{"title":"Underdetermination in classic and modern tests of general relativity","authors":"William J. Wolf, Marco Sanchioni, James Read","doi":"10.1007/s13194-024-00617-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00617-1","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Canonically, ‘classic’ tests of general relativity (GR) include perihelion precession, the bending of light around stars, and gravitational redshift; ‘modern’ tests have to do with, <i>inter alia</i>, relativistic time delay, equivalence principle tests, gravitational lensing, strong field gravity, and gravitational waves. The orthodoxy is that both classic and modern tests of GR afford experimental confirmation of that theory <i>in particular</i>. In this article, we question this orthodoxy, by showing there are classes of both relativistic theories (with spatiotemporal geometrical properties different from those of GR) and non-relativistic theories (in which the lightcones of a relativistic spacetime are ‘widened’) which would also pass such tests. Thus, (a) issues of underdetermination in the context of GR loom much larger than one might have thought, and (b) given this, one has to think more carefully about what exactly such tests in fact <i>are</i> testing.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"79 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142487794","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"What is it like to be unitarily reversed?","authors":"Peter W. Evans","doi":"10.1007/s13194-024-00613-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00613-5","url":null,"abstract":"<p>There has been in recent years a huge surge of interest in the so-called extended Wigner’s friend scenario (EWFS). In short, a series of theorems (with some variation in detail) puts pressure on the ability of different agents in the scenario to account for each of the others’ measured outcomes: the outcomes cannot be assigned single well-defined values while also satisfying other reasonable physical assumptions. These theorems have been interpreted as showing that there can be no absolute, third-person, ‘God’s eye’ description of our reality. The focus of this paper is the strongest of these no-go theorems, the ‘local friendliness’ theorem of Bong et al. (2020, <i>Nature Physics</i>, <i>16</i>, 1199–1205), which gives earnest consideration to the possibility of a measurement that unitarily reverses an entire lab system, including a conscious agent, thereby erasing the agent’s memory. The purpose of this paper is to begin the philosophical conversation regarding key questions concerning this process: Are the events in the lab merely ‘erased’, or do they in some sense not exist at all? What would it be like to be unitarily reversed? Should an agent care about any experiences they have inside the lab before they are reversed? This analysis employs a parallel case of memory erasure, to which this case can be contrasted, arising in the context of drug-induced amnesia as a result of administering anaesthesia during medical procedures (Carbonell, 2014, <i>Bioethics</i>, <i>28</i>(5), 245–254). I argue that the consequences of unitarily reversing an agent are much more dramatic than simply memory erasure—the set of events themselves, and the personal timeline of the agent, leave no record at all inside or outside the lab. I consider the ramifications of this for the picture of reality that arises from the EWFS.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142444507","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Research labs as distributed cognitive-cultural systems","authors":"Nancy J. Nersessian","doi":"10.1007/s13194-024-00618-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00618-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Scientists, either working alone or in groups, require rich cognitive, social, cultural, and material environments to accomplish their epistemic aims. There is research in the cognitive sciences that examines intelligent behavior as a function of the environment (“environmental perspectives”), which can be used to examine how scientists integrate “cognitive-cultural” resources as they create environments for problem-solving. In this paper, I advance the position that an expanded framework of distributed cognition can provide conceptual, analytical, and methodological tools to investigate how scientists enhance natural cognitive capacities by creating specific kinds of environments to address their epistemic goals. In a case study of a pioneering neuroengineering lab seeking to understand learning in living networks of neurons, I examine how the researchers integrated conceptual, methodological, and material resources from engineering, neuroscience, and computational science to create different kinds of distributed problem-solving environments that enhanced their natural cognitive capacities, for instance, for reasoning, visualization, abstraction, imagination, and memory, to attain their epistemic aims.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"231 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142444506","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Separability and fundamentality","authors":"Claudio Calosi","doi":"10.1007/s13194-024-00612-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00612-6","url":null,"abstract":"<p>According to High-Dimensional Wavefunction Fundamentalism (HDWF) the wavefunction field evolving in configuration space is all that exists fundamentally. The main argument in favor of HDWF is an argument from separability and locality: separability is a desirable feature of a fundamental metaphysics and HDWF is indeed such a separable metaphysics. Separability in turn is desirable because it is simple and intuitive. Tim Maudlin has recently argued that intuitiveness and simplicity cannot motivate separability. In particular, our intuitions stem from our interactions with the three-dimensional world which is non-separable. Therefore, he concludes, there is <i>nothing else</i> HDWF theorists can appeal to motivate separability. I call this Maudlin’s challenge. The present paper addresses Maudlin’s challenge by showing how the facts that some plurality of entities are separable entail that its constituents are fundamental, for well-motivated notions of fundamentality.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"88 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142431308","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ravens and Strawberries: Remarks on Hempel’s and Ramsey’s Accounts of laws and scientific explanation","authors":"Caterina Sisti","doi":"10.1007/s13194-024-00605-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00605-5","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Hempel never met Ramsey, but he knew his work. In his 1958 <i>The Theoretician’s Dilemma: a study in the logic of theory construction</i>, Hempel introduces the term <i>Ramsey sentence</i>, referring to Ramsey’s attempt in <i>Theories</i> to get rid of theoretical terms in formal accounts of scientific theories. In this paper, I draw the attention to another connection between Ramsey’s and Hempel’s works. Hempel’s Deductive-Nomological (DN) account of scientific explanation resembles very closely Ramsey’s account of a certain type of conditional sentences. In the first part of the paper, by introducing a fictional story, I highlight the similarities and differences between the two. In the last part of the paper, I claim that the most relevant difference between Ramsey and Hempel can be used to offer original solutions to Hempel’s Raven Paradox. Two possibilities are presented, arguing that the second, which requires a reconsideration of the formalisation of laws, is the most promising.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"29 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142404967","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Values in science: what are values, anyway?","authors":"Kevin C. Elliott, Rebecca Korf","doi":"10.1007/s13194-024-00615-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00615-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Although the philosophical literature on science and values has flourished in recent years, the central concept of “values” has remained ambiguous. This paper endeavors to clarify the nature of values as they are discussed in this literature and then highlights some of the major implications of this clarification. First, it elucidates four major concepts of values and discusses some of their strengths and weaknesses. Second, it clarifies the relationships between these concepts of values and a wide variety of related concepts that are sometimes used interchangeably in the philosophical literature. Third, it argues that this conceptual clarification reveals that much of the literature on science and values has discussed different concepts of values without making these differences clear. The paper illustrates this point by analyzing the different concepts of values at play in different arguments against the value-free ideal and in proposals for managing values. Understanding the literature on values in science as a patchwork of related discourses rather than a single discourse can help researchers more thoughtfully choose a concept of values that best fits their philosophical targets and goals, rather than conflating different discourses because of the common terminology of “values.”</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"59 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142404968","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"GPS observables in Newtonian spacetime or why we do not need ‘physical’ coordinate systems","authors":"Álvaro Mozota Frauca","doi":"10.1007/s13194-024-00611-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00611-7","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Some authors have defended the claim that one needs to be able to define ‘physical coordinate systems’ and ‘observables’ in order to make sense of general relativity. Moreover, in Rovelli (<i>Physical Review D,</i> <i>65</i>(4), 044017 2002), Rovelli proposes a way of implementing these ideas by making use of a system of satellites that allows defining a set of ‘physical coordinates’, the GPS coordinates. In this article I oppose these views in four ways. First, I defend an alternative way of understanding general relativity which implies that we have a perfectly fine interpretation of the models of the theory even in the absence of ‘physical coordinate systems’. Second, I analyze and challenge the motivations behind the ‘observable’ view. Third, I analyze Rovelli’s proposal and I conclude that it does not allow extracting any physical information from our models that wasn’t available before. Fourth, I draw an analogy between general relativistic spacetimes and Newtonian spacetimes, which allows me to argue that as ‘physical observables’ are not needed in Newtonian spacetime, then neither are they in general relativity. In this sense, I conclude that the ‘observable’ view of general relativity is unmotivated.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"123 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142405054","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Explaining AI through mechanistic interpretability","authors":"Lena Kästner, Barnaby Crook","doi":"10.1007/s13194-024-00614-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00614-4","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Recent work in explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) attempts to render opaque AI systems understandable through a divide-and-conquer strategy. However, this fails to illuminate <i>how trained AI systems work as a whole</i>. Precisely this kind of functional understanding is needed, though, to satisfy important societal desiderata such as safety. To remedy this situation, we argue, AI researchers should seek <i>mechanistic interpretability</i>, viz. apply coordinated discovery strategies familiar from the life sciences to uncover the functional organisation of complex AI systems. Additionally, theorists should accommodate for the unique costs and benefits of such strategies in their portrayals of XAI research.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142405031","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Feynman diagrams: visualization of phenomena and diagrammatic representation","authors":"Marco Forgione","doi":"10.1007/s13194-024-00609-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00609-1","url":null,"abstract":"<p>I will argue that the development of Feynman diagrams came from the physicist’s capacity of visualizing phenomena and that such visualization-skill contributed to the forming of a narrative explanation in the sense of Wise (2011) and Morgan (2001). The second part of the paper explores the extent to which Feynman diagrams can be considered as weak representations of quantum phenomena. I will review some of the most common arguments in support of the instrumentalist view and I will suggest that a form of weak representation that does not imply ontological commitment can be applied to the diagrams. Such a form of weak representation will be characterized as non-denotative, intentional, and as conveying a physical interpretation through narrative explanations.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142384375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Defending the quantum reconstruction program","authors":"Philipp Berghofer","doi":"10.1007/s13194-024-00608-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00608-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The program of reconstructing quantum theory based on information-theoretic principles enjoys much popularity in the foundations of physics. Surprisingly, this endeavor has only received very little attention in philosophy. Here I argue that this should change. This is because, on the one hand, reconstructions can help us to better understand quantum mechanics, and, on the other hand, reconstructions are themselves in need of interpretation. My overall objective, thus, is to motivate the reconstruction program and to show why philosophers should care. My specific aims are threefold. (i) Clarify the relationship between reconstructing and interpreting quantum mechanics, (ii) show how the informational reconstruction of quantum theory puts pressure on standard realist interpretations, (iii) defend the quantum reconstruction program against possible objections.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"32 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142231511","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}