European Journal for Philosophy of Science最新文献

{"title":"The pursuitworthiness of experiments","authors":"Enno Fischer","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00711-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00711-y","url":null,"abstract":"When scientists decide to perform an experiment, they expect that their efforts will bear fruit. While assessing such expectations belongs to the everyday work of practicing scientists, we have a limited understanding of the epistemological principles underlying such assessments. Here I argue that we should delineate a “context of pursuit” for experiments. The rational pursuit of experiments, like the pursuit of theories, is governed by distinct epistemic and pragmatic considerations that concern epistemic gain, likelihood of success, and feasibility. I argue that, beyond the theoretically motivated research questions an experiment aims to address, we must also assess the concrete experimental facilities and activities involved, because (1) there are often multiple ways to address a research question, (2) an experiment may be particularly pursuitworthy because it addresses a combination of research questions, and (3) experimental facilities may give rise to research questions in the first place. In this sense experimental pursuitworthiness has a ‘life of its own.’ My claims are supported by a look into ongoing debates about future particle colliders.","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"60 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145972543","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Ad hominem arguments in scientific discourses – rational heuristic or dangerous immunisation strategy?","authors":"Leon-Philip Schäfer","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00707-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00707-8","url":null,"abstract":"Ad hominem arguments have, in terms of their relevance for scientific discourses, a peculiar status that seems to be surprisingly unfathomed in modern philosophy of science. The main aim of the current paper is to shed some light on this latent blind spot and to familiarise philosophers of science with some of the recent discussions that this topic has launched in argumentation theory. In particular, I would like to examine whether ad hominem arguments are to be regarded as epistemically detrimental and should be kept out of scientific discussions altogether or whether we should embrace a more nuanced evaluation that allows for the view that such arguments can be legitimate sometimes. While the modern literature in argumentation theory tends to support a remarkably permissive assessment of ad hominem arguments, the paper advocates for a more cautious conclusion: it shows that ad hominem arguments have the potential to damage or even outright destroy the basis of rational discussions, by substituting the factual criticism of theories with the personal denunciation of their creators. Because of this, a careless rehabilitation of such arguments is not recommended.","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145947251","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The evidential role of economic models in legal proceedings.","authors":"Edoardo Peruzzi","doi":"10.1007/s13194-026-00783-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-026-00783-4","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Scientific models are increasingly used as sources of evidence in legal proceedings, particularly in competition cases, in which economic experts apply theoretical and empirical models to provide quantitative insights into the competitive dynamics of specific markets. Despite being routinely presented in courts, however, model-based evidence often has limited influence on judicial outcomes, undermining its intended role in the courtroom. This paper illustrates this phenomenon and then argues that the dismissal of model-based evidence in court is largely driven by what I call models' large \"attack surface\", which makes model-based evidence particularly vulnerable to challenge in adversarial proceedings. I then show that such dismissal is not without consequences. When model-based evidence is excluded, it is typically replaced by market concentration indices, which are more accessible forms of evidence but also less closely related to the target phenomenon. I conclude by arguing that it is epistemically problematic when courts systematically privilege simpler but less target-relevant sources of evidence.</p><p><strong>Supplementary information: </strong>The online version contains supplementary material available at https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-026-00783-4.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"16 4","pages":"86"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC13658358/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149184414","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Aesthetic sustainability: relational understanding in conservation research environments.","authors":"Luana Poliseli","doi":"10.1007/s13194-026-00747-8","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s13194-026-00747-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Aesthetic experiences are slowly but increasingly gaining attention in the contemporary philosophy of science. However, they remain peripheral in debates about research environments dealing with complex socio-environmental problems. Through a socially engaged and empirically oriented approach, I examine the aesthetic experiences in achievements of understanding in two research environments from the sustainability sciences: the <i>ClimArtLab Evolving Futures Owing Our Mess</i> and the <i>Council of Care</i>. I further the debate by presenting a relational account of aesthetics in scientific understanding, where understanding is a triadic engagement between subject, object and environment mediated by aesthetic experiences.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"16 2","pages":"48"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC13236775/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148200825","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"What kind of relationality does quantum mechanics exhibit?","authors":"Emily Adlam","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00709-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00709-6","url":null,"abstract":"In this article I elaborate on the approach to relational quantum mechanics suggested by Adlam and Rovelli (2023). I suggest that this approach fills an important gap in the spectrum of relational approaches, because it posits that the relational aspects of quantum mechanics are both inherent and dynamical. I compare this approach to Orthodox RQM, arguing that it has a number of advantages, and I show how some possible objections can be resolved.","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"94 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"147642089","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The pursuitworthiness of team science collaborations in translational neuroscience.","authors":"Jacqueline A Sullivan, Saher Panjwani","doi":"10.1007/s13194-026-00782-5","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s13194-026-00782-5","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Neuroscientists investigating the neural bases of cognition in health and disease increasingly face choices about how to structure their programs of research. On the one hand, they can pursue independent investigator-led disciplinary specific research projects and seek funding through traditional granting mechanisms. On the other, they can experiment with interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary collaborations of varying scale and scope, applying for funding for multi-year milestone driven projects. Although team-based initiatives have become a prominent feature of the neuroscientific research landscape in recent years, relatively little is known about how scientists evaluate whether participation in them is worth pursuing. In this paper, we present findings from semi-structured interviews with 10 neuroscientists participating in the <i>TRanslational Initiative to De-Risk NeuroTherapeutics</i> (<i>TRIDENT</i>) that bear on this question. Drawing on Laudan's distinction between the contexts of acceptance and pursuit and conceptual tools from decision theory to frame the empirical findings, we argue that scientists' assessments of the pursuitworthiness of interdisciplinary collaboration are shaped not only by expectations about the epistemic benefits that such collaborations may potentially afford, but also by forms of experiential knowledge acquired through prior collaborative experiences. Three key themes emerge from the interviews. First, scientists explore team-based approaches to achieve emergent epistemic benefits that they do not regard as attainable through independent investigator-led disciplinary research. Second, positive and negative experiences occurring in the contexts of these explorations generate forms of experiential knowledge about the costs of interdisciplinary collaboration and the interpersonal dynamics that can facilitate and hinder its success. Third, scientists subsequently leverage this experiential knowledge to determine which future collaborations are worthy of pursuit. We conclude by situating our findings within the relevant philosophical literature on interdisciplinary collaboration, acknowledging the limitations of our study, and identifying some future directions for research.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"16 4","pages":"76"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC13601157/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149041651","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The uneasy triangle: scientific realism, naturalism and empiricism on scientific change","authors":"Thodoris Dimitrakos","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00706-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00706-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-12-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145847406","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Correction to: Scientific progress and modern cosmology","authors":"Patrick M. Duerr, Finnur Dellsén","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00712-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00712-x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145770645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Expert trustworthiness and the value-free ideal of science","authors":"Kristina Rolin","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00704-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00704-x","url":null,"abstract":"I examine critically a received view of expert trustworthiness and the value-free ideal of science. According to this view, to be epistemically trustworthy in the eyes of citizens, scientific experts should aim to be as neutral as possible with respect to moral and social values when they provide research-based knowledge and advice to different publics. This view is thought to be feasible and desirable for both epistemic and moral/political reasons. I challenge this view by arguing against three recent attempts to defend the legacy of the value-free ideal of science. An analysis of epistemic trustworthiness helps philosophers understand why moral and social values should guide scientific experts’ knowledge-sharing activities. It also helps understand which moral and social values are needed to build and maintain expert trustworthiness. However, it does not amount to a full-service account of the proper roles of non-epistemic values in science. The analysis offers merely a partial approach to the value management question.","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"162 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145753233","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Performative power in science","authors":"Philippe van Basshuysen","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00705-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00705-w","url":null,"abstract":"Performativity is the capacity of scientific representations (such as models, theories, predictions, or classifications) to alter the phenomena they are supposed to represent. Because one and the same representation may alter its target a lot, a little, or not at all, I argue that we should conceptualize performativity as a function of a representation and its <jats:italic>performative power</jats:italic> , which depends on its reach, acceptance, and its relevance to people. Using this framework, I then argue for a re-evaluation of performativity. Because performative effects can impair scientists’ ability to model, classify, explain, or predict (e.g. by steering outcomes away from those predicted) and they raise concerns about the legitimacy of science influencing the social world, performativity is often viewed as a threat to science. In contrast, I argue that we shouldn’t be worried about performativity as such, but rather, about <jats:italic>concentrated performative power</jats:italic> , that is, that the representations issued by individual scientists, or groups of scientists with uniform views, gain a power that is not in line with their epistemic credentials. To eradicate such power concentrations and to secure science’s proper role in a democratic society, we may sometimes hope for more, rather than fewer, performative effects.","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"144 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145718185","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}