the level of understandings of ID that researchers working in the same ID field express. Specifically, we analyse qualitatively, building on the method of culture contrast, six interviews with researchers working in computational linguistics and language technology in Estonia. We identify six understandings of ID expressed by the interviewees: centred on an ID method; a disciplinary method in an ID field; an ID way of seeing and thinking; ID education; ID interests; one’s field as naturally ID. We show how understandings of ID are significant for analysing research practice, since they are involved in how researchers form a positive picture of themselves and their colleagues. We also show how an awareness of different understandings of ID is useful for discussing the significance of integration in ID.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"2014 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139938904","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Physicists’ views on scientific realism","authors":"Céline Henne, Hannah Tomczyk, Christoph Sperber","doi":"10.1007/s13194-024-00570-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00570-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Do physicists believe that general relativity is <i>true</i>, and that electrons and phonons <i>exist</i>, and if so, in what sense? To what extent does the spectrum of positions among physicists correspond to philosophical positions like scientific realism, instrumentalism, or perspectivism? Does agreement with these positions correlate with demographic factors, and are realist physicists more likely to support research projects purely aimed at increasing knowledge? We conducted a questionnaire study to scrutinize the philosophical stances of physicists. We received responses from 384 physicists and 151 philosophers. Our main findings are (1) On average, physicists tend toward scientific realism, and slightly more so than philosophers of science. (2) Physicists can be clustered into five groups. Three show variants of scientific realism, one is instrumentalist, and one seems undecided or incoherent. (3) Agreement with realism weakly correlates with approval of building a bigger particle collider. (4) Agreement with realism weakly correlates with the seniority of physicists. (5) We did not find correlations with other factors, such as whether physicists focus on theoretical or experimental research and whether they engage with applied or basic research.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139917181","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Quantum ontology without textbooks. Nor overlapping","authors":"Cristian Lopez","doi":"10.1007/s13194-024-00573-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00573-w","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper, I critically assess two recent proposals for an interpretation-independent understanding of non-relativistic quantum mechanics: the overlap strategy (Fraser & Vickers, 2022) and the textbook account (Egg, 2021). My argument has three steps. I first argue that they presume a Quinean-Carnapian meta-ontological framework that yields flat, structureless ontologies. Second, such ontologies are unable to solve the problems that quantum ontologists want to solve. Finally, only structured ontologies are capable of solving the problems that quantum ontologists want to solve. But they require some dose of speculation. In the end, I defend the conservative way to do quantum ontology, which is (and must be) speculative and non-neutral.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139917295","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Adding causality to the information-theoretic perspective on individuality","authors":"Pierrick Bourrat","doi":"10.1007/s13194-023-00566-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-023-00566-1","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I extend work from Krakauer et al. (2020), who propose a conception of individuality as the capacity to propagate information through time. From this conception, they develop information-theoretic measures. I identify several shortcomings with these measures—in particular, that they are associative rather than causal. I rectify this shortcoming by deriving a causal information-theoretic measure of individuality. I then illustrate how this measure can be implemented and extended in the context of evolutionary transitions in individuality.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139745406","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Reactivity in the human sciences","authors":"Caterina Marchionni, Julie Zahle, Marion Godman","doi":"10.1007/s13194-024-00571-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00571-y","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The reactions that science triggers on the people it studies, describes, or theorises about, can affect the science itself and its claims to knowledge. This phenomenon, which we call <i>reactivity</i>, has been discussed in many different areas of the social sciences and the philosophy of science, falling under different rubrics such as the Hawthorne effect, self-fulfilling prophecies, the looping effects of human kinds, the performativity of models, observer effects, experimenter effects and experimenter demand effects. In this paper we review state-of-the-art research that falls under the remit of the philosophy of reactivity by considering ontological, epistemic and moral issues that reactivity raises. Along the way, we devote special attention to articles belonging to this journal's Topical Collection entitled “Reactivity in the Human Sciences”.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"185 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139750399","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Science and values: a two-way direction","authors":"Emanuele Ratti, Federica Russo","doi":"10.1007/s13194-024-00567-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00567-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In the science and values literature, scholars have shown how science is influenced and shaped by values, often in opposition to the ‘value free’ ideal of science. In this paper, we aim to contribute to the science and values literature by showing that the relation between science and values flows not only from values into scientific practice, but also from (allegedly neutral) science to values themselves. The extant literature in the ‘science and values’ field focuses by and large on reconstructing, post hoc, how values have influenced science; our reconstruction of the case studies, instead, aims to show that scientific concepts and methods <i>too, because of specific identifiable characteristics,</i> can promote some values rather than (or at the expense of) others. We explain this bidirectional relation in analogy to debates on the normativity of technical artifacts and on feminist approaches in science, and we illustrate our claims with cases from the health sciences and machine learning. While our arguments in this paper also draw on post hoc reconstructions, we intend to show where, in the science in the making, we should engage not only with the question whether a practice is value-laden, but also how specific conceptual and methodological choices can influence values down the road. All in all, these considerations expand the ways in which philosophers can contribute to more value-aware scientific practices.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"80 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139695961","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ethnobiological kinds and material grounding: comments on Ludwig","authors":"Thomas A. C. Reydon, Marc Ereshefsky","doi":"10.1007/s13194-024-00568-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00568-7","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In a recent article, David Ludwig proposed to reorient the debate on natural kinds away from inquiring into the naturalness of kinds and toward elucidating the materiality of kinds. This article responds to Ludwig’s critique of a recently proposed account of kinds and classification, the Grounded Functionality Account, against which Ludwig offsets his own account, and criticizes Ludwig’s proposal to shift focus from naturalness to materiality in the philosophy of kinds and classification.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139695945","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}