设计的最后期限

IF 10.5 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Erik Madsen
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引用次数: 3

摘要

我研究的是一个组织应该如何管理一个范围不确定的项目,当这个项目是由一个私下知情的专家建议的,这个专家更愿意延长他的雇佣期。最优的长期合同包括项目完成的最后期限和奖励付款,奖励付款随着最后期限的临近而减少。当企业可以从产出中额外了解到项目的状态时,最优期限对产出表现出可变的敏感性,在项目开始时是硬期限,随着项目绩效的下降,软期限越来越多。(jl d21, d82, d86, g31, j33, m52, m54)
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Designing Deadlines
I study how an organization should manage a project of uncertain scope, when it is advised by a privately informed expert who prefers to prolong his employment. The optimal long-term contract combines a deadline for project completion and incentive payments which decline as the deadline approaches. When the firm can additionally learn about the project's state from output, the optimal deadline exhibits variable sensitivity to output, with a hard deadline at the outset of the project and increasingly soft deadlines as the project's performance declines. (JEL D21, D82, D86, G31, J33, M52, M54)
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来源期刊
CiteScore
18.60
自引率
2.80%
发文量
122
期刊介绍: The American Economic Review (AER) stands as a prestigious general-interest economics journal. Founded in 1911, it holds the distinction of being one of the nation's oldest and most esteemed scholarly journals in economics. With a commitment to academic excellence, the AER releases 12 issues annually, featuring articles that span a wide spectrum of economic topics.
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