{"title":"Employer Incentives and Distortions in Health Insurance Design: Implications for Welfare and Costs","authors":"N. Tilipman","doi":"10.1257/aer.20181917","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20181917","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies employer incentives in designing health insurance provider networks and whether observed offerings reflect preferences that are aligned with employees. I estimate a model of supply and demand where I endogenize employer health plan offerings with respect to hospital and physician networks. I find that employers “overprovide” broad networks by overweighting the preferences of certain employees, specifically older workers and those in regions with less provider competition, over the preferences of the average employee household. Shifting employers toward offering different provider networks in different geographic markets could yield substantial gains to surplus, with minimal distributional or selection effects. (JEL G22, G28, I13, J32, M52)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74340577","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Reshmaan N. Hussam, Natalia Rigol, Benjamin N. Roth
{"title":"Targeting High Ability Entrepreneurs Using Community Information: Mechanism Design in the Field","authors":"Reshmaan N. Hussam, Natalia Rigol, Benjamin N. Roth","doi":"10.1257/aer.20200751","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20200751","url":null,"abstract":"Identifying high-growth microentrepreneurs in low-income countries remains a challenge due to a scarcity of verifiable information. With a cash grant experiment in India we demonstrate that community knowledge can help target high-growth microentrepreneurs; while the average marginal return to capital in our sample is 9.4 percent per month, microentrepreneurs reported in the top third of the community are estimated to have marginal returns to capital between 24 percent and 30 percent per month. Further we find evidence that community members distort their predictions when they can influence the distribution of resources. Finally, we demonstrate that simple mechanisms can realign incentives for truthful reporting. (JEL D82, G21, I38, L25, L26, O12, O16)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"88 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84447647","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Designing Deadlines","authors":"Erik Madsen","doi":"10.1257/aer.20200212","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20200212","url":null,"abstract":"I study how an organization should manage a project of uncertain scope, when it is advised by a privately informed expert who prefers to prolong his employment. The optimal long-term contract combines a deadline for project completion and incentive payments which decline as the deadline approaches. When the firm can additionally learn about the project's state from output, the optimal deadline exhibits variable sensitivity to output, with a hard deadline at the outset of the project and increasingly soft deadlines as the project's performance declines. (JEL D21, D82, D86, G31, J33, M52, M54)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"166 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73601576","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Does Race Matter for Police Use of Force? Evidence from 911 Calls","authors":"Mark Hoekstra,CarlyWill Sloan","doi":"10.1257/aer.20201292","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20201292","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines race and police use of force using data on 1.6 million 911 calls in two cities, neither of which allows for discretion in officer dispatch. Results indicate White officers increase force much more than minority officers when dispatched to more minority neighborhoods. Estimates indicate Black (Hispanic) civilians are 55 (75) percent more likely to experience any force, and five times as likely to experience a police shooting, compared to if White officers scaled up force similarly to minority officers. Additionally, 14 percent of White officers use excess force in Black neighborhoods relative to our statistical benchmark. (JEL H76, J15, K42, R23)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"104 1","pages":"827-860"},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138541190","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Misspecified Politics and the Recurrence of Populism","authors":"Gilat Levy, R. Razin, Alwyn Young","doi":"10.1257/aer.20210154","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20210154","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a dynamic model of political competition between two groups that differ in their subjective model of the data generating process for a common outcome. One group has a simpler model than the other group as they ignore some relevant policy variables. We show that policy cycles must arise and that simple world views—which can be interpreted as populist world views—imply extreme policy choices. Periods in which those with a more complex model govern increase the specification error of the simpler world view, leading the latter to overestimate the positive impact of a few extreme policy actions. (JEL D72, D83, K42)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"53 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78475759","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"State-Dependent Effects of Monetary Policy: The Refinancing Channel","authors":"Martin Eichenbaum,Sergio Rebelo,Arlene Wong","doi":"10.1257/aer.20191244","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20191244","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies how the impact of monetary policy depends on the distribution of savings from refinancing mortgages. We show that the efficacy of monetary policy is state dependent, varying in a systematic way with the pool of potential savings from refinancing. We construct a quantitative dynamic life-cycle model that accounts for our findings and use it to study how the response of consumption to a change in mortgage rates depends on the distribution of savings from refinancing. These effects are strongly state dependent. We also use the model to study the impact of a long period of low interest rates on the potency of monetary policy. We find that this potency is substantially reduced both during the period and for a substantial amount of time after interest rates renormalize. (JEL D15, E21, E43, E52, G21, G51, R31)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"27 1","pages":"721-761"},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138541189","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Reshaping Adolescents' Gender Attitudes: Evidence from a School-Based Experiment in India","authors":"Diva Dhar,Tarun Jain,Seema Jayachandran","doi":"10.1257/aer.20201112","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20201112","url":null,"abstract":"This paper evaluates an intervention in India that engaged adolescent girls and boys in classroom discussions about gender equality for two years, aiming to reduce their support for societal norms that restrict women's and girls' opportunities. Using a randomized controlled trial, we find that the program made attitudes more supportive of gender equality by 0.18 standard deviations, or, equivalently, converted 16 percent of regressive attitudes. When we resurveyed study participants two years after the intervention had ended, the effects had persisted. The program also led to more gender-equal self-reported behavior, and we find weak evidence that it affected two revealed-preference measures. (JEL D63, D91, I21, J13, J16, 012)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"530 ","pages":"899-927"},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138505163","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pablo Balán, Augustin Bergeron, Gabriel Tourek, Jonathan L. Weigel
{"title":"Local Elites as State Capacity: How City Chiefs Use Local Information to Increase Tax Compliance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo","authors":"Pablo Balán, Augustin Bergeron, Gabriel Tourek, Jonathan L. Weigel","doi":"10.1257/aer.20201159","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20201159","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates the trade-offs between local elites and state agents as tax collectors in low-capacity states. We study a randomized policy experiment assigning neighborhoods of a large Congolese city to property tax collection by city chiefs or state agents. Chief collection raised tax compliance by 3.2 percentage points, increasing revenue by 44 percent. Chiefs collected more bribes but did not undermine tax morale or trust in government. Results from a hybrid treatment arm in which state agents consulted with chiefs before collection suggest that chief collectors achieved higher compliance by using local information to more efficiently target households with high payment propensities, rather than by being more effective at persuading households to pay conditional on having visited them. (JEL D73, D83, H24, H26, H71, O12, O17)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81905816","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Can You Move to Opportunity? Evidence from the Great Migration","authors":"Ellora Derenoncourt","doi":"10.1257/aer.20200002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20200002","url":null,"abstract":"This paper shows that racial composition shocks during the Great Migration (1940–1970) reduced the gains from growing up in the northern United States for Black families and can explain 27 percent of the region’s racial upward mobility gap today. I identify northern Black share increases by interacting pre-1940 Black migrants’ location choices with predicted southern county out-migration. Locational changes, not negative selection of families, explain lower upward mobility, with persistent segregation and increased crime and policing as plausible mechanisms. The case of the Great Migration provides a more nuanced view of moving to opportunity when destination reactions are taken into account. (JEL H75, H76, J15, J62, K42, N32, R23)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75997817","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Imperfect Markets versus Imperfect Regulation in US Electricity Generation","authors":"Steve Cicala","doi":"10.1257/aer.20172034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20172034","url":null,"abstract":"This paper evaluates changes in electricity generation costs caused by the introduction of market mechanisms to determine production in the United States. I use the staggered transition to markets from 1999 to 2012 to estimate the causal impact of liberalization using a differences-in-difference design on a comprehensive hourly panel of electricity demand, generators’ costs, capacities, and output. I find that markets reduce production costs by 5 percent by reallocating production: gains from trade across service areas increase by 55 percent based on a 25 percent increase in traded electricity, and costs from using uneconomical units fall 16 percent. (JEL L51, L94, L98, Q41, Q48)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.7,"publicationDate":"2022-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82794266","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}