European Journal for Philosophy of Science最新文献_第3页

Values in science: what are values, anyway? 科学价值观：价值观到底是什么？

IF 1.5 1区哲学

European Journal for Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2024-10-11 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-024-00615-3

Kevin C. Elliott, Rebecca Korf

{"title":"Values in science: what are values, anyway?","authors":"Kevin C. Elliott, Rebecca Korf","doi":"10.1007/s13194-024-00615-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00615-3","url":null,"abstract":"Although the philosophical literature on science and values has flourished in recent years, the central concept of “values” has remained ambiguous. This paper endeavors to clarify the nature of values as they are discussed in this literature and then highlights some of the major implications of this clarification. First, it elucidates four major concepts of values and discusses some of their strengths and weaknesses. Second, it clarifies the relationships between these concepts of values and a wide variety of related concepts that are sometimes used interchangeably in the philosophical literature. Third, it argues that this conceptual clarification reveals that much of the literature on science and values has discussed different concepts of values without making these differences clear. The paper illustrates this point by analyzing the different concepts of values at play in different arguments against the value-free ideal and in proposals for managing values. Understanding the literature on values in science as a patchwork of related discourses rather than a single discourse can help researchers more thoughtfully choose a concept of values that best fits their philosophical targets and goals, rather than conflating different discourses because of the common terminology of “values.”","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"59 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142404968","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

GPS observables in Newtonian spacetime or why we do not need ‘physical’ coordinate systems 牛顿时空中的全球定位系统观测值或为什么我们不需要 "物理 "坐标系

IF 1.5 1区哲学

European Journal for Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2024-10-11 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-024-00611-7

Álvaro Mozota Frauca

{"title":"GPS observables in Newtonian spacetime or why we do not need ‘physical’ coordinate systems","authors":"Álvaro Mozota Frauca","doi":"10.1007/s13194-024-00611-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00611-7","url":null,"abstract":"Some authors have defended the claim that one needs to be able to define ‘physical coordinate systems’ and ‘observables’ in order to make sense of general relativity. Moreover, in Rovelli (Physical Review D, 65(4), 044017 2002), Rovelli proposes a way of implementing these ideas by making use of a system of satellites that allows defining a set of ‘physical coordinates’, the GPS coordinates. In this article I oppose these views in four ways. First, I defend an alternative way of understanding general relativity which implies that we have a perfectly fine interpretation of the models of the theory even in the absence of ‘physical coordinate systems’. Second, I analyze and challenge the motivations behind the ‘observable’ view. Third, I analyze Rovelli’s proposal and I conclude that it does not allow extracting any physical information from our models that wasn’t available before. Fourth, I draw an analogy between general relativistic spacetimes and Newtonian spacetimes, which allows me to argue that as ‘physical observables’ are not needed in Newtonian spacetime, then neither are they in general relativity. In this sense, I conclude that the ‘observable’ view of general relativity is unmotivated.","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"123 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142405054","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Explaining AI through mechanistic interpretability 通过机械可解释性解释人工智能

IF 1.5 1区哲学

European Journal for Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2024-10-11 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-024-00614-4

Lena Kästner, Barnaby Crook

引用次数: 0

Feynman diagrams: visualization of phenomena and diagrammatic representation 费曼图：现象的可视化和图解表示法

IF 1.5 1区哲学

European Journal for Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2024-10-08 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-024-00609-1

Marco Forgione

引用次数: 0

Defending the quantum reconstruction program 为量子重建计划辩护

IF 1.5 1区哲学

European Journal for Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2024-09-14 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-024-00608-2

Philipp Berghofer

引用次数: 0

Simpson’s paradox beyond confounding 超越混淆的辛普森悖论

IF 1.5 1区哲学

European Journal for Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2024-09-13 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-024-00610-8

Zili Dong, Weixin Cai, Shimin Zhao

{"title":"Simpson’s paradox beyond confounding","authors":"Zili Dong, Weixin Cai, Shimin Zhao","doi":"10.1007/s13194-024-00610-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00610-8","url":null,"abstract":"Simpson’s paradox (SP) is a statistical phenomenon where the association between two variables reverses, disappears, or emerges, after conditioning on a third variable. It has been proposed (by, e.g., Judea Pearl) that SP should be analyzed using the framework of graphical causal models (i.e., causal DAGs) in which SP is diagnosed as a symptom of confounding bias. This paper contends that this confounding-based analysis cannot fully capture SP: there are cases of SP that cannot be explained away in terms of confounding. Previous works have argued that some cases of SP do not require causal analysis at all. Despite being a logically valid counterexample, we argue that this type of cases poses only a limited challenge to Pearl’s analysis of SP. In our view, a more powerful challenge to Pearl comes from cases of SP that do require causal analysis but can arise without confounding. We demonstrate with examples that accidental associations due to genetic drift, the use of inappropriate aggregate variables as causes, and interactions between units (i.e., inter-unit causation) can all give rise to SP of this type. The discussion is also extended to the amalgamation paradox (of which SP is a special form) which can occur due to the use of non-collapsible association measures, in the absence of confounding.","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"383 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142174487","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Science as public service 科学作为公共服务

IF 1.5 1区哲学

European Journal for Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2024-09-13 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-024-00607-3

Hannah Hilligardt

{"title":"Science as public service","authors":"Hannah Hilligardt","doi":"10.1007/s13194-024-00607-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00607-3","url":null,"abstract":"The problem this paper addresses is that scientists have to take normatively charged decisions which can have a significant impact on individual members of the public or the public as a whole. And yet mechanisms to exercise democratic control over them are often absent. Given the normative nature of these choices, this is often perceived to be at odds with basic democratic principles. I show that this problem applies in similar ways to civil service institutions and draw on political philosophy literature on the civil service (e.g. Rosanvallon, 2011; Heath, 2022) to discuss when such normative judgements can nevertheless be said to be democratically legitimate. Concretely, I seek to show that normative judgements in research need not be democratically legitimated in order for science to be democratically legitimate. Indeed, it can be democratically legitimate for scientists to go against the expressed views of the public or political representatives if this is justified in light of, firstly, the role science has been asked to fulfil and, secondly, when it is in line with public institutions’ key principles. This is a counter-position to views currently held in the values in science debate (e.g. by Kitcher, 2011; Intemann, 2015; Schroeder, 2021; Lusk, 2021) which argue that value-laden judgements in science are legitimate if they are aligned with the public’s views or directly decided by public.","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"2015 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142174619","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Research environments vis-à-vis biological environments: ontological parallels, epistemic parallax, and metaphilosophical parallelization 研究环境与生物环境：本体论平行、认识论视差和形而上学平行

IF 1.5 1区哲学

European Journal for Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2024-09-13 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-024-00603-7

Alejandro Fábregas-Tejeda

{"title":"Research environments vis-à-vis biological environments: ontological parallels, epistemic parallax, and metaphilosophical parallelization","authors":"Alejandro Fábregas-Tejeda","doi":"10.1007/s13194-024-00603-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00603-7","url":null,"abstract":"In a recent development of what may be called biological philosophy of science, scholars have proposed that aligning notions of research environments with biological concepts of environment holds great promise for understanding the socio-material contexts in and through which science happens. Here, I explore the prospects and potential shortcomings of building sound research environment concepts by contrasting them with biological environment concepts. In doing so, I emphasize the importance of adhering to two central desiderata: the need to clarify what is being environed (i.e., what the counter relatum of an environment is) and what is doing the environing (i.e., what type of environmental partition is instantiated). Subsequently, I juxtapose two biological construals of environment—organismal environments and population environments—with possible articulations of what ‘research environments’ might stand for, and I maintain that each presents distinct epistemic upshots and limitations. More generally, I argue that there are two broad relations that could exist between biological and research environments: ontological parallels and ontic discordance. Finally, employing the visual metaphor of epistemic parallax, I conclude by conveying some lessons and cautionary notes arising from these comparisons and the importation of biological environment concepts into philosophy of science. While environment concepts may come with epistemic purchase, we should be careful when ontologizing them.","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"31 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142174529","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Niches and Niche Construction in Biology and Scientific Practice 生物学和科学实践中的利基和利基构建

IF 1.5 1区哲学

European Journal for Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2024-08-16 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-024-00604-6

Joseph Rouse

{"title":"Niches and Niche Construction in Biology and Scientific Practice","authors":"Joseph Rouse","doi":"10.1007/s13194-024-00604-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00604-6","url":null,"abstract":"Concepts of an organism’s biological environment and of niche construction as how organisms alter their environment and that of other organisms now play prominent roles in multiple sub-fields of biology, including ecology, evolution, and development. Some philosophers now use these concepts to understand the dynamics of scientific research. Others note divergences among the concepts of niche and niche construction employed in these biological fields, with implications for their possible conceptual integration. My (Rouse, 2015) account of scientific research as niche constructive and of laws and lawful invariance in scientific practice illuminates these conceptual differences and their implications for integrating those domains of biological research in two ways. First, it accounts for the partial autonomy of these domains and their concepts as characteristic of scientific conceptual development. Second, it provides a more complex understanding of how research domains can be integrated, which shows how those different conceptions of niches and niche construction do not block their appropriate integration. The conclusion situates my account and its application to niche concepts both amid other philosophical uses of niche concepts to understand research environments and as exemplifying my revisionist conception of philosophical naturalism.","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"35 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141991997","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Individualisation and individualised science across disciplinary perspectives 跨学科的个性化和个性化科学

IF 1.5 1区哲学

European Journal for Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2024-08-10 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-024-00602-8

Marie I. Kaiser, Anton Killin, Anja-Kristin Abendroth, Mitja D. Back, Bernhard T. Baune, Nicola Bilstein, Yves Breitmoser, Barbara A. Caspers, Jürgen Gadau, Toni I. Gossmann, Sylvia Kaiser, Oliver Krüger, Joachim Kurtz, Diana Lengersdorf, Annette K. F. Malsch, Caroline Müller, John F. Rauthmann, Klaus Reinhold, S. Helene Richter, Christian Stummer, Rose Trappes, Claudia Voelcker-Rehage, Meike J. Wittmann

{"title":"Individualisation and individualised science across disciplinary perspectives","authors":"Marie I. Kaiser, Anton Killin, Anja-Kristin Abendroth, Mitja D. Back, Bernhard T. Baune, Nicola Bilstein, Yves Breitmoser, Barbara A. Caspers, Jürgen Gadau, Toni I. Gossmann, Sylvia Kaiser, Oliver Krüger, Joachim Kurtz, Diana Lengersdorf, Annette K. F. Malsch, Caroline Müller, John F. Rauthmann, Klaus Reinhold, S. Helene Richter, Christian Stummer, Rose Trappes, Claudia Voelcker-Rehage, Meike J. Wittmann","doi":"10.1007/s13194-024-00602-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00602-8","url":null,"abstract":"Recent efforts in a range of scientific fields have emphasised research and methods concerning individual differences and individualisation. This article brings together various scientific disciplines—ecology, evolution, and animal behaviour; medicine and psychiatry; public health and sport/exercise science; sociology; psychology; economics and management science—and presents their research on individualisation. We then clarify the concept of individualisation as it appears in the disciplinary casework by distinguishing three kinds of individualisation studied in and across these disciplines: IndividualisationONE as creating/changing individual differences (the process that generates differences between individuals: intrapopulation or intraspecific variation/heterogeneity); IndividualisationTWO as individualising applications (the tailoring or customising of something—information, treatment, a product or service, etc.—for an individual or specific group of individuals); and IndividualisationTHREE as social changes influencing autonomy, risk, and responsibilities (the process discussed under the rubric of sociological individualisation theory). Moreover, we analyse conceptual links between individualisation and individuality, and characterise different sorts of individuality that the disciplines study. This paper aims to promote interdisciplinary research concerning individualisation by establishing a common conceptual-theoretical basis, while leaving room for disciplinary differences.","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"191 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141910488","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0