地方精英作为国家能力:刚果民主共和国城市领导人如何利用地方信息提高税收合规性

IF 10.5 1区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

American Economic Review Pub Date : 2022-03-01 DOI:10.1257/aer.20201159

Pablo Balán, Augustin Bergeron, Gabriel Tourek, Jonathan L. Weigel

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引用次数: 19

摘要

本文研究了低能力国家的地方精英和国家代理人作为税收征收者之间的权衡。我们研究了一项随机政策实验，将刚果一个大城市的社区分配给城市负责人或国家代理人征收财产税。首席征管提高税收合规性3.2个百分点，财政收入增加44%。酋长们收取了更多的贿赂，但并没有削弱税收士气或对政府的信任。一个混合处理部门的结果表明，国家代理人在收税前与酋长进行了协商，通过利用当地信息更有效地针对有高付款倾向的家庭，而不是更有效地说服家庭在拜访他们的情况下付款，首席收税官获得了更高的依从性。(凝胶d73, d83, h24, h26, h71, o12, o17)

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Local Elites as State Capacity: How City Chiefs Use Local Information to Increase Tax Compliance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

This paper investigates the trade-offs between local elites and state agents as tax collectors in low-capacity states. We study a randomized policy experiment assigning neighborhoods of a large Congolese city to property tax collection by city chiefs or state agents. Chief collection raised tax compliance by 3.2 percentage points, increasing revenue by 44 percent. Chiefs collected more bribes but did not undermine tax morale or trust in government. Results from a hybrid treatment arm in which state agents consulted with chiefs before collection suggest that chief collectors achieved higher compliance by using local information to more efficiently target households with high payment propensities, rather than by being more effective at persuading households to pay conditional on having visited them. (JEL D73, D83, H24, H26, H71, O12, O17)

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来源期刊

American Economic Review ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

18.60

自引率

2.80%

发文量

122

期刊介绍： The American Economic Review (AER) stands as a prestigious general-interest economics journal. Founded in 1911, it holds the distinction of being one of the nation's oldest and most esteemed scholarly journals in economics. With a commitment to academic excellence, the AER releases 12 issues annually, featuring articles that span a wide spectrum of economic topics.