{"title":"Who ought to look towards the horizon? A qualitative study on the collective social responsibility of scientific research","authors":"Vincenzo Politi","doi":"10.1007/s13194-024-00580-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00580-x","url":null,"abstract":"<p>There is a growing concern for the proper role of science within democratic societies, which has led to the development of new science policies for the implementation of social responsibility in research. Although the very expression ‘social responsibility of science’ may be interpreted in different ways, many of these emerging policy frameworks define it, at least in part, as a form of anticipative reflection about the potential impacts of research in society. What remains a rather under-discussed issue is the definition of the bearer of the social responsibility of science. In other words, it is not clear who is supposed to engage in such an anticipative reflection, whether individual researchers or research groups. In the past few years, philosophers of science have begun to use qualitative research methods to fill the gaps between normative models of the organisation of ideal scientific communities and the reality of actual scientific practices. In this article, I follow this approach to discuss the issue of the collective dimension of the social responsibility of science. I rely on a qualitative study conducted on an interdisciplinary research group and I describe how group dynamics position individuals and distribute duties and roles, including social responsibility. Qualitative descriptions of the distribution of duties within actual research groups should inform the formulation of general prescriptive theories on the collective responsibility of science.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"85 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140622916","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Anthropocene, planetary boundaries and tipping points: interdisciplinarity and values in Earth system science","authors":"Vincent Lam, Yannick Rousselot","doi":"10.1007/s13194-024-00579-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00579-4","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Earth system science (ESS) and modelling have given rise to a new conceptual framework in the recent decades, which goes much beyond climate science. Indeed, Earth system science and modelling have the ambition “to build a unified understanding of the Earth”, involving not only the physical Earth system components (atmosphere, cryosphere, land, ocean, lithosphere) but also all the relevant human and social processes interacting with them. This unified understanding that ESS aims to achieve raises a number of epistemological issues about interdisciplinarity. We argue that the interdisciplinary relations in ESS between natural and social / human sciences are best characterized in terms of what is called ‘scientific imperialism’ in the literature and we show that this imperialistic feature has some detrimental epistemic and non-epistemic effects, notably when addressing the issue of values in ESS. This paper considers in particular the core ESS concepts of Anthropocene, planetary boundaries and tipping points in the light of the philosophy of science discussions on interdisciplinarity and values. We show that acknowledging the interconnections between interdisciplinarity and values suggests ways for ESS to move forward in view of addressing the climate and environmental challenges.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"131 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140527433","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Cosmic topology, underdetermination, and spatial infinity","authors":"Patrick James Ryan","doi":"10.1007/s13194-024-00576-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00576-7","url":null,"abstract":"<p>It is well-known that the global structure of every space-time model for relativistic cosmology is observationally underdetermined. In order to alleviate the severity of this underdetermination, it has been proposed that we adopt the Cosmological Principle because the Principle restricts our attention to a distinguished class of space-time models (spatially homogeneous and isotropic models). I argue that, even assuming the Cosmological Principle, the topology of space remains observationally underdetermined. Nonetheless, I argue that we can muster reasons to prefer various topological properties over others. In particular, I favor the adoption of multiply connected universe models on grounds of (i) simplicity, (ii) Machian considerations, and (iii) explanatory power. We are able to appeal to such grounds because multiply connected topologies open up the possibility of finite universe models (consistent with our best data), which in turn avoid thorny issues concerning the postulation of an actually infinite universe.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"110 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140317244","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Criteria of success for engineering accident investigations: a question-centered account","authors":"","doi":"10.1007/s13194-024-00578-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00578-5","url":null,"abstract":"<h3>Abstract</h3> <p>Engineering accident investigations are systematic inquiries into the facts and causes of engineering accidents. The aims of an engineering accident investigation include identifying significant truths about an accident, learning lessons to prevent similar future accidents, and authoritatively communicating the investigative results to the stakeholders. An important normative dimension along which an engineering accident investigation can be evaluated is its degree of success in fulfilling these aims. In this paper, I propose criteria for evaluating the degree of success of an engineering accident investigation using a question-centered framework, and then argue for the relevance of this proposal to the actual engineering practice. The basic idea of my proposal is that an engineering accident investigation is successful to the extent that (1) questions that should arise in the investigation do arise, and (2) questions that arise—especially the more significant ones—are resolved satisfactorily by the end of the investigation. The first part of this paper unpacks my proposal by analyzing the following three concepts and illustrating them using examples from the TWA Flight 800 accident investigation: The (satisfactory) resolution of questions, the significance of questions, and the arising of questions. The second part of this paper argues for the relevance of my proposal to the practitioners and stakeholders of engineering accident investigations. First, I argue that my proposal is sensitive to the aims of the investigators and stakeholders regarding engineering accident investigations, and that it helps them navigate competing and conflicting aims. Second, I go beyond the TWA 800 case study and argue that my proposal explains the strengths and limitations of different types of accident causation models used in investigations.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140146124","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Unexpected quantum indeterminacy","authors":"Andrea Oldofredi","doi":"10.1007/s13194-024-00574-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00574-9","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Recent philosophical discussions about metaphysical indeterminacy have been substantiated with the idea that quantum mechanics, one of the most successful physical theories in the history of science, provides explicit instances of worldly indefiniteness. Against this background, several philosophers underline that there are alternative formulations of quantum theory in which such indeterminacy has no room and plays no role. A typical example is Bohmian mechanics in virtue of its clear particle ontology. Contrary to these latter claims, this paper aims at showing that different pilot-wave theories do in fact instantiate diverse forms of metaphysical indeterminacy. Namely, I argue that there are various questions about worldly states of affairs that cannot be determined by looking exclusively at their ontologies and dynamical laws. Moreover, it will be claimed that Bohmian mechanics generates a new form of <i>modal</i> indeterminacy. Finally, it will be concluded that ontological clarity and indeterminacy are not mutually exclusive, i.e., the two can coexist in the same theory.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"50 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140097091","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Contrast classes and agreement in climate modeling","authors":"Corey Dethier","doi":"10.1007/s13194-024-00577-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00577-6","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In an influential paper, Wendy Parker argues that agreement across climate models isn’t a reliable marker of confirmation in the context of cutting-edge climate science. In this paper, I argue that while Parker’s conclusion is generally correct, there is an important class of exceptions. Broadly speaking, agreement is not a reliable marker of confirmation when the hypotheses under consideration are mutually consistent—when, e.g., we’re concerned with overlapping ranges. Since many cutting-edge questions in climate modeling require making distinctions between mutually consistent hypotheses, agreement across models will be generally unreliable in this domain. In cases where we are only concerned with mutually exclusive hypotheses, by contrast, agreement across climate models is plausibly a reliable marker of confirmation.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"81 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140053616","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The epistemic status of reproducibility in political fact-checking","authors":"Alejandro Fernández-Roldan, David Teira","doi":"10.1007/s13194-024-00575-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00575-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Fact-checking agencies assess and score the truthfulness of politicians’ claims to foster their electoral accountability. Fact-checking is sometimes presented as a quasi-scientific activity, based on reproducible verification protocols that would guarantee an unbiased assessment. We will study these verification protocols and discuss under which conditions fact-checking could achieve effective reproducibility. Through an analysis of the methodological norms in verification protocols, we will argue that achieving reproducible fact-checking may not help much in rendering politicians accountable. Political fact-checkers do not deliver either reproducibility or accountability today, and there are reasons to think that traditional quality journalism may serve liberal democracies better.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"97 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139938916","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jaana Eigi-Watkin, Katrin Velbaum, Edit Talpsepp, Endla Lõhkivi
{"title":"How interdisciplinary researchers see themselves: plurality of understandings of interdisciplinarity within a field and why it matters","authors":"Jaana Eigi-Watkin, Katrin Velbaum, Edit Talpsepp, Endla Lõhkivi","doi":"10.1007/s13194-024-00572-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00572-x","url":null,"abstract":"<p>It is widely acknowledged that interdisciplinarity (ID) is very diverse. Our contribution is a demonstration that considerable diversity exists also on the level of understandings of ID that researchers working in the same ID field express. Specifically, we analyse qualitatively, building on the method of culture contrast, six interviews with researchers working in computational linguistics and language technology in Estonia. We identify six understandings of ID expressed by the interviewees: centred on an ID method; a disciplinary method in an ID field; an ID way of seeing and thinking; ID education; ID interests; one’s field as naturally ID. We show how understandings of ID are significant for analysing research practice, since they are involved in how researchers form a positive picture of themselves and their colleagues. We also show how an awareness of different understandings of ID is useful for discussing the significance of integration in ID.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"2014 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139938904","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Physicists’ views on scientific realism","authors":"Céline Henne, Hannah Tomczyk, Christoph Sperber","doi":"10.1007/s13194-024-00570-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00570-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Do physicists believe that general relativity is <i>true</i>, and that electrons and phonons <i>exist</i>, and if so, in what sense? To what extent does the spectrum of positions among physicists correspond to philosophical positions like scientific realism, instrumentalism, or perspectivism? Does agreement with these positions correlate with demographic factors, and are realist physicists more likely to support research projects purely aimed at increasing knowledge? We conducted a questionnaire study to scrutinize the philosophical stances of physicists. We received responses from 384 physicists and 151 philosophers. Our main findings are (1) On average, physicists tend toward scientific realism, and slightly more so than philosophers of science. (2) Physicists can be clustered into five groups. Three show variants of scientific realism, one is instrumentalist, and one seems undecided or incoherent. (3) Agreement with realism weakly correlates with approval of building a bigger particle collider. (4) Agreement with realism weakly correlates with the seniority of physicists. (5) We did not find correlations with other factors, such as whether physicists focus on theoretical or experimental research and whether they engage with applied or basic research.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139917181","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Quantum ontology without textbooks. Nor overlapping","authors":"Cristian Lopez","doi":"10.1007/s13194-024-00573-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-024-00573-w","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper, I critically assess two recent proposals for an interpretation-independent understanding of non-relativistic quantum mechanics: the overlap strategy (Fraser & Vickers, 2022) and the textbook account (Egg, 2021). My argument has three steps. I first argue that they presume a Quinean-Carnapian meta-ontological framework that yields flat, structureless ontologies. Second, such ontologies are unable to solve the problems that quantum ontologists want to solve. Finally, only structured ontologies are capable of solving the problems that quantum ontologists want to solve. But they require some dose of speculation. In the end, I defend the conservative way to do quantum ontology, which is (and must be) speculative and non-neutral.</p>","PeriodicalId":48832,"journal":{"name":"European Journal for Philosophy of Science","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139917295","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}