European Journal for Philosophy of Science最新文献

Correction to: Scientific understanding and the controversy over adaptationism in evolutionary biology 修正：进化生物学中对适应主义的科学理解和争议

IF 1.5 1区哲学

European Journal for Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2026-10-19 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-026-00797-y

Ludo L. J. Schoenmakers

引用次数: 0

The limits of critical thinking: climate skepticism, epistemic trespassing, and the understanding that grounds trust 批判性思维的局限：气候怀疑论、认知越界和基于信任的理解

IF 1.5 1区哲学

European Journal for Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2026-10-15 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-026-00796-z

Tadej Todorović,Janez Bregant

{"title":"The limits of critical thinking: climate skepticism, epistemic trespassing, and the understanding that grounds trust","authors":"Tadej Todorović,Janez Bregant","doi":"10.1007/s13194-026-00796-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-026-00796-z","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract What should the public understand about climate change to form true beliefs and responsibly participate in democratic deliberation? We argue for a partly negative and partly positive answer. Negatively, the public does not need to understand the climate or first-order evidence in climate science: endeavors that pursue such first-order competence, such as mainstream critical thinking (CT) and logic-based inoculation strategies task non-experts with a demand they cannot reliably perform. We demonstrate this by applying such inoculation procedures to a sophisticated and credentialed argument against climate change, and show that encouraging non-experts to evaluate the first-order premises and scientific claims leads to epistemic trespassing. Positively, we argue that what the public actually needs for responsible participation in the climate debate is a more modest and attainable understanding of the social epistemology of science – understanding how the scientific consensus is formed and why the process is more reliable than the alternatives. This kind of understanding transforms blind reliance into rationally warranted trust. In doing so, we distinguish the process of higher-order critical assessment, the understanding it gives, and the calibrated deference it licenses, and we locate higher-order evidence on the side of warranted trust rather than first-order understanding. The result is an epistemically responsible framework for public engagement with climate science that redirects, rather than abandons, critical thinking.","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"73 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149210825","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Putnam on mathematics and ontological commitment 论数学与本体论承诺

IF 1.5 1区哲学

European Journal for Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2026-10-10 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-026-00794-1

Alex LeBrun

引用次数: 0

Biological possibility: a mechanistic account 生物学上的可能性：一个机械的解释

IF 1.5 1区哲学

European Journal for Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2026-10-10 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-026-00790-5

Ziren Yang, Jiyuan Li

引用次数: 0

Flat-footed functionalism in the face of T-duality 面对t-二元性的扁平功能主义

IF 1.5 1区哲学

European Journal for Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2026-10-10 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-026-00787-0

Christian Airikka

引用次数: 0

Unconceived alternatives, scientific instrumentalism, and the methodology of pragmatist philosophy of science 非设想的替代、科学工具主义和实用主义科学哲学的方法论

IF 1.5 1区哲学

European Journal for Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2026-10-09 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-026-00785-2

Chris Mitsch

引用次数: 0

Losing the goal, finding the way: a dilemma for realist naturalistic metaphysics 失去目标，找到道路：现实主义自然主义形而上学的困境

IF 1.5 1区哲学

European Journal for Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2026-10-09 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-026-00789-y

Raoni Arroyo, Jonas R. Becker Arenhart

引用次数: 0

The causal grounds of really statistical explanations 真正的统计解释的因果基础

IF 1.5 1区哲学

European Journal for Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2026-10-08 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-026-00791-4

Stefan Roski

{"title":"The causal grounds of really statistical explanations","authors":"Stefan Roski","doi":"10.1007/s13194-026-00791-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-026-00791-4","url":null,"abstract":"A number of philosophers have argued that purely statistical theorems can non-causally explain empirical matters of fact. Marc Lange has coined the term Really Statistical Explanations (short: RS explanations) for such explanations. A toy example would be an explanation of the average value of a fair die after a large number of throws in terms of the purely statistical law of large numbers. More substantial examples include certain explanations of trait-fitness distributions, and explanations of the average number of particles emitted from a radioactive source. This paper takes issue with the view that RS explanations are non-causal. More specifically, it argues that Lange’s attempts at elucidating what makes such explanations non-causal are unsuccessful. Lange agrees that RS explanations supply information about causes. Yet, he argues, they are not causal, since they do not derive their explanatory power from supplying information about causes. I discuss several readings of this claim, and argue that none of them establishes Lange’s intended conclusion. Finally, I discuss a recent argument by Lange that tries to show that a causal construal of RS explanations cannot do justice to their unifying power, and argue that it is inconclusive.","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"52 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149130468","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Inferring unobservable relations by analogy 通过类比推断不可观察的关系

IF 1.5 1区哲学

European Journal for Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2026-09-30 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-026-00776-3

Benjamin Santos Genta

引用次数: 0

Nudges alter choice sets 轻推改变选择集

IF 1.5 1区哲学

European Journal for Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2026-09-30 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-026-00784-3

Polaris Koi

{"title":"Nudges alter choice sets","authors":"Polaris Koi","doi":"10.1007/s13194-026-00784-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-026-00784-3","url":null,"abstract":"According to a widespread view, nudges are freedom-retaining in virtue of <italic>choice set non-interference</italic>: they help agents make better choices without altering the sets of options agents choose amongst. The present paper argues that this view is false and that nudges in fact do both add and remove options from agents’ choice sets. Two distinct lines of argument support this case. The primary argument appeals to the role of attention and salience in shaping agents’ choice sets in rich environments. The secondary argument analyses options as bundles of behavioural outputs and relevant considerations, where nudges alter these bundles. I argue that the received concept of nudge as something that does not alter choice sets and is based on behavioural science is inconsistent: choice set non-interference can only be endorsed if the role of salience in shaping choice sets, a crucial aspect of human bounded rationality, is ignored. Choice set non-interference, a foundational assumption in the nudge literature, ought therefore to be abandoned. This is a far-reaching implication: a central premise of the nudge programme fails, and its broader justification must be rebuilt accordingly. The conclusion generalizes beyond nudges to behavioral policy more broadly. While appreciating that choice sets are shaped by nudges does not require us to consider them as freedom-undermining, it does require proponents of nudges to abandon choice set non-interference for a more nuanced account of the relevant sense of freedom, and to revise their arguments for nudges accordingly.","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2026-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"149093450","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0