European Journal for Philosophy of Science最新文献

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Scientific experimental articles are modernist stories 科学实验文章是现代主义故事
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
European Journal for Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2024-07-17 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-024-00592-7
Anatolii Kozlov, Michael T. Stuart
{"title":"Scientific experimental articles are modernist stories","authors":"Anatolii Kozlov, Michael T. Stuart","doi":"10.1007/s13194-024-00592-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00592-7","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper attempts to revive the epistemological discussion of scientific articles. What are their epistemic aims, and how are they achieved? We argue that scientific experimental articles are best understood as a particular kind of narrative: i.e., modernist narratives (think: Woolf, Joyce), at least in the sense that they employ many of the same techniques, including colligation and the juxtaposition of multiple perspectives. We suggest that this way of writing is necessary given the nature of modern science, but it also has specific epistemic benefits: it provides readers with an effective way to grasp the content of scientific articles which increases their understanding. On the other hand, modernist writing is vulnerable to certain kinds of epistemic abuses, which can be found instantiated in modern scientific writing as well.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141631498","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Quantum ontology and intuitions 量子本体论与直觉
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
European Journal for Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2024-07-10 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-024-00595-4
Valia Allori
{"title":"Quantum ontology and intuitions","authors":"Valia Allori","doi":"10.1007/s13194-024-00595-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00595-4","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Among the various proposals for quantum ontology, both wavefunction realists and the primitive ontologists have argued that their approach is to be preferred because it relies on intuitive notions: locality, separability and spatiotemporality. As such, these proposals should be seen as normative frameworks asserting that one should choose the fundamental ontology which preserves these intuitions, even if they disagree about their relative importance: wavefunction realists favor preserving locality and separability, while primitive ontologists advocate for spatiotemporality. In this paper, first I clarify the main tenets of wavefunction realism and the primitive ontology approach, arguing that seeing the latter as favoring constructive explanation makes sense of their requirement of a spatiotemporal ontology. Then I show how the aforementioned intuitive notions cannot all be kept in the quantum domain. Consequently, wavefunction realists rank locality and separability higher than spatiotemporality, while primitive ontologists do the opposite. I conclude that however, the choice of which notions to favor is not as arbitrary as it might seem. In fact, they are not independent: requiring locality and separability can soundly be justified by requiring spatiotemporality, and not the other way around. If so, the primitive ontology approach has a better justification of its intuitions than its rival wavefunction realist framework.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"57 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141566314","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
How do different interpretations work together in a single scientific explanatory project? A case study of the Olami-Feder-Christensen model of earthquakes 不同的解释如何在一个科学解释项目中共同发挥作用?奥拉米-费德勒-克里斯滕森地震模型案例研究
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
European Journal for Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2024-07-05 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-024-00591-8
Hernán Bobadilla
{"title":"How do different interpretations work together in a single scientific explanatory project? A case study of the Olami-Feder-Christensen model of earthquakes","authors":"Hernán Bobadilla","doi":"10.1007/s13194-024-00591-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00591-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Interpretation plays a central role in using scientific models to explain natural phenomena: Meaning must be bestowed upon a model in terms of <i>what it is</i> and <i>what it represents</i> to be used for model explanations. However, it remains unclear how capacious and complex interpretation in models can be, particularly when conducted by the same group of scientists in the context of one explanatory project. This paper sheds light upon this question by examining modelling and explanatory practices related to the Olami-Feder-Christensen model of earthquakes. This case study shows that various interpretations are intricately connected in the overall meaning of a model used for model explanations. This leads to a manifold picture of interpretation, according to which scientific models are construed as networks of interconnected meanings. As scientists ponder and integrate these various interpretations, guided by locally attended epistemic interests, they achieve model explanations with layers of content, both in their explanantia and explananda.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"77 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141545890","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Exploring the socio-ecology of science: the case of coral reefs 探索科学的社会生态学:珊瑚礁案例
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
European Journal for Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2024-06-20 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-024-00589-2
Elis Jones
{"title":"Exploring the socio-ecology of science: the case of coral reefs","authors":"Elis Jones","doi":"10.1007/s13194-024-00589-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00589-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper I use data from interviews conducted with coral scientists to examine the socio-ecological dimensions of science, i.e. how science shapes and is shaped by the living world around it. I use two sets of ideas in particular: niche construction and socio-ecological value frameworks. Using these I offer socio-ecological criteria by which coral scientists evaluate the activities of coral science, more specifically which living systems are intended to benefit from coral science as an activity, and the motivations behind this. The overall picture I present is one of coral science as activity primarily aimed at sustaining a diverse set of living systems, including humans, other organisms, species, and ecosystems, and the social practices associated with these. The value relations between scientists and aspects of these processes dictate how they respond to shifts in the socio-ecological context coral science is embedded in, explaining why the activities associated with coral science are changing as reef ecosystems are threatened. The implication is that natural sciences more generally are entangled with a greater number of social and ecological process than is typically considered, and that shifts in the activities undertaken by scientists may be driven by ecological as well as social and epistemic processes.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"44 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141430424","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Local ontology: reconciling processualism and new mechanism 地方本体论:调和过程论与新机制
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
European Journal for Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2024-06-19 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-024-00587-4
Tyler D. P. Brunet
{"title":"Local ontology: reconciling processualism and new mechanism","authors":"Tyler D. P. Brunet","doi":"10.1007/s13194-024-00587-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00587-4","url":null,"abstract":"<p>What should we do when two conflicting ontologies are both fruitful, though their fruitfulness varies by context or location? To achieve reconciliation, it is not enough to advocate pluralism. There are many varieties of pluralism and not all pluralisms will serve equally well; some may be inconsistent, others unhelpful. This essay considers another option: <i>local ontology</i>. For a pair of ontologies, a local ontology consists of two claims: (1) each location enjoys a unique ontology, and (2) neither ontology is most fundamental nor most global. To argue for this view and provide an example, I develop a local ontology for two scientific ontologies: processualism and new mechanism. To further support this ontology, I argue against two varieties of pluralism: first, a pluralism based on directly unifying the assumptions of both ontologies and, second, one of allowing both ontologies to coexist within a discipline. I argue that the first option is inconsistent and the second is unhelpful. I conclude that this local ontology provides us with a consistent and fruitful account that includes elements from both mechanism and processualism.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"41 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141425593","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Two construals of Hempel’s dilemma: a challenge to physicalism, not dualism 亨普尔困境的两种解释:对物理主义而非二元论的挑战
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
European Journal for Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2024-06-13 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-024-00590-9
David Buzaglo
{"title":"Two construals of Hempel’s dilemma: a challenge to physicalism, not dualism","authors":"David Buzaglo","doi":"10.1007/s13194-024-00590-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00590-9","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In a recent paper, Firt, Hemmo and Shenker argue that Hempel’s dilemma, typically thought to primarily undermine physicalism, is generalizable and impacts mind-body dualism and many other theories equally. I challenge this view and argue that Hempel’s dilemma admits of at least two distinct construals: a general-skeptical construal, underpinned by historically driven arguments such as the pessimistic induction, and a non-skeptical construal, driven by the specific puzzles and volatility of current physics. While the general-skeptical construal applies to all changeable deep-structure theories, the non-skeptical construal primarily targets volatile theories which harbor exclusionary ambitions. As a result, dualism largely evades both construals due to the stability of theories of the mental and their lack of exclusionary ambitions. Conversely, physicalism is uniquely susceptible to both construals due to its strong commitment to deep-structure realism, inherent exclusionary ambitions, and the volatility of certain branches of fundamental physics. The paper ultimately concludes that Hempel’s dilemma is not universally problematic, but presents a unique challenge to physicalism while being relatively congenial to dualism.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"54 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141315773","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The preservation of thickly detectable structure: a case study in gravity 厚可探测结构的保存:重力案例研究
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
European Journal for Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2024-06-13 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-024-00588-3
Jared Hanson-Park
{"title":"The preservation of thickly detectable structure: a case study in gravity","authors":"Jared Hanson-Park","doi":"10.1007/s13194-024-00588-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00588-3","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Structural realists claim that structure is preserved across instances of radical theory change, and that this preservation provides an argument in favor of realism about structure. In this paper, I use the shift from Newtonian gravity to Einstein’s general relativity as a case study for structural preservation, and I demonstrate that two prominent views of structural preservation fail to provide a solid basis for realism about structure. The case study demonstrates that (i) structural realists must be epistemically precise about the concrete structure that is being preserved, and (ii) they must provide a metaphysical account of how structure is preserved through re-interpretation in light of a new theory. Regarding (i), I describe a means of epistemic access to the unobservable that I call “thick detection” of structure, which isolates the structure that will be preserved. Regarding (ii), I argue that thickly detectable structure is preserved across theory change through a process of extracting the old structure from the new structure, much like what has been done with geometrized versions of Newtonian gravity. With these two responses in hand, the structural realist can adequately account for the preservation of structure and can provide a strong argument in favor of structural realism.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"31 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141315659","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On quantum computing for artificial superintelligence 关于人工超级智能的量子计算
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
European Journal for Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2024-06-04 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-024-00584-7
Anna Grabowska, Artur Gunia
{"title":"On quantum computing for artificial superintelligence","authors":"Anna Grabowska, Artur Gunia","doi":"10.1007/s13194-024-00584-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00584-7","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Artificial intelligence algorithms, fueled by continuous technological development and increased computing power, have proven effective across a variety of tasks. Concurrently, quantum computers have shown promise in solving problems beyond the reach of classical computers. These advancements have contributed to a misconception that quantum computers enable hypercomputation, sparking speculation about quantum supremacy leading to an intelligence explosion and the creation of superintelligent agents. We challenge this notion, arguing that current evidence does not support the idea that quantum technologies enable hypercomputation. Fundamental limitations on information storage within finite spaces and the accessibility of information from quantum states constrain quantum computers from surpassing the Turing computing barrier. While quantum technologies may offer exponential speed-ups in specific computing cases, there is insufficient evidence to suggest that focusing solely on quantum-related problems will lead to technological singularity and the emergence of superintelligence. Subsequently, there is no premise suggesting that general intelligence depends on quantum effects or that accelerating existing algorithms through quantum means will replicate true intelligence. We propose that if superintelligence is to be achieved, it will not be solely through quantum technologies. Instead, the attainment of superintelligence remains a conceptual challenge that humanity has yet to overcome, with quantum technologies showing no clear path toward its resolution.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"65 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141246503","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Collapsing strong emergence’s collapse problem 强涌现的崩溃问题
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
European Journal for Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2024-06-04 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-024-00586-5
J. M. Fritzman
{"title":"Collapsing strong emergence’s collapse problem","authors":"J. M. Fritzman","doi":"10.1007/s13194-024-00586-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00586-5","url":null,"abstract":"<p>It is impossible to deduce the properties of a strongly emergent whole from a complete knowledge of the properties of its constituents, according to C. D. Broad, when those constituents are isolated from the whole or when they are constituents of other wholes. Elanor Taylor proposes the Collapse Problem. Macro-level property p supposedly emerges when its micro-level components combine in relation r. However, each component has the property that it can combine with the others in r to produce p. Broad’s nondeducibility criterion is not met. This article argues that the amount of information required for r is physically impossible. Strong Emergence does not collapse. But the Collapse Problem does. Belief in Strong Emergence is strongly warranted. Strong Emergence occurs whenever it is physically impossible to deduce how components, in a specific relation, would combine to produce a whole with p. Almost always, that is impossible. Strong Emergence is ubiquitous.</p><p>Word counts:</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"49 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141246628","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Overdetermination, underdetermination, and epistemic granularity in the historical sciences 历史科学中的过度判定、判定不足和认识粒度
IF 1.5 1区 哲学
European Journal for Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2024-05-30 DOI: 10.1007/s13194-024-00583-8
Christophe Malaterre
{"title":"Overdetermination, underdetermination, and epistemic granularity in the historical sciences","authors":"Christophe Malaterre","doi":"10.1007/s13194-024-00583-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00583-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The optimism vs. pessimism debate about the historical sciences is often framed in terms of arguments about the relative importance of overdetermination vs. underdetermination of historical claims by available evidence. While the interplay between natural processes that create multiple traces of past events (thereby conducive of overdetermination) and processes that erase past information (whence underdetermination) cannot be ignored, I locate the root of the debate in the epistemic granularity, or intuitively the level of detail, that pervades any historical claim justification network. To reveal the role played by granularity, I elaborate a model of historical claim justification. This model maps out the different elements that enter the justification of historical claims (incl., actual and inferred states of affairs, dating and information reconstructing theories). It also incorporates the different types of processes that affect traces of past events (information creating, preserving, modifying, and destroying processes). Granularity is shown to play a pivotal role in all elements of this model, and thereby in the inferred justification of any historical claim. As a result, while upward or downward shifts in granularity may explain changes about claims being considered as overdetermined or underdetermined, epistemic granularity constitutes an integral part of evidential reasoning in the historical sciences (and possibly elsewhere).</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"42 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141183013","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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