European Journal for Philosophy of Science最新文献_第7页

Adding causality to the information-theoretic perspective on individuality 从信息论角度看个体性的因果关系

IF 1.5 1区哲学

European Journal for Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2024-02-16 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-023-00566-1

Pierrick Bourrat

引用次数: 0

Reactivity in the human sciences 人文科学中的反应性

IF 1.5 1区哲学

European Journal for Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2024-02-08 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-024-00571-y

Caterina Marchionni, Julie Zahle, Marion Godman

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Science and values: a two-way direction 科学与价值观：双向的方向

IF 1.5 1区哲学

European Journal for Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2024-02-05 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-024-00567-8

Emanuele Ratti, Federica Russo

{"title":"Science and values: a two-way direction","authors":"Emanuele Ratti, Federica Russo","doi":"10.1007/s13194-024-00567-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00567-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In the science and values literature, scholars have shown how science is influenced and shaped by values, often in opposition to the ‘value free’ ideal of science. In this paper, we aim to contribute to the science and values literature by showing that the relation between science and values flows not only from values into scientific practice, but also from (allegedly neutral) science to values themselves. The extant literature in the ‘science and values’ field focuses by and large on reconstructing, post hoc, how values have influenced science; our reconstruction of the case studies, instead, aims to show that scientific concepts and methods <i>too, because of specific identifiable characteristics,</i> can promote some values rather than (or at the expense of) others. We explain this bidirectional relation in analogy to debates on the normativity of technical artifacts and on feminist approaches in science, and we illustrate our claims with cases from the health sciences and machine learning. While our arguments in this paper also draw on post hoc reconstructions, we intend to show where, in the science in the making, we should engage not only with the question whether a practice is value-laden, but also how specific conceptual and methodological choices can influence values down the road. All in all, these considerations expand the ways in which philosophers can contribute to more value-aware scientific practices.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"80 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139695961","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Ethnobiological kinds and material grounding: comments on Ludwig 民族生物学种类和物质基础：对路德维希的评论

IF 1.5 1区哲学

European Journal for Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2024-02-05 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-024-00568-7

Thomas A. C. Reydon, Marc Ereshefsky

引用次数: 0

Broken brakes and dreaming drivers: the heuristic value of causal models in the law 刹车失灵和做梦的司机：因果模型在法律中的启发式价值

IF 1.5 1区哲学

European Journal for Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2024-01-25 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-023-00563-4

Enno Fischer

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Theorem proving in artificial neural networks: new frontiers in mathematical AI 人工神经网络中的定理证明：数学人工智能的新领域

IF 1.5 1区哲学

European Journal for Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2024-01-20 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-024-00569-6

{"title":"Theorem proving in artificial neural networks: new frontiers in mathematical AI","authors":"","doi":"10.1007/s13194-024-00569-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00569-6","url":null,"abstract":"<h3>Abstract</h3> <p>Computer assisted theorem proving is an increasingly important part of mathematical methodology, as well as a long-standing topic in artificial intelligence (AI) research. However, the current generation of theorem proving software have limited functioning in terms of providing new proofs. Importantly, they are not able to discriminate interesting theorems and proofs from trivial ones. In order for computers to develop further in theorem proving, there would need to be a radical change in how the software functions. Recently, machine learning results in solving mathematical tasks have shown early promise that deep artificial neural networks could learn symbolic mathematical processing. In this paper, I analyze the theoretical prospects of such neural networks in proving mathematical theorems. In particular, I focus on the question how such AI systems could be incorporated in practice to theorem proving and what consequences that could have. In the most optimistic scenario, this includes the possibility of autonomous automated theorem provers (AATP). Here I discuss whether such AI systems could, or should, become accepted as active agents in mathematical communities.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"84 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139510533","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Metaphysical indeterminacy in Everettian quantum mechanics 埃弗雷特量子力学中的形而上学不确定性

IF 1.5 1区哲学

European Journal for Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2024-01-04 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-023-00562-5

David Glick, Baptiste Le Bihan

引用次数: 0

Toward a more natural historical attitude 走向更自然的历史态度

IF 1.5 1区哲学

European Journal for Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2024-01-03 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-023-00564-3

Todd Grantham

引用次数: 0

Inductive risk and epistemically detrimental dissent in policy-relevant science 政策相关科学中的归纳风险和认识论上的有害异议

IF 1.5 1区哲学

European Journal for Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2024-01-03 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-023-00565-2

Tyler Paetkau

{"title":"Inductive risk and epistemically detrimental dissent in policy-relevant science","authors":"Tyler Paetkau","doi":"10.1007/s13194-023-00565-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-023-00565-2","url":null,"abstract":"<h3>Abstract</h3> <p>While dissent is key to successful science, it is not always beneficial. By requiring scientists to respond to objections, epistemically detrimental dissent (EDD) consumes resources that could be better devoted to furthering scientific discovery. Moreover, bad-faith dissent can create a chilling effect on certain lines of inquiry and make settled controversies seem open to debate. Such dissent results in harm to scientific progress and the public policy that depends on this science. Biddle and Leuschner propose four criteria that draw on inductive risk as a method for separating this EDD from beneficial dissent while de Melo-Martín and Intemann reject this approach for failing to capture paradigmatic instances of EDD. Against de Melo-Martín and Intemann’s objections, I propose the inductive risk account can be saved and strengthened through the following modifications: (1) removing the requirement that the four conditions of EDD be jointly satisfied, (2) requiring that each criterion be measured as a matter of degree rather than as a binary, and (3) requiring that the four criteria are measured holistically. These modifications not only mitigate the criticisms but produce five benefits over Biddle and Leuschner’s account, including: (1) capturing paradigmatic instances of EDD, (2) reflecting the degree to which an instance of EDD is problematic, (3) capturing the interactions between criteria, (4) avoiding legitimizing inappropriate dissent, and (5) reflecting changes to the epistemic standing of dissent. As such, I argue that the modified IndRA provides a powerful tool for identifying EDD and strengthening science.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139110350","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Averaged versus individualized: pragmatic N-of-1 design as a method to investigate individual treatment response 平均与个体化：作为研究个体治疗反应方法的实用N-of-1设计

IF 1.5 1区哲学

European Journal for Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2023-12-14 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-023-00559-0

Davide Serpico, Mariusz Maziarz

{"title":"Averaged versus individualized: pragmatic N-of-1 design as a method to investigate individual treatment response","authors":"Davide Serpico, Mariusz Maziarz","doi":"10.1007/s13194-023-00559-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-023-00559-0","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Heterogeneous treatment effects represent a major issue for medicine as they undermine reliable inference and clinical decision-making. To overcome the issue, the current vision of precision and personalized medicine acknowledges the need to control individual variability in response to treatment. In this paper, we argue that gene-treatment-environment interactions (G × T × E) undermine inferences about individual treatment effects from the results of both genomics-based methodologies—such as genome-wide association studies (GWAS) and genome-wide interaction studies (GWIS)—and randomized controlled trials (RCTs). Then, we argue that N-of-1 trials can be a solution to overcome difficulties in handling individual variability in treatment response. Although this type of trial has been suggested as a promising strategy to assess individual treatment effects, it nonetheless has limitations that limit its use in everyday clinical practice. We analyze the existing variability within the designs of N-of-1 trials in terms of a continuum where each design prioritizes epistemic and pragmatic considerations. We then support wider use of the designs located at the pragmatic end of the explanatory-pragmatic continuum.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-12-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138582918","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0