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European Journal for Philosophy of Science最新文献

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Intervention and experiment 干预和实验
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
European Journal for Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2025-03-13 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-025-00647-3
Irina Mikhalevich
{"title":"Intervention and experiment","authors":"Irina Mikhalevich","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00647-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00647-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The received view of scientific experimentation holds that science is characterized by experiment and experiment is characterized by active intervention on the system of interest. Although versions of this view are widely held, they have seldom been explicitly defended. The present essay reconstructs and defuses two arguments in defense of the received view: first, that intervention is necessary for uncovering causal structures, and second, that intervention conduces to better evidence. By examining a range of non-interventionist studies from across the sciences, I conclude that interventionist experiments are not, <i>ceteris paribus,</i> epistemically superior to non-interventionist studies and that the latter may thus be classified as experiment proper. My analysis explains why intervention remains valuable while at the same time elevating the status of some non-interventionist studies to that of experiment proper<i>.</i></p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"32 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143608042","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Explanatory essentialism and cryptic species
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
European Journal for Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2025-03-12 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-025-00643-7
Milenko Lasnibat
{"title":"Explanatory essentialism and cryptic species","authors":"Milenko Lasnibat","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00643-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00643-7","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Explanatory Essentialism (EE) is the view that a property is the essence of a kind because it causally explains the many properties that instances of the kind exhibit. This paper examines an application of EE to biological species, which I call Biological Explanatory Essentialism (BEE). BEE states that a particular biological origin is the essence of a species on the grounds that it causes certain organisms to display the group of properties the species is associated with. Evaluating BEE is important, as it offers a novel argument for Biological Essentialism, the contentious claim that biological species have essences. The paper critically assesses the empirical foundations of BEE, focusing on the presupposition that a single biological origin causes the many properties associated with the species in question. By discussing a case of five-toed jerboas within the <i>Scarturus elater</i> species complex, I challenge that presupposition, thereby showing that cryptic species present a serious obstacle to BEE. I conclude that BEE fails to support Biological Essentialism, and suggest that essentialist philosophers reconsider the relevance of causal-explanatory factors in accounting for the purported essences of biological species. These philosophers may need to explore alternatives beyond such factors, one of which I briefly outline.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"43 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143599950","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Absolute representations and modern physics 绝对表征与现代物理学
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
European Journal for Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2025-03-11 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-025-00645-5
Caspar Jacobs, James Read
{"title":"Absolute representations and modern physics","authors":"Caspar Jacobs, James Read","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00645-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00645-5","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Famously, Adrian Moore has argued that an absolute representation of reality is possible: that it is possible to represent reality from no particular point of view. Moreover, Moore believes that such absolute representations are a <i>desideratum</i> of physics. Recently, however, debates in the philosophy of physics have arisen regarding the apparent <i>impossibility</i> of an absolute representation of certain aspects of nature in light of our current best theories of physics. Throughout this article, we take gravitational energy as a particular case study of an aspect of nature that seemingly does not admit of an absolute representation. There is, therefore, a <i>prima facie</i> tension between Moore’s <i>a priori</i> case on the one hand, and the state-of-play in modern physics on the other. This article overcomes this tension by demonstrating how, when formulated in the correct way, modern physics admits of an absolute representation of gravitational energy after all. In so doing, the article offers a detailed case study of Moore’s argument for absolute representation, clarifying its structure and bringing it into contact with the distinction drawn by philosophers of physics between coordinate-freedom and coordinate-independence, as well as the philosophy of spacetime physics.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"56 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143599953","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Relational quantum mechanics is still incompatible with quantum mechanics 关系量子力学仍与量子力学不相容
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
European Journal for Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2025-03-11 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-025-00639-3
Jay Lawrence, Marcin Markiewicz, Marek Żukowski
{"title":"Relational quantum mechanics is still incompatible with quantum mechanics","authors":"Jay Lawrence, Marcin Markiewicz, Marek Żukowski","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00639-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00639-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We showed in a recent article (Lawrence et al. 2023. <i>Quantum, 7</i>, 1015), that relative facts (outcomes), a central concept in Relational Quantum Mechanics, are inconsistent with Quantum Mechanics. We proved this by constructing a Wigner-Friend type sequential measurement scenario on a Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) state of three qubits, and making the following assumption: “if an interpretation of quantum theory introduces some conceptualization of outcomes of a measurement, then probabilities of these outcomes must follow the quantum predictions as given by the Born rule.” Our work has been criticized by Cavalcanti et al. (2023. <i>European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 13</i>(4),55). In this note we show that their critique, based on their own reformulation of our argument, does not apply to our paper. It also raises questions of principle which are not answered within the framework of Relational Quantum Mechanics.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143599952","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Perspectives and meta-perspectives: context versus hierarchy in the epistemology of complex systems
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
European Journal for Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2025-03-03 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-025-00641-9
Ragnar van der Merwe
{"title":"Perspectives and meta-perspectives: context versus hierarchy in the epistemology of complex systems","authors":"Ragnar van der Merwe","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00641-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00641-9","url":null,"abstract":"<p>For some post-structuralist complexity theorists, there are no epistemic <i>meta</i>-perspectives from where to judge between different epistemic perspectives toward complex systems. In this paper, I argue that these theorists face a dilemma because they argue against meta-perspectives from just such a meta-perspective. In fact, when we <i>understand</i> two or more different perspectives, we seem to unavoidably adopt a meta-perspective to analyse, compare, and judge between those perspectives. I further argue that meta-perspectives can be evaluated and judged from <i>meta</i>-meta-perspectives, and so on. This suggests an epistemic hierarchy. Perspectives, meta-perspectives, meta-meta-perspectives, etc. can be ranked according to the degree to which they confer understanding. I also explore what scope my thesis might have outside the philosophy of complexity by applying it to the sociology of science. </p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"90 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143532693","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Conceptualising research environments using biological niche concepts 利用生物生态位概念构思研究环境
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
European Journal for Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2025-03-01 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-025-00640-w
Rose Trappes, Sabina Leonelli
{"title":"Conceptualising research environments using biological niche concepts","authors":"Rose Trappes, Sabina Leonelli","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00640-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00640-w","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Several philosophers of science have taken inspiration from biological research on niches to conceptualise scientific practice. We systematise and extend three niche-based theories of scientific practice: conceptual ecology, cognitive niche construction, and scientific niche construction. We argue that research niches are a promising conceptual tool for understanding complex and dynamic research environments, which helps to investigate relevant forms of agency and material and social interdependencies, while also highlighting their historical and dynamic nature. To illustrate this, we develop a six-point framework for conceptualising research niches<i>.</i> Within this framework, research niches incorporate multiple and heterogenous material, social and conceptual factors (multi-dimensionality); research outputs arise, persist and differentiate through interactions between researchers and research niches (processes); researchers actively respond to and construct research niches (agency); research niches enable certain interactions and processes and not others (capability); and research niches are defined in relation to particular entities, such as individual researchers, disciplines, or concepts (relationality), and in relation to goals, such as understanding, solving problems, intervention, or the persistence of concepts or instruments (normativity).</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"52 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143528301","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Not quite killing it: black hole evaporation, global energy, and de-idealization
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
European Journal for Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2025-03-01 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-025-00638-4
Eugene Y. S. Chua
{"title":"Not quite killing it: black hole evaporation, global energy, and de-idealization","authors":"Eugene Y. S. Chua","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00638-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00638-4","url":null,"abstract":"<p>A family of arguments for black hole evaporation relies on conservation laws, defined through symmetries represented by Killing vector fields which exist globally or asymptotically. However, these symmetries often rely on the idealizations of stationarity and asymptotic flatness, respectively. In non-stationary or non-asymptotically-flat spacetimes where realistic black holes evaporate, the requisite Killing fields typically do not exist. Can we ‘de-idealize’ these idealizations, and subsequently the associated arguments for black hole evaporation? Here, I critically examine the strategy of using ‘approximately Killing’ fields to de-idealize black hole spacetimes and approximately extend conservation laws to non-idealized cases. I argue that this approach encounters significant challenges, undermining the use of these idealizations to justify the evaporation of realistic – rather than idealized – black holes, and raising questions about the justified use of such idealizations.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143528299","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Quantum indeterminacy: a matter of degree? 量子不确定性：程度问题？
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
European Journal for Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2025-03-01 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-025-00637-5
Maria Nørgaard
{"title":"Quantum indeterminacy: a matter of degree?","authors":"Maria Nørgaard","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00637-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00637-5","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The degreed view is an influential account in the debate on quantum value indefiniteness, linking the gradedness of quantum properties to quantum indeterminacy. This paper challenges the connection between degrees and indeterminacy by presenting an example of a graded quantum property that does not entail metaphysical indeterminacy. Through an investigation of two graded approaches to location in quantum mechanics, the paper argues that while the first account, degreed instantiation of <i>exact location</i>, is indeterminate, the second account, degreed <i>quantum location</i>, is not. This indicates that indeterminacy and degrees are not inherently linked, offering a novel perspective on quantum ontology. The paper advocates adopting a graded view of quantum properties without indeterminacy, potentially leading to a paradigm shift in understanding quantum phenomena.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"617 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143528300","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Formal consistency of the Principal Principle revisited 重新审视主要原则的形式一致性
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
European Journal for Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2025-03-01 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-025-00636-6
Leszek Wroński, Zalán Gyenis, Mariangela Zoe Cocchiaro
{"title":"Formal consistency of the Principal Principle revisited","authors":"Leszek Wroński, Zalán Gyenis, Mariangela Zoe Cocchiaro","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00636-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00636-6","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We rigorously describe the relation in which a credence function should stand to a set of chance functions in order for these to be compatible in the way mandated by the Principal Principle. This resolves an apparent contradiction in the literature, by means of providing a formal way of combining credences with modest chance functions so that the latter indeed serve as guides for the former. Along the way we note some problematic consequences of taking admissibility to imply requirements involving probabilistic independence. We also argue, <i>contra</i> (Hawthorne et al., <i>The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science,</i> <i>68</i>(1), 123–131 2017), that the Principal Principle does <i>not</i> imply the Principle of Indifference.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"33 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143528297","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Questioning origins: the role of ethical and metaethical claims in the debate about the evolution of morality
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
European Journal for Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2025-02-13 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-025-00635-7
Rebekka Hufendiek
{"title":"Questioning origins: the role of ethical and metaethical claims in the debate about the evolution of morality","authors":"Rebekka Hufendiek","doi":"10.1007/s13194-025-00635-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-025-00635-7","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Research about the evolution of morality suffers from the lack of a clear, agreed-upon concept of morality. In response to this, recent accounts have become increasingly pluralist and pragmatic. In this paper, I argue that 1) both the concept of morality and the broader understanding of what makes us moral include ethical and metaethical assumptions; 2) there is no uncontroversial descriptive notion available, and therefore settling on a particular concept inevitably entails such assumptions; and 3) what is lacking is a reflection on the role that ethical and metaethical assumptions play, suggesting that the debate would benefit from making them explicit. Claims about “the true origin of morality” can fruitfully be analyzed as “mixed claims”: claims that combine a causal-historical hypothesis (e.g., about the evolution of a certain ability, such as empathy or joint intentionality) with ethical or metaethical assumptions about which abilities or norms make us moral. Making such assumptions explicit advances the epistemic aims of transparency and comparability, and thereby helps to avoid rash conclusions regarding, for instance, the nature of moral progress. Finally, it helps to unpack the normative knowledge shared by behavioral scientists and comparative psychologists and to give this knowledge its proper place in research.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"162 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2025-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143401600","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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